USCA11 Case: 22-12023 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/19/2023 Page: 1 of 15
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12023
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONELL BERNARD BRYANT, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-14017-AMC-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronell Bryant appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm
and ammunition as a convicted felon. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Before trial, Bryant moved to suppress the gun and ammunition,
challenging the validity and scope of the search warrant that led to
their discovery. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and
then denied the motion. After careful review, we affirm the denial
of Bryant’s motion to suppress and his resulting conviction.
I.
On July 8, 2020, a state judge in Osceola County, Florida,
issued an arrest warrant for Bryant for aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, among other offenses, arising from a shooting in
May 2020. 1 Believing that Bryant was outside the county, local law
enforcement requested assistance from U.S. Deputy Marshal Andy
Deacon, the federal warrants coordinator in Fort Pierce, Florida.
Deacon organized a team to execute the arrest warrant at a
single-family residence on Avenue K in Fort Pierce, where Bryant’s
mother lived and where multiple officers had previously encoun-
tered Bryant. That address was also listed on the arrest warrant.
The arrest team included ATF Special Agent Seth Christy and
1 “When considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, we construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the district court—here, the
government.” United States v. Mercer,
541 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2008).
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 3
Detectives Christopher Jadin and Marc Stotler of the St. Lucie
County Sheriff’s Office.
On July 9, 2020, the arrest team converged on the residence
after officers saw Bryant pull up in a Nissan sedan and park in the
driveway next to the house. Jadin approached Bryant, who was
sitting in the driver’s seat, and conducted an arrest. The passenger,
Shaun Cole, was standing outside by the car. Jadin saw that the
door of the house near where Bryant had parked was ajar.
Not long after, Bryant’s mother arrived on the scene. She
notified law enforcement that a child could be inside her house, so
Deacon went inside with her to check. They did not see a child,
but Deacon saw a Glock handgun in Bryant’s mother’s bedroom,
some firearm paraphernalia in the house, and a box for a handgun
in the open closet of another bedroom.
Christy approached Bryant’s mother outside the residence,
seeking to obtain her consent to search the home for evidence re-
lated to the May 2020 shooting. At that time, Christy was record-
ing the events using his cell phone, which he had placed in a chest
pocket. Bryant’s mother was on the phone when Christy came
over, and she was overhead saying that Bryant and Cole “just came
in from out of town” after having been gone for “over a week,” and
that she was “tired of all this bulls—” and had told him “to leave”
and not “even come back to this . . . place.” After ending the call,
Bryant’s mother confirmed to Christy that she owned and kept sev-
eral guns in the house, including a 9mm under her pillow, but she
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
denied owning any weapon that shot .40 or .380 ammunition,
which had been used in the shooting.
Bryant’s mother gave consent for a small group of officers
to search the house. But first she wanted to get her keys back from
either Bryant or Cole. She said, “We literally just left the store.
They have my keys. One of them have my keys. . . . So, if you can
get my keys, it’s got a pink thing. That’s my key.” She repeated
that same point—that Bryant and Cole together had recently ob-
tained her keys—multiple times. She also said that they had her
phone, which was found in Bryant’s possession.
The officers eventually recovered the keys and returned
them to Bryant’s mother. Jadin testified that the keys were taken
from Bryant’s pocket. But it appears he was mistaken about that.
Based on Christy’s cell phone video footage, the district court
found that the officers obtained the keys from Cole.
Christy, Deacon, and Stotler entered the house with Bry-
ant’s mother. Christy asked which room was Bryant’s, and Bry-
ant’s mother responded that he “don’t stay here with me,” did not
“live here,” and was “barely here,” and instead was staying with his
girlfriend. But she agreed with Christy’s statement that Bryant
“stays here sometimes,” and she said he had slept there “over a
week ago.” She identified one of the rooms as where he slept. A
search of that room did not reveal any firearms or personal items
belonging to Bryant.
Christy asked to check the caliber of the guns in the house,
and Bryant’s mother took him first to her bedroom, where the
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 5
9mm was located. Meanwhile, Stotler walked into a third bed-
room and saw, in an open closet, a Crown Royal bag on a shelf near
a box for an FN handgun. Stotler notified Christy and opened the
bag, which contained two “AK-47”-style magazines and corre-
sponding ammunition. In that bedroom, the officers also saw
men’s clothing and equipment consistent with Bryant’s music ca-
reer.
