USCA11 Case: 22-10813 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10813
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JULIUS DWIGHT MOZIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20256-BB-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10813
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, AND LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Julius Dwight Mozie appeals his total sentence of 300
months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), and sex trafficking of a minor by
force or coercion, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1).
On appeal, he argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasona-
ble because his crimes of conviction incorporate the use of a com-
puter and the commission of a sex act, such that sentencing en-
hancements for using a computer and the commission of a sex act
were impermissible double counting. He also argues that his sen-
tence is substantively unreasonable based on statistical disparities
and his life expectancy. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I.
Ordinarily, we review claims of double counting de novo.
United States v. Aimufua,
935 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1991). How-
ever, plain-error review applies when an appellant does not bring
an argument to the district court’s attention. Rosales-Mireles v.
United States,
138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018). An appellant’s argument
survives plain-error review only when (1) an error has occurred, (2)
the error was plain, (3) the error affected the defendant’s substan-
tial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness of the
judicial proceedings.
Id. at 1904–05. An error is plain if the explicit
language of a statute or rule or precedent from the Supreme Court
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22-10813 Opinion of the Court 3
or this Court directly resolves the issue. United States v. Hesser,
800
F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part
of the [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines is applied to increase a defend-
ant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already
been fully accounted for by application of another part of the
Guidelines.” United States v. Dudley,
463 F.3d 1221, 1226–27 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Matos-Rodriguez,
188 F.3d 1300,
1309 (11th Cir. 1999)). When adjustments to a sentence are based
on sections of the Guidelines that address “different sentencing
considerations,” such as one section addressing the conviction for
the base offense and another addressing an aggravating factor that
is not an element of the underlying conviction, it is not double
counting. See United States v. Suarez,
893 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.
2018).
Section 1591(a) criminalizes knowingly recruiting, enticing,
advertising, or soliciting by any means a person while knowing, or
in reckless disregard of the fact, that the person has not attained
the age of eighteen years and will be caused to engage in a com-
mercial sex act. § 1591(a)(1). If the offense was perpetrated by
means of force, threats of force, coercion, or a combination of such
means, a statutory minimum term of fifteen years applies.
§ 1591(b)(1).
A base offense level of 34 applies to a conviction under
18
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(1). If the § 1591 offense in-
volved the use of a computer or interactive computer service to
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10813
entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited
sexual conduct with a minor, a sentence enhancement of two levels
shall be applied. Id. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). Another two levels shall be
applied if the offense involved the commission of a sex act or sexual
contact. Id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). We have held that the
§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement applies where a sex act or sexual
conduct actually did occur, while criminal liability attaches under
§ 1591 if the defendant “put the victim in a position where a sex act
could occur, regardless of whether a sex act eventually did occur.”
United States v. Blake,
868 F.3d 960, 977 (11th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in
original).
Because Mozie did not object to the procedural reasonable-
ness of his sentence or the application of either enhancement at
the district court, the proper standard of review is plain error.
Rosales-Mireles,
138 S. Ct. at 1904. We conclude that the district
court did not commit error, much less plain error, in applying the
computer and sex act enhancements because the crime from which
his base offense level was calculated did not require the use of a
computer or the commission of a sex act.
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),
(b)(1). His base offense level and the enhancements therefore ac-
counted for different harms and do not constitute impermissible
double counting. See Dudley,
463 F.3d at 1226-27; Suarez,
893 F.3d
at 1337. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
II.
We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
abuse of discretion, including whether the statutory factors in 18
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22-10813 Opinion of the Court
5
U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the sentence in question. United States v.
Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). “In reviewing
the reasonableness of a sentence, we must, as the Supreme Court
has instructed us, consider the totality of the facts and circum-
stances.”
Id. at 1189. “A district court abuses its discretion when it
(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due
significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-
sidering the proper factors.”
Id. at 1189 (quoting United States v.
Campa, 459 F.3 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Further, alt-
hough we do not automatically presume that a sentence within the
guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence
to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
2008).
Traditionally, we will vacate a sentence “only if ‘we are left
with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com-
mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” United States v. Wood-
son,
30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.) (quoting Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190),
cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 412 (2022). We have stated that “[t]he weight
to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to
the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay,
483
F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Williams,
456
F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006)). The district court may “attach
‘great weight’” to any single factor or combination of factors.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10813
United States v. Overstreet,
713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Shaw,
560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)).
One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty
and fairness in sentencing, with the goal of “avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States
v. Docampo,
573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B)). The Supreme Court has stated that the “avoidance
of unwarranted disparities was clearly considered by the Sentenc-
ing Commission when setting the Guidelines ranges.” Gall v. United
States,
552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007). When a district court correctly calcu-
lates and carefully reviews the Guidelines range, the court has “nec-
essarily [given] significant weight and consideration to the need to
avoid unwarranted disparities.”
Id.
Here, the district court appropriately considered the victims’
in-court statements and the dehumanizing nature of Mozie’s ac-
tions in imposing a substantively reasonable sentence. The district
court recognized Mozie’s difficult childhood and the time he spent
in fifteen different foster homes, but it also recognized the degree
of abuse Mozie committed and his statement during sentencing
that he had not believed he was doing bad things. We thus con-
clude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in con-
sidering all of the relevant factors and weighing the seriousness of
the offense conduct more heavily than the mitigating factors Mozie
highlighted. Further, by correctly calculating and carefully review-
ing the guideline range, the district court necessarily gave
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22-10813 Opinion of the Court 7
significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwar-
ranted disparities. See Gall,
552 U.S. at 54. Accordingly, we affirm
as to this issue.
III.
For the reasons stated, we affirm Mozie’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
