Reginald D. Marable, Sr. v. Marion Military Institute , 595 F. App'x 921 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16189
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00563-CG-B
REGINALD D. MARABLE, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARION MILITARY INSTITUTE,
THOMAS L. TATE,
Col. individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(December 22, 2014)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Reginald Marable, an African-American male represented by counsel,
appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Marion
Military Institute, the state military college of Alabama (MMI), and Thomas L.
Tate, his supervisor at MMI, in his employment discrimination suit under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On appeal, Marable presents four arguments. First, he contends that the district
court erred by concluding that he was judicially estopped from obtaining monetary
damages from MMI due to his failure to disclose his current lawsuit in a
concurrent bankruptcy proceeding. Further, he argues that the district court also
erred in concluding that, with respect to obtaining non-monetary relief, he failed to
establish prima facie cases of retaliation, racially discriminatory failure-to-
promote, and a racially hostile work environment, all under Title VII and § 1981.
For ease of reference, we will address each point in turn.
I.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. I.C. Sys.,
Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Additionally, we review the district
court’s application of the judicial estoppel doctrine for abuse of discretion. Burnes
v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Under the judicial estoppel doctrine, a party is precluded from asserting a
claim in a proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim he took in a previous
proceeding. Id. at 1285. The doctrine’s purpose is “to prevent the perversion of
the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Application of
judicial estoppel is appropriate where: (1) the allegedly inconsistent positions were
made under oath in the prior proceeding; and (2) such inconsistencies have been
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system. Id.
The judicial estoppel doctrine is applied to situations involving intentional
contradictions, not simple error or inadvertence. Id. at 1286. When considering
the issue of judicial estoppel in the context of the omission of assets in a
bankruptcy case, deliberate or intentional manipulation can be inferred from the
record. Id. at 1287. In order for an omission to have been “inadvertent,” the
debtor must show either that he lacked knowledge of the undisclosed claims or that
he had no motive for concealing them. Id.
We have held that plaintiffs who intentionally fail to disclose the existence
of their employment discrimination claims in their concurrent bankruptcy petitions
are judicially estopped from obtaining monetary relief on those claims. De Leon v.
Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Specifically, we held in De Leon that a financial motive to conceal assets exists in
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Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, as the hiding of assets affects the amount to be
discounted and repaid. Id. at 1291.
A debtor seeking shelter under the bankruptcy laws must disclose all assets,
or potential assets, to the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i). In
addition, the duty to disclose is a continuing one; thus, a debtor must amend his
financial statements if circumstances change. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7); Burnes, 291
F.3d at 1286.
In the context of an unreported employment discrimination claim for
injunctive relief, as opposed to monetary damages, judicial estoppel does not
apply, as injunctive relief does not add to the value of the bankruptcy estate.
Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288–89.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Marable’s
claim for monetary damages was barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Marable filed his initial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in May 2010, and later filed his bankruptcy
petition in February 2011. Marable omitted the fact of his EEOC charge on the
bankruptcy petition. Further, when Marable filed the instant lawsuit in July 2011,
he did not amend his bankruptcy petition to include the lawsuit, despite his
obligation to do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7); Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286. He only
amended his petition to include the present lawsuit in August 2012, after the
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defendants had already moved for summary judgment. Thus, Marable had
knowledge of his EEOC charge and the instant lawsuit. He also had a motive to
conceal his discrimination claims in his bankruptcy proceeding because, by not
listing the potential proceeds of the instant lawsuit as a potential asset, he would
ensure that any proceeds would accrue to him personally, rather than to the
bankruptcy estate. See De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1291. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by finding that Marable was judicially estopped from
obtaining monetary damages on his claims. See id. at 1292.
As the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not bar a plaintiff from obtaining
injunctive relief, we will analyze the merits of each of Marable’s claims only
insofar as he sought injunctive relief on his claims. See Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288–
89.
II.
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibit employers from taking adverse
actions against employees in retaliation for their opposition to statutorily
prohibited racial discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954–55 (2008). Claims against
state actors under § 1981 must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bryant v.
Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2009). As Marable filed suit under both
§ 1981 and § 1983, his § 1981 claim against MMI was properly brought.
