USCA11 Case: 22-11030 Document: 63-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11030
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FAN YANG,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00192-HES-LLL-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11030 Document: 63-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11030
Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fan Yang appeals his convictions for conspiring to violate
federal firearms laws, making false statements to a federally
licensed firearms dealer, and making a false statement within the
executive branch’s jurisdiction. He asserts the district court
reversibly erred by precluding his willfulness defense and
presentation of evidence thereof. After review, 1 we affirm.
The district court did not preclude Yang’s willfulness
defense—it allowed evidence and argument regarding Yang’s
willfulness defense. Rather, the district court precluded evidence
of selective prosecution related to Yang’s willfulness defense. The
district court issued a detailed order denying in part and granting
in part the Government’s motion in limine, detailing how Yang’s
proffered evidence could be used in a willfulness defense, and the
evidence that would be precluded as evidence of selective
prosecution. “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the
merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion
that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden
by the Constitution.” United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 463
(1996); see also United States v. Jones,
52 F.3d 924, 927 (11th Cir. 1995)
1 We review a district court’s grant of a government’s motion in limine for
abuse of discretion. United States v.
Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.
1994). “Generally, courts should not prohibit a defendant from presenting a
theory of defense to the jury.” Id. at 1564.
USCA11 Case: 22-11030 Document: 63-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 3 of 3
22-11030 Opinion of the Court 3
(“[S]elective prosecution is a defect in the institution of the
prosecution that has no bearing on the determination of factual
guilt.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting in
part the Government’s motion in limine to preclude evidence and
argument regarding selective prosecution. Because a selective
prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits and is not a matter
for the jury to decide, the district court did not improperly apply
the law or err in its conclusion of law. See United States v. Smith,
459
F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An abuse of discretion arises when
the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding
of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of
law to fact.” (quotation marks omitted)); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
Selective prosecution remains a claim to hold the institutions of the
legal system accountable for misconduct and has “no bearing on
the determination of factual guilt”; therefore, the district court
properly prohibited the evidence and argument of selective
prosecution in Yang’s criminal jury trial. Jones,
52 F.3d at 927; see
also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. Thus, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
