USCA11 Case: 23-10274 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10274
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES WESLEY BUCHANAN,
a.k.a. James Buchanan,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00004-KKM-CPT-1
USCA11 Case: 23-10274 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 23-10274
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Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Buchanan appeals his sentence for possession of child
pornography and destruction of evidence, arguing that the district
court failed to orally pronounce at sentencing thirteen discretion-
ary conditions of supervised release that were included in his writ-
ten judgment. The government has filed a motion to dismiss Bu-
chanan’s appeal, citing the sentence appeal waiver in his plea agree-
ment. We now grant that motion because Buchanan’s appeal
waiver is enforceable and bars his challenge.
We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.
United States v. Johnson,
541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sen-
tence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and
voluntarily. United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.
1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and vol-
untarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur-
ing the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defend-
ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.
Id.
Here, the government has shown both.
In Buchanan’s plea agreement, a section titled and under-
lined, “Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence,” states
that Buchanan “expressly waive[d] the right to appeal [his] sen-
tence on any ground,” with certain exceptions that do not apply
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23-10274 Opinion of the Court 3
here. Buchanan and his attorney signed the plea agreement under
a certification stating that Buchanan had read or been read the
agreement and fully understood its terms.
Then, during the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge cov-
ered the plea agreement in detail and specifically questioned Bu-
chanan about the appeal waiver. Buchanan confirmed his under-
standing of the appeal waiver and its limited exceptions. The mag-
istrate judge found that Buchanan’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary and supported by a factual basis. And the district court
accepted the plea without objection by either party. Accordingly,
the government has established that the appeal waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily.
The district court sentenced Buchanan to serve 97 months
in prison, followed by ten years of supervised release. “While on
supervised release,” the court advised Buchanan, “you must com-
ply with the mandatory and standard conditions as adopted by the
United States Court for the Middle District of Florida.” The court
also imposed several special conditions of release. Buchanan did
not raise any issue with these conditions at the time. The written
judgment included more detail about the conditions of Buchanan’s
release, including, as relevant here, thirteen discretionary condi-
tions under the heading, “Standard Conditions of Supervision.”
On appeal, Buchanan argues that the district court erred
when it imposed these discretionary conditions because it never
identified them at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Ro-
driguez,
75 F.4th 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that a district
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10274
court “erred in imposing additional [discretionary] conditions in
the written judgment” that were not “pronounced during his sen-
tencing hearing”).
Buchanan concedes, though, that his “appeal waiver likely
bars him from challenging the imposition of certain conditions of
supervision.” See United States v. Cordero,
7 F.4th 1058, 1067 n.10
(11th Cir. 2021) (holding that “any challenge related to the condi-
tions of [the defendant’s] supervised release” was “barred by the
sentence-appeal waiver”). While he argues that the appeal waiver
“should not” apply here, attempting to exclude his challenge from
the scope of the waiver, he does not rely on any of the exceptions
set forth in the waiver. Because the appeal waiver is enforceable
and no exception applies, we must enforce the waiver according to
its terms and dismiss the appeal. See United States v. Bascomb,
451
F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently enforced
knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.”).
For these reasons, we GRANT the government’s motion to
dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