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Similarly, while liability of an employer will lie under Title VII, the sole basis for
holding Tate liable was under §§ 1981 and 1983. See Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga.
Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that Title VII grants relief
against employers, but not individual employees sued in their individual capacity);
Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892 (11th Cir. 2000) (providing that §
1983 provides the sole remedy against state actors for violations of rights
contained in § 1981).
In the employment context, the same substantive analysis applies to § 1981
and Title VII claims. Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th
Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we may analyze Marable’s retaliation claim under the
Title VII framework.
A plaintiff may establish a claim of retaliation by direct or circumstantial
evidence, and when he only produces circumstantial evidence, a court may use the
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d
1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie retaliation
case, and the employer articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
challenged employment action, the employee must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer for taking the
adverse actions were not its true reasons. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
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Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); see also Pennington v. City
of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing the burden-shifting
framework for retaliation cases).
An employee cannot establish pretext by simply demonstrating facts that
suggest retaliatory animus, but must specifically respond to each of the employer’s
explanations and rebut them. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305,
1309 (11th Cir. 2007). A reason is not pretextual unless it is shown both that the
reason was false, and that retaliation was the real reason. Brooks v. County
Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). If “the
proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee
must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by
simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason” or showing that the decision
was based on erroneous facts. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Moreover, an employer is entitled to summary
judgment if it had a good faith belief that the employee engaged in misconduct
warranting termination. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176–77
(11th Cir. 2000).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Marable’s
retaliation claim, as he did not establish that MMI’s proffered non-retaliatory
reasons for his non-renewal were pretexts for retaliation. MMI identified the
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following non-retaliatory reasons for Marable’s non-renewal: (1) Marable’s
hostile relationship with cadets; (2) his failure to comply with several orders and
directives; (3) the personality conflict between him and Tate, his supervisor; and
(4) budgetary concerns. Thus, the burden shifted to Marable to show that each of
MMI’s stated reasons was false, and that the real reason for his non-renewal was
retaliation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; Brooks, 446 F.3d at
1163.
The district court correctly found that Marable did not meet his burden to
establish pretext. In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Marable did not submit any evidence showing that any of the stated reasons for his
non-renewal were false. See Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. Further, while evidence
did show that Tate, Marable’s supervisor, had racially discriminatory animus
against African-Americans, such evidence was insufficient to establish pretext.
Marable was required to do more than show racial animus on the part of his
supervisor to establish pretext; rather, he was also required to demonstrate that
each of MMI’s stated reasons for his non-renewal was false and that the real reason
was retaliation, which he failed to do. See Crawford, 482 F.3d at 1309; Brooks,
446 F.3d at 1163. Thus, the district court correctly found that Marable did not
establish pretext, and its grant of summary judgment on his retaliation claim was
proper.
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III.
Procedurally, when a district court’s judgment is based upon multiple,
independent grounds, an appellant must convince the appellate court that each
enumerated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect. Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). In Sapuppo, we noted that
an appellant must clearly and specifically identify in his brief any issue he wants
the appellate court to address. Id. If an appellant does not appropriately challenge
one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to
have abandoned any challenge to that ground, and we affirm the district court’s
judgment. Id.
Substantively, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a
person based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The elements
of a race discrimination claim under § 1981, in an employment context, are the
same as a Title VII disparate treatment claim. Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000).
Specifically, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of his race. 42 U.S.C.
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§ 2000e-2(a)(1). An employee can prove discriminatory intent by using either
direct or circumstantial evidence. When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, as here, we apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in
McDonnell Douglas. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253,
1264 (11th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of presenting
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to determine that he has satisfied the
elements of his prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at
1824.
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie failure-to-promote claim by showing
that: “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was qualified and applied
for a promotion; (3) [he] was rejected despite [his] qualifications; and (4) other
equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the protected class
were promoted.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1089.
The district court based its grant of summary judgment on Marable’s racially
discriminatory failure-to-promote claim on two alternative grounds: (1) he
abandoned his claim; and (2) he did not establish a prima facie case. On appeal,
Marable has not expressly challenged the district court’s finding of abandonment.
