USCA11 Case: 23-10904 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 12/06/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10904
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DIEGO ERNESTO OBREGON-CAICEDO,
a.k.a. Pampiro
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00331-JSM-SPF-3
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10904
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Diego Obregon-Caicedo, a federal prisoner and native and
citizen of Colombia, appeals pro se the denial of his third motion for
compassionate release.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to address whether
his post-release deportation is an extraordinary and compelling rea-
son for compassionate release and by failing to adequately consider
the statutory sentencing factors,
id. § 3553(a). He also challenges
the denial of his request for appointed counsel. We affirm.
After Obregon-Caicedo pleaded guilty to conspiring to dis-
tribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel
subject to United States jurisdiction,
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a)
and (b),
21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), the district court sentenced him
to 188 months of imprisonment. In 2021, the district court granted
the government’s motion for a sentence reduction, Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35, and reduced Obregon-Caicedo’s sentence to 151 months. In
2022, Obregon-Caidedo moved for compassionate release,
18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and appointed counsel, but the district court
denied the motion because his medical conditions were properly
managed by the Bureau of Prisons and the statutory sentencing fac-
tors did not warrant early release. While his first motion was
USCA11 Case: 23-10904 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 12/06/2023 Page: 3 of 4
23-10904 Opinion of the Court 3
pending appeal, he filed a second motion for compassionate re-
lease, which the district court dismissed.
In 2023, Obregon-Caicedo again moved for compassionate
release and appointed counsel. He argued that although his pro-
jected release date is in 2024, his medical conditions, conditions of
confinement, family circumstances, and rehabilitation warranted
early release. He argued that he posed no danger to the public be-
cause he would be deported upon release and that he had taken
several educational courses to further his rehabilitation.
The district court denied Obregon-Caicedo’s motion be-
cause it found no new information warranting early release. It
stated that it considered the statutory sentencing factors, and it de-
termined that the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punish-
ment, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and provide
the defendant with education and vocational training “still exists.”
We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris,
989 F.3d 908, 911
(11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies
an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making
the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erro-
neous.”
Id. “When review is only for abuse of discretion, it means
that the district court had a ‘range of choice’ and that we cannot
reverse just because we might have come to a different conclusion
had it been our call to make.”
Id. at 912.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10904
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Obregon-Caicedo’s motion for compassionate release. It consid-
ered the statutory sentencing factors and explained that they did
not support early release. See United States v. Cook,
998 F.3d 1180,
1185 (11th Cir. 2021). Although Obregon-Caicedo argues that the
district court failed to consider his rehabilitation efforts or that his
post-release deportation obviated the need to consider protecting
the public, the district court was not required to discuss them. See
United States v. Tinker,
14 F.4th 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021). And be-
cause we affirm on this ground, we need not address
Obregon-Caicedo’s argument that his deportation status qualified
as an extraordinary and compelling reason for his early release. See
id. at 1237; Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680
(11th Cir. 2014).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by not ap-
pointing counsel for Obregon-Caicedo. He was not entitled to ap-
pointed counsel in seeking a sentencing reduction, see United States
v. Webb,
565 F.3d 789, 794–95 (11th Cir. 2009), and his arguments
were not “so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a
trained practitioner,” Kilgo v. Ricks,
983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir.
1993).
We AFFIRM the denial of Obregon-Caicedo’s motion to re-
duce his sentence and for appointment of counsel.
