USCA11 Case: 23-11884 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 11/21/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11884
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEANO DONALD ALTIERI,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cr-60182-RS-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11884
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Keano Donald Altieri appeals his conviction for possessing a
postal service key, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1704, and possessing
stolen mail, in violation of U.S.C. § 1708. Mr. Altieri argues that
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the postal
key and stolen mail evidence seized after police arrested him for
prowling, in violation of Florida Statute § 856.021 (“the prowling
statute”). 1
1 The statute reads as follows: “(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or
prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals,
under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or imme-
diate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. (2) Among
the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight
upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or
herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.
Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law
enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section,
afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern
which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify
himself or herself and explain his or her presence and conduct. No person shall
be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did
not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation
given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at the time, would
have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern. (3) Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second de-
gree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.”
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23-11884 Opinion of the Court 3
I
On March 28, 2022, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Officer
Shannon noticed a car parked on Nova Drive, alongside a college,
in Davie, Florida. Two males exited the vehicle dressed in all black
and wearing black masks. Mr. Altieri—one of the two men—car-
ried a plastic garbage bag and at least one of the two wore latex
gloves. The two began to run across Nova Drive—toward a row
of warehouses—but before they could complete the crossing, Of-
ficer Shannon intercepted them in his marked vehicle.
Officer Shannon exited his car, identified himself as police,
drew his gun, and commanded the men to the ground. The two
men stopped and complied. Officer Shannon handcuffed both and
took them into custody. While searching the men, Officer Shan-
non found unopened mail in the garbage bag that Mr. Altieri was
carrying and a postal service key on his person.
In August of 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Mr. Altieri with possession of a postal service key, in vio-
lation of
18 U.S.C. § 1704, and with possession of stolen mail, in
violation of U.S.C. § 1708.
Mr. Altieri moved to suppress evidence of the postal service
key and the stolen mail seized after his arrest. In his motion, Mr.
Altieri argued that Officer Shannon lacked probable cause to arrest
him for violating the prowling statute. Mr. Altieri asserted that be-
cause he had not fled, refused to identify himself, or attempted to
conceal himself, the government could not satisfy the statute’s
prima facie elements. Mr. Altieri also maintained that Florida
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11884
courts had found probable cause lacking in “much more suspi-
cious” circumstances and that his act of running across a street at
1:25 a.m. should not have alarmed Officer Shannon because Nova
Drive was a busy intersection with 24-hour businesses and bus
stops. See D.E. 12 at 6.
In response, the government argued that probable cause
was not lacking. As support, the government pointed out that both
men wore gloves and hooded shirts; both men pulled masks over
their faces before crossing Nova Drive; both men refused to answer
when asked to explain their conduct; and the car that had driven
Mr. Altieri and the other suspect to the scene fled when the police
officer approached. The government argued that Officer Shannon
thus had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri for prowling because
the two men were engaged in suspicious conduct and had failed to
quell Officer Shannon’s concerns when given the opportunity.
The magistrate judge to whom the case was referred found
that Officer Shannon had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri be-
cause the circumstances leading up to the arrest, when “viewed
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,”
supported the conclusion that he was “loitering or prowling in a
place and at a time and manner not usual for law-abiding citizens.”
D.E. 19. at 6. The magistrate judge also concluded that the cases
cited by Mr. Altieri were “factually distinguishable” from the cir-
cumstances in the case at hand. See id. at 6. Accordingly, the mag-
istrate judge concluded that Officer Shannon “had reasonable
alarm or immediate concern for the persons and property in the
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23-11884 Opinion of the Court 5
area” and that after Mr. Altieri failed to dispel this concern, the of-
ficer had probable cause to arrest him. Id.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation and denied Mr. Altieri’s suppression motion. Mr.
Altieri pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement and timely appealed to this Court.
II
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s factual
findings for clear error and the application of the law to those facts
de novo. See United States v. Smith,
459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir.
2006). The district court’s factual findings are construed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. See
id.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the ex-
clusionary rule, evidence generally cannot be used against a de-
fendant in a criminal trial where that evidence was obtained via an
encounter with police that violated the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. Perkins,
348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). But, “a
warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a crimi-
nal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Whether probable cause exists depends
upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known
to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”
Id.
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11884
We have interpreted Florida Statute § 856.021 as having two
elements: “(1) the accused must be loitering or prowling at a place,
at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens; and (2)
the loitering or prowling must be under circumstances that war-
rant a reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in the
vicinity.” United States v. Gordon,
231 F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000).
These are some elements set out by the Florida courts. See, e.g.,
P.R. v. State,
97 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
The statute lists several factors that may create the reasona-
ble fear necessary for arrest, stating that reasonable fear is war-
ranted if “the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforce-
ment officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly en-
deavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.”
Fla. Stat.
§ 856.021(2). The statute further provides that “a law enforcement
officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section,
afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate
concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the
person to identify himself or herself and explain his or her presence
and conduct.”
Id.
Probable cause requires “only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”
District of Columbia v. Wesby,
138 S.Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). Here the district court did not
err by denying the motion to suppress the postal service key and
stolen mail evidence.
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23-11884 Opinion of the Court 7
The facts, known to Officer Shannon at the time of the ar-
rest, based on his personal observations, see P.R.,
97 So. 3d at
982−93, establish that there was probable cause to believe that a
criminal offense had been or was being committed. See Devenpeck,
543 U.S. at 152. The facts establish that (1) Mr. Altieri and another
male existed a vehicle at 1:25 a.m.; (2) that both men were wearing
black clothing and masks; (3) that Mr. Altieri was carrying a plastic
garbage bag; (4) that at least one of the two men was wearing
gloves; (5) that the car which drove the two men to the scene fled
when Officer Shannon confronted Mr. Altieri; and (6) that Mr. Al-
tieri refused to communicate with Officer Shannon when asked to
explain his conduct.
III
In sum, probable cause existed for Officer Shannon to con-
clude that Mr. Altieri was “loitering or prowling at a place, at a
time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens,” and that
there was “reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in
the vicinity.” See
Fla. Stat. § 856.021(2). The district court correctly
denied Mr. Altieri’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
