Gertrude Isaac v. IMRG ( 2007 )


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  •                                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAR 21, 2007
    No. 06-15127                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-02498-CV-JEC-1
    GERTRUDE ISAAC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    IMRG,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (March 21, 2007)
    Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gertrude Isaac, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    her claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 2000
     et seq., and state tort claims against her employer, Integrated Management
    Resources Group (“IMRG”).1 The district court dismissed her claims because it
    found that the bankruptcy estate resulting from her bankruptcy petition was the
    only party with standing to pursue her claims and, therefore, Isaac did not have
    standing to pursue the claims herself. Isaac argues that she was not subject to
    judicial estoppel and that IMRG acted in bad faith. Moreover, she contends that
    she is entitled to summary judgment. Isaac also claims, inter alia, that the district
    court should not award attorneys’ fees to IMRG. IMRG has filed a motion
    requesting that we award it attorneys’ fees on the ground that Isaac’s appeal is
    frivolous.2
    We review the district court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo,
    considering all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party. Rojas v. Florida, 
    285 F.3d 1339
    , 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2002). The
    moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
    1
    We construe Isaac’s pro se brief to include a motion requesting that we seal the record
    of this appeal. However, we deny this motion because IMRG has filed record excerpts under
    seal in accordance with Eleventh Circuit Rule 25-5(2).
    2
    We deny IMRG’s motion requesting attorneys’ fees because we have concluded that
    sanctions would be inappropriate.
    2
    any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    We have jurisdiction over appeals “from all final decisions of the district
    courts of the United States . . . .” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . However, we do not have
    jurisdiction to review judgments or issues that are “expressly referred to and which
    are not impliedly intended for appeal.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 
    701 F.2d 1365
    , 1375 (11th Cir. 1983). In addition, the law is well settled that “a legal claim
    or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its
    merits will not be addressed.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).     Moreover, “[a]ny issue that an appellant wants the
    Court to address should be specifically and clearly identified in the brief.” 
    Id.
    However, we do construe pro se filings liberally. Faulk v. City of Orlando, 
    731 F.2d 787
    , 789 (11th Cir. 1984). We have also held that “an issue not raised in the
    district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this
    court.” Access Now, Inc., 
    385 F.3d at 1331
     (quotations omitted).
    The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate which is
    comprised of, among other things, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
    property as of the commencement of the case.” 
    11 U.S.C. § 541
    (a)(1). Therefore,
    a cause of action belonging to the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding vests in the
    3
    bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l,
    Inc., 
    365 F.3d 1268
    , 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). “Thus, a trustee, as the representative
    of the bankruptcy estate, is the proper party in interest, and is the only party with
    standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the estate.” 
    Id. at 1272
    . “At
    the close of the bankruptcy case, property of the estate that is not abandoned . . .
    and that is not administered in the bankruptcy proceedings remains the property of
    the estate.” 
    Id.
     (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the “[f]ailure to list an interest on
    a bankruptcy schedule leaves that interest in the bankruptcy estate.” 
    Id.
    As an initial matter, we conclude from the record that we do not have
    jurisdiction to address Isaac’s claim that the district court should not award
    attorneys’ fees to IMRG because she has not appealed a final decision or order of
    the district court granting such attorneys’ fees. In addition, Isaac has abandoned
    any challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment because, even
    construing her brief liberally, she does not argue that she has standing, the lack of
    which was the basis for the district court’s decision. See Access Now, Inc., 
    385 F.3d at 1330
    . Even if she had raised this claim, it would fail because the cause of
    action she pursues in this case vested with the bankruptcy estate when she filed her
    bankruptcy petition. See Wendy’s, 
    365 F.3d at 1272
    . Therefore, Isaac does not
    have standing to bring these claims because the only party with standing to bring
    4
    these claims is the trustee of the bankruptcy estate. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, we reject
    the remainder of Isaac’s arguments and affirm the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of IMRG.
    AFFIRMED.
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