USCA11 Case: 22-10220 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10220
____________________
AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
versus
O.H.M.
a.k.a. O.H.S., a minor,
Defendant-Appellee,
LISA MAHARAJH,
in her individual capacity,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10220
LISA MAHARAJH,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dev-Anand A.
Maharajh,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-01581-WFJ-CPT
____________________
Before GRANT, TJOFLAT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lisa Maharajh appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of O.H.M. as the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy. We affirm.
I.
In 2003, decedent Dev-Anand Maharajh purchased a one-
million-dollar life insurance policy from American General Life
Insurance Company. At the inception of the policy, the decedent
named his then-wife Jennifer as primary beneficiary and any
children born to that marriage as contingent beneficiaries. In July
2008, while his divorce from Jennifer was pending, the decedent
submitted to American General a request to designate his
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22-10220 Opinion of the Court 3
daughter, O.H.M., who was born after the policy was purchased,
as one hundred percent beneficiary. He additionally named
Jennifer as trustee for O.H.M. under the Minor Beneficiary Clause.
The decedent divorced Jennifer in September 2008 and married
Lisa a year later. In November 2009, the decedent submitted
another request to modify his beneficiary designations. The 2009
request listed Lisa as seventy-five percent primary beneficiary and
O.H.M. as twenty-five percent primary beneficiary. The decedent
also listed O.H.M. and Lisa’s minor child from a previous
relationship as fifty percent contingent beneficiaries.
The following week, American General sent the decedent a
letter that stated, in part, the following:
We are unable to complete your request until such
time as the item(s) below have been resolved:
• Separate parties should be assigned for primary
and contingent beneficiary designations.
• Please provide the relationship of the new
contingent beneficiary [redacted] to the insured.
Please complete, sign, and date the enclosed change
form(s) and return it to our office.
The letter from American General included a blank copy of the
form completed by the decedent the previous week and two pages
of “Instructions and Conditions.” The decedent never responded.
The decedent died in April 2020, having paid all premiums
billed for the subject policy up to his death. In the following weeks,
American General received two “Proof of Death Claimant’s
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10220
Statements”: one signed by Lisa and the other signed on behalf of
O.H.M. by Jennifer as parent and legal guardian.
American General filed a complaint for interpleader relief
because it was uncertain who was entitled to the death benefit
under the policy. O.H.M. moved for summary judgment. No facts
were in dispute; the parties disagreed only as to the legal
significance of the decedent’s 2009 beneficiary request and
American General’s subsequent actions. The district court granted
O.H.M.’s motion and entered judgment in her favor. Lisa appeals.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment
order, viewing the evidence and all factual inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of
Educ.,
93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). A district court should
grant summary judgment only when “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where reasonable minds
could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, a
district court should deny summary judgment. Allen v. Tyson Foods,
Inc.,
121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
III.
The interpretation of a contract, including whether it is
ambiguous, is a question of law that we review de novo. Reynolds
v. Roberts,
202 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). “In construing a
contract, the court should consider its plain language and take care
not to give the contract any meaning beyond that expressed.
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22-10220 Opinion of the Court 5
When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed
to mean ‘just what the language therein implies and nothing
more.’” O’Brien v. McMahon,
44 So. 3d 1273, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting Walker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
758 So. 2d
1161, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted)). The
parties agree that Florida law applies to this dispute.
Under Florida law, an insured’s right to change the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy depends on the terms of the
policy. McDaniel v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins.,
722 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The insured must strictly comply with the
terms of the policy to effectuate a change in the beneficiary.
Id.
The doctrine of strict compliance exists to protect the insurer, and
only the insurer may waive it. Miller v. Gulf Life Ins.,
12 So. 2d 127,
130 (Fla. 1942).
Lisa argues that the decedent’s 2009 beneficiary request
controls because the decedent strictly complied with the terms of
his policy governing changes of beneficiary. The relevant policy
provision provided:
While this policy is in force the owner may change
the beneficiary or ownership by written notice to us.
When we record the change, it will take effect as of
the date the owner signed the notice, subject to any
payment we make or other action we take before
recording.
Florida law requires that we read the phrase “subject to any
payment we make or other action we take before recording” “as
creating some objectively reasonable standard.” See O’Brien, 44 So.
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3d at 1278–79 (interpreting the similar phrase “Your request must
be in writing and in a form that meets our needs”). In other words,
any such “other action” must be “objectively reasonable.” This
reading allows the insurer to protect itself from liability when faced
with a defective beneficiary request. Cf.
id. (“If a policy holder
submitted a beneficiary change form that named ‘John Smith of
New York’ as a new beneficiary, it would not be feasible for [the
insurer] to act on the request without additional identifying
information.”). In such cases, strict compliance with the policy
may require the insured to respond appropriately in curing any
defects.
We agree with the district court that American General’s
actions upon receiving the decedent’s defective beneficiary request
were objectively reasonable. The insurer provided the decedent
with written notice that identified (a) how the beneficiary request
was defective and (b) how to resolve the defects. It even provided
him with the necessary form along with instructions for filling it
out. Because the decedent neither responded to the notice nor
inquired as to the status of his filing in the ten years that followed,
we conclude that the decedent did not strictly comply with the
terms of the policy.
Lisa raises several unavailing arguments in support of her
appeal. First, she argues that “[o]nly the insurance policy”—not
the instructions contained in American General’s notice to the
decedent—“sets forth the terms with which the owner/insured
must strictly comply in order to change a beneficiary.” But the
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22-10220 Opinion of the Court 7
policy allowed American General to take “other action[s] . . .
before recording” the beneficiary change, such as requiring the
decedent to cure a defective request.
Second, Lisa argues that the “‘other action we take’ clause is
so broad and ambiguous[] that it should be construed against
American General and in favor of the insured.” This clause is
analogous to the one at issue in O’Brien, where the insurer required
a change request to “be in writing and in a form that meets our
needs.” O’Brien,
44 So. 3d at 1278. In reading this phrase “as
creating some objectively reasonable standard,” the O’Brien court
determined that this provision “plainly requires that a beneficiary
request contain enough information to allow [the insurer] to act on
the request.”
Id. at 1279. We agree with the district court that,
under the standard set in O’Brien, the “other action” clause—
however broad it may be—clearly and unambiguously allowed
American General to take objectively reasonable actions before
recording the decedent’s defective request.
Finally, Lisa argues that “[n]othing in the policy precludes
American General from recording” the decedent’s “beneficiary
change request now, which would make it effective as of the date
signed.” We disagree. The policy plainly requires that only its
“owner” may change the beneficiary. Neither Lisa nor anyone else
is entitled—after the owner’s death—to change the beneficiary.
* * *
The decedent filed a defective request to add Lisa as a
beneficiary on his policy, and American General’s actions in
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10220
response were objectively reasonable. Because the decedent failed
to strictly comply with the terms of his policy, we AFFIRM the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of O.H.M.