In discussing the firearms she owned or possessed, Bryant’s
mother initially did not mention an FN gun. She also incorrectly
stated that 9mm magazines were in the Crown Royal bag. She
later claimed, once Christy mentioned an FN gun, that she previ-
ously had owned and sold an FN gun. The FN gun box was signif-
icant to Christy and Stotler because they had seen a photo of Bry-
ant, posted to social media a few weeks earlier, with what appeared
to be an FN Five-Seven (5.7 mm) handgun in his pocket.
After the consent search, the officers decided to seek a state
search warrant. Soon after, Detective Randy Walker of the St.
Lucie Sheriff’s Office arrived on the scene to draft the warrant affi-
davit. While writing the affidavit, Walker spoke to and questioned
the officers on the scene, including Christy, Deacon, Jadin, and
Stotler. These officers did not proofread what Walker wrote, but
nothing suggests he inaccurately described what they told him.
The details of the warrant affidavit will be discussed in more detail
below.
A state-court judge issued a warrant to search the “resi-
dence, curtilage, outbuildings, and conveyances, and persons
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
located on said curtilage” for evidence of the crime of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon,
Fla. Stat. § 790.23. Based on the
warrant, officers searched not only the house but also the Nissan
sedan that Bryant had parked in the driveway. Inside a bag in the
Nissan’s trunk, officers recovered a loaded FN Five-seven handgun
and a receipt with Bryant’s name on it.
II.
Bryant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm
and ammunition after a felony conviction, in violation of
18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Bryant pled not guilty and moved to suppress the FN
gun and ammunition found in the Nissan. He contended that the
search warrant was invalid under Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154
(1978), because of alleged material misrepresentations or omissions
in the supporting affidavit, and that the affidavit failed to establish
probable cause for the car search.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and heard tes-
timony from the officers we’ve mentioned. The court also viewed
Christy’s cell-phone video from the scene and reviewed various
documents, including the underlying search warrant application
and search warrant.
After the hearing, the district court entered thorough find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law denying Bryant’s demand for
suppression. 2 The court found that the officers testified credibly in
2 The district court rejected the government’s argument that Bryant lacked
grounds to challenge the search because he did not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the residence. While the government raises that argument
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 7
accordance with their good-faith recollections. And in the court’s
view, the affidavit did not contain any intentional or reckless mis-
representations or omissions, nor did any inaccuracies or omissions
defeat the existence of probable cause. The court further found
that the search of the car was properly within the scope of the prob-
able cause established in the affidavit, and that, even if it wasn’t,
the good-faith exception applied to prevent suppression. Bryant
now appeals.
III.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed
question of law and fact, reviewing findings of fact, including cred-
ibility determinations, for clear error and the application of law to
those facts de novo. United States v. White,
593 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2010). Similarly, we review de novo whether probable cause
existed to support a search warrant, although we “take care both
to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers.” United States v. Gamory,
635
F.3d 480, 491 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
IV.
Bryant first argues that various falsehoods and omissions in
the warrant affidavit require the invalidation of the search warrant.
again on appeal, we see no reason to disturb the court’s ruling, given evidence
that Bryant was associated with and occasionally stayed at the residence and
that he kept personal items there, including music equipment consistent with
his occupation as a rap artist.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
Search warrants must be supported by probable cause and describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be
seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. When the place is a residence, the
probable-cause affidavit must establish “a connection between the
defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the
residence and any criminal activity.” United States v. Martin,
297
F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002).
As a reviewing court, we must ensure that the affidavit “pro-
vide[d] the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause”—that is, that “there is a fair probabil-
ity that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a partic-
ular place.” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983). Because
“[a] magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid
great deference by reviewing courts,”
id. at 236 (quotation marks
omitted), our approach to reviewing a warrant affidavit must be
“realistic and commonsense,” not “hypertechnical,” United States v.
Miller,
24 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994).
“An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed
valid.” United States v. Whyte,
928 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019).
