USCA11 Case: 22-14241 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/21/2023 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14241
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
NATHAN LEON ROBERTS,
Sui Juris
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00232-RWS
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14241
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Roberts, pro se, appeals the district court’s order
adopting the recommendation of a magistrate judge and dismissing
his amended civil complaint against Freedom Mortgage Corpora-
tion (“Freedom Mortgage”) with prejudice for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, Roberts makes no
argument in his appellate brief as to the substantive grounds for the
dismissal of his complaint. Rather, he raises the same arguments
that he presented in his objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation (“R&R”), arguing that the magistrate judge
acted without legal authority in his case, and that Freedom Mort-
gage’s counsel acted without authority and engaged in the unau-
thorized practice of law. After review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In September 2021, Roberts filed a pro se civil complaint
against Freedom Mortgage in Georgia state court, which Freedom
Mortgage removed to federal court. In his initial complaint, Rob-
erts alleged that Freedom Mortgage was not a valid debt collector
or creditor over his residential property and that Freedom Mort-
gage had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”).
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22-14241 Opinion of the Court 3
Freedom Mortgage, through counsel Matthew T. Covell,
moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), contending
that Roberts failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. In response, Roberts moved the district court to “deny
Matthew T. Covell’s motion to dismiss,” arguing that Freedom
Mortgage’s attorney’s legal arguments were insufficient to support
its motion to dismiss. Freedom Mortgage replied and argued that
it was not relying on any statements of counsel, but rather on the
alleged facts, as pled in Roberts’s complaint and the applicable laws.
Roberts then moved the district court to take judicial notice
of Covell as an “impersonator” because Covell was filing docu-
ments on Freedom Mortgage’s behalf that were solely authored by
Covell and did not contain information that could be substantiated
by firsthand knowledge. Roberts also moved to disqualify Covell
as Freedom Mortgage’s counsel. In this motion, he argued that he
had given Covell 14 days to rebut his allegations that Covell was an
“impersonator,” and his failure to do so resulted in a tacit admission
of the acts alleged.
In August 2022, the magistrate judge entered a R&R deny-
ing Roberts’s motion to disqualify and recommending that Free-
dom Mortgage’s motion to dismiss be granted and that Roberts’s
complaint should be dismissed with leave to amend. As to Rob-
erts’s motion to disqualify Covell, the magistrate judge found that
such motion was not supported by law or fact and denied the mo-
tion.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14241
As to the motion to dismiss, the magistrate judge recom-
mended that the motion be granted. However, the magistrate
judge determined that, in consideration of Roberts’s pro se status,
it was appropriate to allow Roberts the opportunity to amend. The
magistrate judge cautioned Roberts that, in his amended com-
plaint, he should allege each of his separate causes of action in sep-
arately numbered counts, each of which should assert a single
claim for relief, and that each count should clearly set forth the spe-
cific facts underlying each claim and explain the basis for each cause
of action.
Before the district court could issue a final order regarding
the August 2022 R&R, Roberts filed an amended complaint against
Freedom Mortgage. In Counts 1 through 4 and Counts 6 through
7, Roberts made varying arguments asserting that Freedom Mort-
gage did not have standing to require him to pay his debts. Then,
in Count 5, Roberts alleged that Freedom Mortgage violated the
FDCPA by creating and furnishing “deceptive forms” showing that
he owed them a debt.
Freedom Mortgage again moved to dismiss the amended
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). In the motion, it argued that Rob-
erts’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because the
amended complaint still failed to set forth specific supported facts
underlying each claim and failed to explain the basis for each cause
of action.
On August 29, 2022, the district court approved and adopted
the August 2022 R&R, granting Freedom Mortgage’s first motion
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22-14241 Opinion of the Court 5
to dismiss and dismissing Roberts’s original complaint. The district
court further stated that Roberts’s amended complaint, as contem-
plated by the magistrate judge’s August 2022 R&R, was proper and
accepted by the court, notwithstanding its filing prior to the court’s
decision to adopt the R&R, and was the operative pleading moving
forward. The order noted that all pretrial proceedings would re-
main before the magistrate judge.
Thereafter, Roberts moved in opposition to Freedom Mort-
gage’s motion to dismiss his amended complaint. He contended
that he adequately stated claims upon which relief could be
granted for each of his counts. He also argued that his amended
complaint should not be dismissed with prejudice due to his pro se
status and because he set forth specific supporting facts for each
count that established the grounds for each count.
Then, between September and October 2022, Roberts filed
seven motions attempting to disqualify Covell as Freedom Mort-
gage’s attorney. Although difficult to decipher, in these motions,
he made a variety of arguments centering on his belief that Covell
could not transact business in the state of Georgia or represent
Freedom Mortgage and that he was not registered with the state
bar. The magistrate judge denied the first motion in this series of
motions, concluding that it was frivolous because Covell was an
active member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia, was
admitted to the district court’s bar, and was authorized to file doc-
uments in the current case.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14241
Then, in November 2022, the magistrate judge issued an
R&R addressing Roberts’s amended complaint. The magistrate
judge first denied Roberts’s six pending motions challenging Cov-
ell’s representation of Freedom Mortgage as factually and legally
meritless, reiterating its prior findings on the matter. Then, as to
Freedom Mortgage’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint,
the magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted be-
cause Roberts failed to state a claim upon relief could be granted
on all counts. The magistrate judge also recommended that the
amended complaint be denied with prejudice, finding that Roberts
had been given a chance to amend the complaint with the benefit
of instructions from the court on how to properly plead his case,
yet failed to do so, and that nothing in the amended complaint sug-
gested that giving Roberts another opportunity to amend would
yield viable claims.