Therefore, he has abandoned any challenge on appeal to the district court’s
abandonment finding. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that Marable did not abandon his racially
discriminatory failure-to-promote claim before the district court, and his counseled
brief is deemed to implicitly challenge that finding, the district court correctly
found that Marable failed to establish a prima facie case of failure-to-promote.
The record shows that the Admissions Counselor position, for which Marable
applied, was on the same pay scale as his prior position at MMI, and it did not
carry with it additional benefits or greater responsibility. Thus, the Admissions
Counselor position was not a “promotion” for Marable. See Webster’s II New
College Dictionary 885 (Houghton Mifflin 1995) (defining “promotion” as
“[a]dvancement in responsibility or rank”). Accordingly, the district court
correctly found that he did not establish a prima facie case of racially
discriminatory failure-to-promote. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1089.
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that Marable did establish a prima
facie case of racially discriminatory failure-to-promote, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment was still proper, as he failed to establish that the proffered
reasons for his non-selection were pretextual. MMI identified several reasons for
its selection of another candidate, Harry Howell, for the Admissions Counselor
position: (1) Howell’s intellect, energy, and articulate and polished manner; (2) his
recruiting ideas; (3) his experience with an ROTC officer commissioning program;
(4) his knowledge of social media; and (5) his ability to connect with young
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people. Thus, the burden shifted to Marable to show that each of the stated reasons
was false, and that the real reason was race discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106. Marable did not, however, submit any evidence showing
that any of the stated reasons for Howell’s selection were false, nor did he
demonstrate any racially discriminatory animus on the part of MMI’s President,
who chose Howell for the position. Thus, Marable did not meet his burden to
show that the proffered reasons for his non-selection were pretextual. See Brooks,
446 F.3d at 1163. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
his failure-to-promote claim was proper.
IV.
Title VII prohibits a hostile work environment where “a series of separate
acts collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.” McCann v.
Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may
show that:
(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his
membership in the protected group; (4) it was severe or pervasive
enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
hostile or abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is
responsible for that environment under a theory of either vicarious or
direct liability.
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Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We have held that the requirement that the harassment be “severe or
pervasive” has both an objective and a subjective component. Gowski v. Peake,
682 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). In determining the objective
component, the court is to consider all of the circumstances, including: (1) the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct
was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
(4) whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s job performance.
McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378. Even if offensive, “sporadic and isolated” conduct
does not support a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 1379.
For example, we have concluded that, for summary judgment purposes, a
racially hostile work environment may exist where evidence showed that:
(1) vulgar racial graffiti frequently appeared in employee restrooms; (2) nooses
were displayed at the workplace in the employee breakroom on multiple occasions;
(3) several white employees wore or displayed Confederate flag paraphernalia; and
(4) several white supervisors and coworkers called black employees racial slurs.
See Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., LLC, 754 F.3d 1240, 1246, 1251–54 (11th Cir. 2014).
On the other hand, we have held that, where the plaintiff’s only evidence of
harassment was the use of racially derogatory language by white coworkers over a
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two-year period, such conduct was not “severe or pervasive” so as to create a
racially hostile work environment. See McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378–79.
The district court correctly concluded that Marable failed to establish a
prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment. The record shows that
Marable identified the following alleged instances of harassment: (1) the hazing
allegations and investigation to which he was subjected; (2) Tate’s request that he
check in upon arriving at work; and (3) Tate’s racially offensive remarks. With
respect to Tate’s racially discriminatory comments, the district court correctly
found that such isolated conduct was not sufficient to create a racially hostile work
environment. See McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378–79. Further, Marable did not present
any evidence that either the hazing allegations and subsequent investigation, or
Tate’s request that he check in before starting his shift, was based on his race. See
Jones, 683 F.3d at 1292. Moreover, Marable specifically admitted that he was able
to perform his job duties satisfactorily at all times during his employment with
MMI. Thus, the record demonstrates that any harassment was not severe or
pervasive enough to unreasonably interfere with Marable’s job performance. See
Jones, 683 F.3d at 1292; McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378. Accordingly, the district
court properly granted summary judgment on Marable’s racially hostile work
environment claim.
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Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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