Under Franks, a defendant may overcome that presumption and
obtain suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant
by proving two things: (1) the affiant intentionally or recklessly
made misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit; and (2) ab-
sent those misrepresentations or omissions, probable cause would
have been lacking. Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978);
United States v. Kapordelis,
569 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009);
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 9
United States v. Novaton,
271 F.3d 968, 987 (11th Cir. 2001). Even
intentional or reckless misrepresentations or omissions will invali-
date a warrant only if, after removing the misrepresentations and
including the omitted facts, the revised affidavit fails to support a
finding of probable cause. Kapordelis,
569 F.3d at 1309; Madiwale v.
Savaiko,
117 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997).
Bryant identifies four categories of alleged misrepresenta-
tions or omissions which, in his view, were material to probable
cause. We address each category in turn, and then consider prob-
able cause as a whole. Ultimately, we conclude that the district
court’s findings and conclusions are well-supported by the record,
so we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
A.
First, Bryant disputes the statement in the affidavit that Bry-
ant’s mother “informed ATF Special Agent Christy that the resi-
dence is hers but her son, Ronell Bryant does stay there and has the
keys to the . . . residence.” He believes this statement conveyed
the misleading impression that he lived there, when omitted facts
show that his actual connection to the residence “was much more
attenuated.” He points out that Bryant’s mother told officers that
he did not “stay” or “live” with her, was “barely” there, and had
been out of town for more than a week, that he had a different
address listed on his driver’s license, and that the keys in question
were his mother’s, not his own.
The district court reasonably concluded, however, that any
inaccuracies or omissions on this point did not suggest that the
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
officers acted with intentional or reckless disregard for the truth.
See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (noting
that warrant affidavits are “normally drafted by nonlawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation,” and that “elaborate
specificity” is not required). The affidavit openly acknowledges
that the residence belonged to Bryant’s mother. And it presents a
simplified but reasonably accurate version of what she told officers
at the scene.
Although Bryant’s mother claimed that Bryant “barely”
stayed with her, she also agreed with Christy that he “stays here
sometimes,” including just over a week earlier, and she identified a
room in the house as where he slept. The court also found that
several officers credibly testified about having prior encounters
with Bryant at the Avenue K residence, as well as finding Bryant’s
personal items in the room where the FN gun box was discovered.
And even if Bryant did not have his own keys to the house, it’s un-
disputed that he and Cole had obtained his mother’s keys just be-
fore going to the house. Thus, the record fails to support Bryant’s
claim that officers attempted to mislead the state magistrate about
his connection to the residence.
Second, Bryant asserts that the affidavit falsely stated that he
“has the keys to the . . . residence” and “was in possession of the
keys to the residence.” He notes that officers obtained the keys
from Cole, the co-occupant of his vehicle, and that the keys were
his mother’s, not his own.
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 11
The district court reasonably attributed any inaccuracies on
this point to unintentional error. The court found that Detective
Jadin’s observation that Bryant “was in possession of the keys” was
inaccurate and that officers obtained the keys from Cole. But after
hearing his testimony the court found that Jadin simply made a
good-faith mistake, and we see nothing to contradict that assess-
ment and support a finding of clear error. As the court noted, Bry-
ant’s mother repeatedly told officers that both Bryant and Cole “to-
gether had retrieved the keys from her just before going to the res-
idence.” So in that sense, Bryant did have the keys to the residence,
even if Cole was physically holding them when officers arrived.
Again, the record fails to support Bryant’s claim that any inaccura-
cies or omissions were made intentionally or with a reckless disre-
gard for the truth.
Third, Bryant contends that the affidavit misleadingly omits
that Bryant’s mother owned the Glock 9mm handgun found in the
residence. We disagree. The affidavit notes that the “unsecured’
Glock was observed on the bed of the master bedroom, and that
Bryant’s mother said that the “residence [was] hers” and that she
owned and kept several guns in the residence. Thus, the affidavit
conveys the reasonably accurate impression that Bryant had access
to an unsecured firearm owned by his mother, not that he owned
the gun himself.
Finally, Bryant disputes the statement in the affidavit that
the AK-47-style magazines were “seen in plain sight.” The district
court agreed that this statement was inaccurate because the
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
evidence revealed that the magazines were concealed in a Crown
Royal bag. But, again, the court reasonably attributed this inaccu-
racy to unintentional error. The affidavit otherwise reports the un-
disputed fact that the “FN gun box” was found in “plain sight” in
an open closet, next to the Crown Royal bag. Plus, Bryant does
not dispute that the officers were lawfully entitled to look into the
Crown Royal bag as part of the consent search. So while we think
these officers should be more careful in the future about the preci-
sion of their allegations, we cannot conclude that the magistrate
judge clearly erred in finding that this loose language does not sug-
gest intentional or reckless falsity.
