Tavares Lenard Farrington v. Officer Diah ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-13281   Document: 12-1    Date Filed: 11/02/2023   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-13281
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    TAVARES LENARD FARRINGTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    OFFICER DIAH,
    LIEUTENANT M. BROWN,
    OFFICER CHAMBERS,
    OFFICER WISE,
    ASSISTANT WARDEN MERENO, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 22-13281          Document: 12-1         Date Filed: 11/02/2023           Page: 2 of 5
    2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-13281
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02697-VMC
    ____________________
    Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tavares Lenard Farrington, a federal prisoner proceeding
    pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil
    rights complaint brought against federal prison officials under
    Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
    
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971), in which he alleged an excessive use of force in
    violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and retaliation for filing
    an earlier lawsuit. 1 After review, 2 we affirm.
    We conclude Farrington’s appeal fails for two reasons. First,
    Farrington failed to object or otherwise respond to the magistrate
    1 Farrington appeals only the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment excessive use
    of force claim. Accordingly, he has abandoned any argument as to his retalia-
    tion claim. See United States v. Campbell, 
    26 F.4th 860
    , 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc),
    cert. denied, 
    143 S. Ct. 95 (2022)
    ; Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    , 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating an appellant must clearly and specifically iden-
    tify any issue he wants the appellate court to address in his brief ).
    2 A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim under
    § 1915A(b)(1) is reviewed de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as
    true. Boxer X v. Harris, 
    437 F.3d 1107
    , 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). While pro se plead-
    ings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than those
    drafted by attorneys, they still must suggest some factual basis for a claim.
    Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 
    787 F.3d 1105
    , 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
    USCA11 Case: 22-13281         Document: 12-1        Date Filed: 11/02/2023         Page: 3 of 5
    22-13281                  Opinion of the Court                                3
    judge’s recommendation that the excessive force claim in his com-
    plaint be dismissed in light of the Supreme Court’s suggestion, in
    Egbert v. Boule, 
    142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022)
    , that Bivens did not extend to
    include excessive force claims arising under the Eighth Amend-
    ment. The district court adopted this finding as the grounds for its
    dismissal, and Farrington does not argue on appeal that this was
    plain error or a manifest injustice, and thus he cannot challenge the
    issue on appeal. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,
    
    996 F.2d 1144
    , 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating when a magistrate
    judge provides notice and a party fails to object to the findings in
    the report and recommendation and those findings are adopted by
    the district court, the party may not challenge them on appeal in
    the absence of plain error or manifest injustice).
    Even if we deem Farrington to have implicitly preserved his
    arguments, we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing
    Farrington’s claim. The Supreme Court has stated the expansion
    of Bivens beyond the three specific contexts in which it has already
    been applied 3 is “disfavored.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1857
    (2017). A case presents a new Bivens context when it is different in
    a meaningful way from the previous Bivens cases decided by the
    Supreme Court. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. While the Supreme
    3 While Bivens involved a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
    Court has allowed a Bivens action alleging gender discrimination under the
    Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bivens, 
    403 U.S. at 392
    ; Davis v.
    Passman, 
    442 U.S. 228
    , 248-49 (1979). It has also recognized a Bivens action for
    deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs under the Eighth
    Amendment. Carlson v. Green, 
    446 U.S. 14
    , 18 (1980).
    USCA11 Case: 22-13281       Document: 12-1       Date Filed: 11/02/2023      Page: 4 of 5
    4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13281
    Court previously recognized a Bivens action under the Eighth
    Amendment in the context of a prison official’s deliberate indiffer-
    ence to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, an excessive force claim
    under the Eighth Amendment raises a new context, as the alleged
    official actions in each case differ significantly. See Ziglar, 
    137 S. Ct. at 1859-60
     (stating a case may differ in a meaningful way where
    there are differences in the constitutional right at issue; the gener-
    ality or specificity of the official action; the statutory or other legal
    mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disrup-
    tive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other
    branches; or the presence of potential special factors that the previ-
    ous Bivens cases did not consider).
    Farrington’s argument the remedies provided by the BOP’s
    grievance process and the FTCA are insufficient is also meritless, as
    an alternative process need not provide a plaintiff complete relief
    in order to weigh against the extension of Bivens. See Alvarez v. U.S.
    Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
    818 F.3d 1194
    , 1206 (11th Cir. 2016)
    (stating if a court finds an existing process already provides the
    plaintiff with sufficient protection, it does not recognize a Bivens
    remedy, and the alternative processes need not provide the plaintiff
    complete relief). Congress specifically considered the issue of pris-
    oner abuse in the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, ulti-
    mately providing an alternative remedy pathway that did not pro-
    vide for standalone damages against federal employees. See Ziglar,
    
    137 S. Ct. at 1865
     (stating legislative action suggesting Congress
    does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counselling hesi-
    tation). Ultimately, Congress’s prior examination of the issue and
    USCA11 Case: 22-13281     Document: 12-1     Date Filed: 11/02/2023   Page: 5 of 5
    22-13281              Opinion of the Court                       5
    creation of alternative remedy pathways counsels against recogniz-
    ing a Bivens action under these allegations. Accordingly, we affirm
    the district court’s dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-13281

Filed Date: 11/2/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/2/2023