Gregory Dennis v. Richard G. Poff, Jr. , 344 F. App'x 523 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-11634              ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    SEPTEMBER 2, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 08-01242-CV-2-JFG,
    BKCY No. 05-04943-TBB-7
    IN RE:
    RICHARD G. POFF, JR.,
    Debtor.
    __________________________________________________________________
    GREGORY DENNIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    RICHARD G. POFF, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (September 2, 2009)
    Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gregory Dennis, an alleged creditor acting pro se, appeals the district court’s
    affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s denial of his motion to reopen bankruptcy
    proceedings in connection with debtor Richard Poff’s Chapter 7 petition. Because
    the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion after
    concluding that Dennis’s attempts to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings were
    untimely, the district court correctly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.
    The relevant underlying facts of this case are as follows: Dennis hired Poff,
    an attorney, to represent him in a legal malpractice claim against Dennis’s former
    attorney. Dissatisfied with Poff’s representation, Dennis filed a malpractice action
    against Poff in February 2005. In May 2005, Poff filed a voluntary Chapter 7
    bankruptcy petition; he did not list Dennis as a creditor in the petition. In August
    2005, Poff filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the state court to stay the
    malpractice action. Pursuant to the suggestion of bankruptcy, the state court
    dismissed the malpractice action without prejudice. On August 15, 2005, Dennis
    received a copy of the suggestion of bankruptcy and the order from the state court
    dismissing the action. On August 17, 2005, the bankruptcy court filed its order of
    discharge and closed the bankruptcy case.
    2
    Two years later, in August of 2007, Dennis filed a motion in the bankruptcy
    court seeking to set aside the discharge and reopen the bankruptcy proceedings.
    The bankruptcy court found that Dennis had notice of the bankruptcy proceedings
    in August 2005 and that more than two years had passed since the discharge had
    been ordered. Accordingly, because a creditor must request a revocation of a
    discharge “within one year after such discharge is granted,” the bankruptcy court
    denied Dennis’s motion as untimely. 
    11 U.S.C. § 727
    (e). Dennis moved for
    reconsideration, which the court denied.
    Undeterred, Dennis filed a renewed motion to set aside discharge. At the
    hearing on this renewed motion, held on January 15, 2008, the court deferred
    ruling on the motion and instead directed the trustee to reopen the bankruptcy case
    and conduct a Rule 2004 examination of Poff’s assets. Thereafter, upon the
    motion of the trustee, the court reopened the proceedings to allow the trustee to
    conduct the Rule 2004 examination. After the Rule 2004 examination was held on
    February 8, 2008, the trustee reported that there were no new assets to be
    administered. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court again closed the case on April 7,
    2008.
    On April 17, 2008, Dennis again moved to reopen the bankruptcy case. On
    May 1, 2008, the bankruptcy court denied this motion to reopen based on “the
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    reasons set forth in the three prior hearings and the two prior orders on this
    matter.” Dennis timely moved for reconsideration on May 8, 2008. After
    conducting a hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to reconsider in a
    written order entered June 14, 2008. Thereafter, on June 18, 2008, Dennis
    appealed to the district court.1 The district court concluded that the bankruptcy
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dennis’s motion to reopen and
    affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order. This appeal followed.
    Our court has jurisdiction over this matter under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d). “As
    the second court of review of a bankruptcy court’s judgment,” we independently
    examine the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and employ
    the same standards of review as the district court. In re Issac Leaseco, Inc., 
    389 F.3d 1205
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we review the bankruptcy court’s
    denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Langham, Langston &
    Burnett v. Blanchard, 
    246 F.2d 529
    , 535 (5th Cir. 1957);2 see also In re Lindsay,
    1
    Generally, the bankruptcy rules require a motion to appeal to be filed within 10 days of
    the entry of the challenged judgment. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). The timely filing of a
    Bankruptcy Rule 9023 (analogous to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)) motion to “alter or amend” – also
    known as a motion to reconsider – causes the time for appeal to run from the entry of the order
    disposing of the last such motion outstanding. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
    
    459 U.S. 56
    , 68 (1982) (noting that post-judgment motions to “reconsider” are “almost without
    exception treated as Rule 59 motions [to alter or amend], regardless of their label”).
    Accordingly, because Dennis filed his notice of appeal within 10 days of the denial of his motion
    to reconsider, he timely appealed the May 1, 2008 judgment denying his motion to reopen.
    2
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
    court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
    4
    
    59 F.3d 942
    , 950 (9th Cir. 1995). We review the findings of fact made by the
    bankruptcy court for clear error. In re JLJ Inc., 
    988 F.2d 1112
    , 1116 (11th Cir.
    1993). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous unless “this court, after reviewing
    all of the evidence, [is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been committed.” Lykes Bros., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engr’s, 
    64 F.3d 630
    , 634 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
    conducts a de novo review of “determinations of law, whether from the bankruptcy
    court or the district court.” In re International Administrative Services, Inc., 
    408 F.3d 689
    , 698 (11th Cir. 2005).
    On appeal, Dennis reasserts the arguments in favor of reopening the
    bankruptcy proceedings that he has made multiple times: that the bankruptcy court
    should not have closed the case in 2005 without including Dennis as a listed
    creditor; that Dennis’s debt was non-dischargable under 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    ; that he
    did not receive notice of the pending bankruptcy proceeding in time to file
    objections; and that he could raise the issue at any time under Bankruptcy Rule
    4007. In its May 1, 2008 order, the bankruptcy court, incorporating its previous
    orders and the reasons set forth on the record in the previous hearings, found that
    Dennis had notice of the bankruptcy proceedings as early as August 2005 and
    October 1, 1981.
    5
    waited until 2007 – more than two years after the bankruptcy proceedings had
    closed – to seek to reopen the proceedings. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
    concluded that the case could not be reopened under 
    11 U.S.C. § 727
    .
    We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the bankruptcy
    court’s findings of fact are supported by the record and that it did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Dennis’s motion to reopen as untimely. Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court’s order.
    AFFIRMED.
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