B.
Even assuming Bryant could establish intentional or reckless
falsity, we are not persuaded that probable cause would have been
lacking absent the alleged misrepresentations and omissions. See
Kapordelis,
569 F.3d at 1309; Madiwale,
117 F.3d at 1327. In other
words, the revised affidavit, after removing the false statements
and including the omitted information, still established “a fair prob-
ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” at the
residence. See Gates,
462 U.S. at 238–39.
In particular, the revised affidavit established a connection
between Bryant, the residence, and criminal activity. See Martin,
297 F.3d at 1314. It stated that Bryant was arrested for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon while sitting in a car just outside the
house, near a partially open side door; that he and his co-occupant
Cole had obtained the keys to the house from Bryant’s mother; that
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 13
Bryant sometimes stayed at the house, including approximately
one week earlier, even if he didn’t do so regularly; that a gun box
for an FN handgun was seen in plain sight in an open closet; that
officers had seen a photograph of Bryant in possession of what ap-
peared to be an FN Five-seven handgun; and that Bryant was a con-
victed felon. We agree with the district court that these undisputed
facts establish a fair probability that evidence of Bryant’s illegal fire-
arms possession would be found at the residence.
V.
Bryant also maintains that the search of the Nissan in the
driveway of the Avenue K residence exceeded the scope of the war-
rant. He notes that the warrant affidavit largely concerns the “tar-
get house” or the room where the FN gun box was found, and that
it does not expressly seek to establish a nexus between the car and
the criminal activity.
Bryant’s arguments do not warrant suppression. For start-
ers, the search warrant issued by the state magistrate authorized a
search of the residence and its “curtilage, outbuildings, and convey-
ances, and persons located on said curtilage for items and contra-
band as listed above,” which included firearms and ammunition.
So the search of the car, as a conveyance within the curtilage of the
home, was expressly authorized by the warrant.
We also agree with the district court that the affidavit, while
primarily focusing on the house itself, still provided a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search the car.
Given Bryant’s arrest from the car, the nature of the arrest warrant
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-12023
(involving use of a weapon), his apparent recent possession of a FN
Five-seven handgun, matching the FN gun box found in the house
where he sometimes stayed, and the car’s position in the curtilage
of the home, the state magistrate reasonably could have concluded
that the car would contain evidence of illegal firearms possession.
Finally, any mismatch between the warrant affidavit, the
warrant, and the resulting search falls within the scope of the good-
faith exception established in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984). The Leon good-faith exception “stands for the principle that
courts generally should not render inadmissible evidence obtained
by police officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search war-
rant that is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”
Martin,
297 F.3d at 1313. Suppression is warranted in only four lim-
ited circumstances, where it would be objectively unreasonable to
rely on the warrant. See
id.
Here, the officers’ reliance on the search warrant was not
objectively unreasonable. We have already concluded that the
search warrant was not the product of any intentional or reckless
falsity in the underlying affidavit. We have also found that there
was a substantial basis for finding probable cause to search the Nis-
san in the curtilage of the home. And Bryant’s claim that the state
magistrate abandoned his independent judicial role is not only
speculative but is inconsistent with those conclusions. See
id.
Even assuming the warrant affidavit and search warrant
should have specifically identified the Nissan as a place to be
searched, that does not render the resulting search of the car
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22-12023 Opinion of the Court 15
unreasonable. It’s undisputed that the Nissan was in the home’s
“curtilage,” the area immediately adjacent to a home which is “con-
sidered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”
United States v. Taylor,
458 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006) (quota-
tion marks omitted). And our predecessor court has held that a
warrant authorizing the search of an apartment was sufficient to
support a search of a vehicle parked in the carport of that apart-
ment, even though the driver was not listed as an occupant of the
premises in the warrant. United States v. Cole,
628 F.2d 897, 899–900
(5th Cir. 1980). 3 Given this precedent and other details supporting
a connection among Bryant, the car, and the house, Bryant has not
shown that it was unreasonable for the officers to believe that the
car was properly included in the scope of the search warrant.
VI.
In sum, we affirm the denial of Bryant’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
3 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc).
