USCA11 Case: 22-13947 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13947
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER SEALS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00077-CG-B-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13947
Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Seals appeals his sentence of 37 months’ impris-
onment imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. Seals
argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to con-
sider the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, failing to explain its sentence,
and giving undue weight to the conduct underlying the revocation
violations. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
In 2010, Seals was sentenced to a total of 180 months in
prison for trafficking cocaine base and using a gun in furtherance
of that crime. His sentence was reduced to 120 months in 2012. In
June 2018, he was released from custody and began serving a five-
year term of supervised release.
In 2022, Seals’s probation officer filed three successive peti-
tions to revoke his supervised release for committing new crimes,
possessing and distributing controlled substances, and leaving the
judicial district without permission. According to the petitions,
Seals was arrested for and charged with burglary in January 2022.
Then, in March 2022, after his release on bond, he was charged with
a federal drug conspiracy offense, see
21 U.S.C. § 846, for delivering
a backpack containing just over 100 grams of cocaine to a confiden-
tial informant. After a warrant issued for his arrest, Seals was ob-
served driving into Alabama from Georgia, and he fled an at-
tempted traffic stop. During the ensuing pursuit, which reached
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22-13947 Opinion of the Court 3
speeds up to 110 miles per hour and involved the use of spike strips,
Seals discarded a bag containing cocaine. Based on this conduct,
which involved a Grade A violation, the probation officer calcu-
lated a guideline range of 30 to 37 months.
Before the final revocation hearing, Seals filed a notice waiv-
ing his right to a revocation hearing and admitting to the violations
set forth in the probation officer’s petitions. Accordingly, the dis-
trict court revoked Seals’s supervised release and proceeded di-
rectly to sentencing.
The parties offered their views on an appropriate revocation
sentence. Seals asked for a term of years with no supervision to
follow, noting that he would be on supervised release for the un-
derlying § 846 drug offense. The government requested a sentence
of 37 months, to run consecutively to the 60-month prison sen-
tence the court imposed for the § 846 offense.
Having “read through the entire file,” the district court
found that a sentence at the high end of the guideline range was
appropriate based on Seals’s conduct while on supervision. The
court said it had considered the “chapter seven provisions” and
found them “appropriate in this matter.” The court imposed a rev-
ocation prison sentence of 37 months, with no supervision to fol-
low, to run consecutively to the 60-month drug sentence.
Seals objected to the consecutive nature of the sentence as
“excessive,” noting that the revocation “conduct is the same as
[drug] charge and that the [drug] charge also considered in the
PS[R] that Mr. Seals was on supervised release.” Defense counsel
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13947
noted that, in his understanding, Seals’s agreement with the gov-
ernment called for a total term in custody of no more than 60
months for the underlying conduct. The district court overruled
the objection, stating, “[B]ased on his conduct, I find that it is not
excessive and it is appropriate in this case, and so it will be run con-
secutively.”
Soon after the hearing adjourned, the government notified
the district court and defense counsel that it needed to change its
sentencing recommendation to match Seals’s position. It advised
that it had agreed to recommend a total prison term of 60 months
for the drug and revocation cases.
The district court maintained its sentence. The court stated
that it would have imposed the same sentence “regardless” of the
government’s recommendation, because Seals’s “conduct deserves
the consecutive sentence on the revocation of his supervised re-
lease.” Since Seals had left the courtroom, the court called him
back in to inform him of what had happened, and to explain that it
was imposing the same sentence despite the government’s change
in recommendation. After Seals personally addressed the court,
the hearing concluded. This appeal followed.
II.
In reviewing a sentence, we first ensure that the district
court committed “no significant procedural error,” such as “failing
to consider the § 3553(a) factors” or “failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Assuming the sentence is procedurally sound, we consider its
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22-13947 Opinion of the Court 5
substantive reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.
Id. Seals bears “the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is
unreasonable, considering the complete record, the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, and the substantial deference we give sentencing courts.”
United States v. Osorto,
995 F.3d 801, 822 (11th Cir. 2021).
District courts are authorized to “revoke a term of super-
vised release” and impose a prison sentence when a defendant vio-
lates a condition of supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). A
sentence imposed upon revocation must be “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary,” to comply with the sentencing goals of de-
terrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defend-
ant. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (requiring district courts to “consider[]
the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)”). The court must also con-
sider the nature and circumstances of the violation, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, and the sentencing guidelines,
among other factors. See id.
Although the district court must consider the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, it’s “not required to explicitly address each of the § 3553(a)
factors or all of the mitigating evidence,” so long as the record re-
flects its consideration of these factors. United States v. Taylor,
997
F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Cabezas-Montano,
949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir. 2020). The court’s “explanation of a
sentence may be brief and may derive substance from the context
of the record, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the
parties’ arguments.” United States v. Hamilton,
66 F.4th 1267, 1275
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13947
(11th Cir. 2023). The court must “set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
“The decision about how much weight to assign a particular
sentencing factor is committed to the sound discretion of the dis-
trict court.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the district
court abuses it discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration
to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-
icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United
States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines contains policy
statements for sentencing upon revocation of supervised release.
Among other things, Chapter Seven provides rules for calculating
the advisory guideline range and recommends that all revocation
sentences run consecutively. See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.3(f), 7B1.4. In
particular, according to § 7B1.3(f), revocation sentences “shall be
ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprison-
ment that the defendant is serving,” even if the sentence being
served “resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation
of probation or supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). Revoca-
tion sentences are intended to sanction “the defendant’s breach of
trust,” not to punish the underlying conduct. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7,
Pt. A, intro. cmt. 3(b).
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22-13947 Opinion of the Court 7
Here, Seals has not established any significant procedural er-
ror at his sentencing. The district court stated that a sentence at
the high end of the guideline range, running consecutively to the
related drug sentence, was appropriate based on Seals’s conduct
while on supervision. That undisputed conduct included multiple
felonies, dangerous conduct, and other violations of the conditions
of his release. The court also cited the “chapter seven provisions,”
stating that they were “appropriate in this matter.” In other words,
the court found that a sentence within the range and of the type
recommended by the guidelines was appropriate based on Seals’s
repeated, serious breaches of the court’s trust while on supervision.
While the court did not go into further detail during the brief hear-
ing or address mitigating evidence, its explanation was adequate to
show that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-
ments and had a reasoned basis for its decision. See Rita,
551 U.S.
at 356–58.
Seals also has not shown that the district court imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence. As we just noted, the court’s
sentence fell within the guideline range of 30 to 37 months, and
“we ordinarily expect a sentence within [that] range to be reasona-
ble.” United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008)
(cleaned up). While Seals objects to the consecutive nature of the
revocation sentence, the guidelines recommended that, too. See
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). And given Seals’s serious breach of the court’s
trust, based on undisputed facts about his conduct while under su-
pervision, the record amply supports the court’s decision to follow
the ordinary rule and impose a consecutive sentence. Giving due
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13947
deference to the court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, we can-
not say its choice of sentence was unreasonable under the totality
of the circumstances. See Osorto, 995 F.3d at 822.
For these reasons, we affirm Seals’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