The magistrate judge then ordered service of the R&R
which instructed the parties that, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
each party had fourteen days to file written objections, and that if
no objections were filed, the R&R could be adopted as the opinion
and order of the district court. The magistrate judge also warned
that, should no objections be made, this Court, on appeal, would
deem waived any challenge to factual and legal findings, subject to
interests of justice plain error review.
Roberts filed two sets of objections to the November 2022
R&R. In his first set of objections, he did not address the magis-
trate judge’s findings regarding the dismissal of his amended
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22-14241 Opinion of the Court 7
complaint. Instead, he challenged the magistrate judge’s denial of
his motions to disqualify Covell. He also argued that the magis-
trate judge acted without authority and challenged the magistrate
judge’s ability to “transact business” in the state of Georgia. In his
second set of objections, Roberts reiterated his arguments about
the magistrate judge and Covell. Roberts also filed a motion de-
clining the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction and requesting that the
case be immediately assigned to a district court judge. He also
stated that he never received notice of the assignment of his case
to a magistrate judge, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1). Rob-
erts reiterated these arguments in another filing.
Ultimately, the district court adopted and affirmed the No-
vember 2022 R&R. In its order, the court addressed Roberts’s ob-
jections and other filings, finding that, construed liberally, they
were subject to summary dismissal due to their frivolity. As to Rob-
erts’s other filings, the court found that they lacked any basis in law
or fact. Thus, the court overruled Roberts’s objections, granted
Freedom Mortgage’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed Roberts’s
complaint with prejudice. Roberts’s appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and lib-
erally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168
(11th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, courts should not serve as a pro se
party’s counsel or rewrite a deficient pleading to sustain an action.
Id. at 1168-69. Pro se litigants must comply with the applicable pro-
cedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-14241
Additionally, a pro se party abandons an issue by failing to challenge
it on appeal. Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
A party abandons a claim when he presents his argument in “pass-
ing references” or “in a perfunctory manner without supporting
arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739
F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,”
without providing reasoning and citation to authority that the ap-
pellant relies on, “constitutes abandonment of that issue.” Singh v.
U.S. Att’y Gen.,
561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under § 636(b)(1)(A), a district court may designate a magis-
trate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter, except a dis-
positive motion.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Further, a district court
may designate a magistrate judge to make a recommendation for
the disposition of a case.
Id. § 636(b)(1)(B). A magistrate judge also
“may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil mat-
ter and order the entry of judgment in the case” upon consent of
the parties. Id. § 636(c)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a) (explaining
that a magistrate judge may conduct civil actions or proceedings,
including a trial, if all parties consent in the manner outlined by the
Rule). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that, while a magis-
trate judge is not an Article III judge, “a district court may refer
dispositive motions to a magistrate for a recommendation so long
as ‘the entire process takes place under the district court’s total con-
trol and jurisdiction,’ and the judge ‘exercise[s] the ultimate author-
ity to issue an appropriate order.’” Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 153
(1985) (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Raddatz,
447
U.S. 667, 681-82 (1980)).
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22-14241 Opinion of the Court 9
Importantly, a party who fails to object to a magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a R&R “waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was in-
formed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. However, we still may
review an unobjected-to issue on appeal “for plain error if neces-
sary in the interests of justice.”
Id.
“Rule 3-1 bars an appeal only when the party who failed to
object was informed of the time period for objecting and the con-
sequences on appeal for failing to do so.” Harrigan v. Metro Dade
Police Dep’t Station #4,
977 F.3d 1181, 1191 (11th Cir. 2020) (empha-
sis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v.
Ga. Reg'l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017), abrogated on
other grounds by Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)). If
we determine that the interests of justice necessitate us to review
an unobjected-to error in a R&R, we will then “apply the height-
ened civil plain error standard.” Roy v. Ivy,
53 F.4th 1338, 1351 (11th
Cir. 2022). Under such standard, “we will consider an issue not
raised in the district court if it involves a pure question of law, and
if refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burch v. P.J. Cheese,
Inc.,
861 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017)).
On appeal, Roberts makes no arguments challenging the ac-
tual dismissal of his amended complaint. As a result, he has waived
and abandoned any challenge to the dismissal. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1;
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-14241
Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1191; Timson,
518 F.3d at 874. He failed to
object to the November 2022 R&R’s findings related to the merits
of Counts 1 through 7, and he failed to make any appellate argu-
ments on based on the same. Moreover, there is no indication that
the interests of justice would be served upon this Court conducting
a plain error review of the dismissal. Roy, 53 F.4th at 1351. Thus,
we decline to review the district court’s decision to dismiss Rob-
erts’s amended complaint with prejudice.
Instead, on appeal Roberts continues to challenge the mag-
istrate judge’s authority to rule on non-dispositive motions and
Freedom Mortgage’s counsel’s ability to practice law in the state of
Georgia on the company’s behalf. Because he raised these issues in
his objections to the November 2022 R&R and in his brief, the ar-
guments are properly before us. Nevertheless, his contentions are
meritless. To Roberts’s challenges against the magistrate judge’s
authority, the magistrate judge appropriately ruled on non-dispos-
itive motions and made a recommendation on Freedom Mort-
gage’s motion to dismiss in accordance with § 636(b). While Rob-
erts challenges the fact that he did not consent to the magistrate
judge under Rule 73, such consent was not necessary in this in-
stance, because the magistrate judge was not ruling on dispositive
motions or resolving the case in its entirety. Moreover, the district
court always retained jurisdiction and control over the case and its
ultimate authority to issue an appropriate order resolving the case.
Thomas, 474 U.S. at 153. Finally, Roberts challenges to Covell’s
work on the case are frivolous, for Covell is a member of good
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22-14241 Opinion of the Court 11
standing with the State Bar of Georgia and is authorized to practice
law before the district court and this Court on behalf of his clients.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the district
court’s dismissal with prejudice of Roberts’s amended complaint.
