USCA11 Case: 23-10722 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10722
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL PEGRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00434-ELR-JFK-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10722
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Pegram appeals the district court’s order denying
his
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of
supervised release. On appeal, Pegram argues that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to consider properly the
relevant § 3553(a) factors and by impermissibly considering the
seriousness of his offense. After review, we find no abuse of
discretion and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2009, Pegram pled guilty to receipt of child pornography,
in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2)(A) and 2256(8)(A). Pegram
was originally arrested on state charges of sexual battery and child
exploitation based on allegations he inappropriately touched minor
children while working at an afterschool program. After a search
of Pegram’s computers turned up child pornography, the federal
government charged Pegram with the instant federal child
pornography offense.
In 2015, after completing his 97-month sentence, Pegram
began serving his supervised release term of ten years. At the time
of his § 3583(e)(1) motion in 2023, Pregram had served over 7 years
of his supervised release term. Pegram asked the district court to
terminate his supervised release, stressing that he had never
violated the terms of his supervised release, was employed, had
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23-10722 Opinion of the Court 3
completed specialized sex offender treatment, and lived with and
helped his parents.
The district court denied Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The
court reviewed the procedural history of Pegram’s case. In
particular, the district court noted an earlier determination in the
amended judgment and commitment order that Pegram required
the most secure housing in prison and was “especially vulnerable”
due to his slight physical stature, emotional immaturity, well-
below-average IQ, learning disabilities, and treatment for
depression and anxiety.
The district court summarized the grounds for Pegram’s
§ 3583(e)(1) motion, including that he had “done well on
supervision, is unlikely to recidivate, has been employed since
2021, helps people in the community and his family.” Ultimately,
the district court stated it denied the motion after conducting “a
careful review of the record and the motion filed,” and explained
that denial was appropriate “especially in light of the serious nature
of the crime of which [Pegram] was convicted.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Principles
“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for early ter-
mination of supervised release for an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Johnson,
877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). A court abuses
its discretion when it fails to explain its sentencing decisions ade-
quately enough for meaningful appellate review.
Id.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10722
Under § 3583(e)(1), and after the expiration of one year of
supervised release, a district court may terminate a defendant’s
supervised release term if, “after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
and (a)(7),” the court “is satisfied that such action is warranted by
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see Johnson,
877 F.3d at 996.
The particular § 3553(a) factors referenced in § 3583(e)
include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the
sentence imposed (a) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, (b) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and (c) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(4) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7).
However, § 3583(e)’s list of factors does not expressly
include the factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are “the need for the
sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense.” Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), 3583(e). Section 3583(e), however,
does not explicitly forbid consideration of these factors, and
§ 3583(e) does expressly permit the district court to consider the
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23-10722 Opinion of the Court 5
§ 3553(a)(1) factors, which include the nature and circumstances of
the offense.
Further, this Court has concluded that it is not plain error
for a district court to consider the same § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors,
even though not listed in § 3583(e), when deciding a revocation of
supervised release. See United States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303,
1308-09 (11th Cir. 2014). In Vandergrift, we emphasized that
§ 3583(e) did not “explicitly forbid a district court from considering
§ 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id. at 1308.
In addition, a district court ruling on a § 3583(e)(1) motion
“must indicate that [it] considered the [
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors
enumerated in the provision,” but it “need not explain each factor’s
applicability, nor always explicitly articulate that it considered the
factors.” Johnson,
877 F.3d at 998. That said, the district court
“must explain its sentencing decisions adequately enough to allow
for meaningful appellate review.”
Id. at 997-98 (addressing a
paperless order stating only that the motion was denied).
Meaningful appellate review “requires the reasons for the district
court’s decision to be sufficiently apparent,” and thus, apart from
the district court’s order, the record can also provide a sufficient
basis for meaningful appellate review.
Id. at 998 (stating that the
“record must clearly imply that the relevant factors were
considered”).
B. Denial of Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) Motion
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The district court was not
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10722
required to explicitly consider or invoke the sentencing factors and
it was sufficiently apparent from its written order that the court
considered the relevant sentencing factors.
The district court stated that it had carefully reviewed the
record, including Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The court noted
the reasons Pegram was “especially vulnerable” and Pegram’s
arguments for why his supervised release should be terminated
early—that he had “done well on supervision,” was “unlikely to
recidivate,” had been employed for multiple years, and “helps
people in the community.” These statements show the district
court considered relevant factors, such as Pegram’s history and
characteristics, protection of the public, and the need for
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment. See Johnson,
877 F.3d at 997-98.
The district court explicitly stated that early termination of
Pegram’s supervised release was not warranted—despite Pegram’s
assertion that certain factors weighed in his favor—“in light of the
serious nature of the crime of which [Pegram] was convicted.”
Although the district court’s reference to the serious nature of
Pegram’s crime used language similar to that found in
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), Pegram fails to demonstrate that such
consideration was not regarding “the nature . . . of the offense,”
which is found in § 3553(a)(1), one of the enumerated factors. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Because the nature of the offense is a relevant
factor, the district court did not improperly consider the serious
nature of Pegram’s crime.
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23-10722 Opinion of the Court 7
Additionally, the district court’s order provided a sufficient
basis to afford meaningful appellate review because it explained the
court’s determination that the serious nature of Pegram’s child
pornography crime outweighed the other factors Pegram asserted
in his motion. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and
affirm the denial of Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion to terminate
early his supervised release term.
AFFIRMED.
