Lin v. Barr ( 2019 )


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  •      17-2259
    Lin v. Barr
    BIA
    A079 141 366
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 17th day of April, two thousand nineteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    8                 Chief Judge,
    9            REENA RAGGI,
    10            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   BAI XIANG LIN,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                 v.                                            17-2259
    18                                                               NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.*
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONER:                  Margaret W. Wong, Esq.,
    26                                    Cleveland, OH.
    27
    *Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
    Attorney General William P. Barr is automatically
    substituted for former Acting Attorney General Matthew G.
    Whitaker.
    1    FOR RESPONDENT:                  Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    2                                     Attorney General, Civil Division;
    3                                     Song E. Park, Senior Litigation
    4                                     Counsel; Matt A. Crapo, Attorney,
    5                                     Office of Immigration Litigation,
    6                                     United States Department of
    7                                     Justice, Washington, DC.
    8
    9        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    12   is DENIED.
    13       Petitioner Bai Xiang Lin, a native and citizen of the
    14   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of June 23, 2017
    15   decision of the BIA denying his third motion to reopen.              In
    16   re Bai Xiang Lin, No. A079 141 366 (B.I.A. June 23, 2017).
    17   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    18   and procedural history in this case.
    19       We review the BIA’s denial of Lin’s motion to reopen for
    20   abuse   of   discretion    and   consider   whether    its   conclusion
    21   regarding    changed      country    conditions   is    supported   by
    22   substantial evidence.        Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 23
       138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).         It is undisputed that Lin’s 2017
    24   motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it
    25   was his third motion to reopen, and he filed it nearly 8 years
    2
    1    after the BIA affirmed his removal order.            See 8 U.S.C.
    2    § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2).        Although
    3    exceeding the time and number limitations may be excused under
    4    certain circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
    5    in   concluding   that   neither   ineffective   assistance   nor   a
    6    change in country conditions excused petitioner from meeting
    7    these limitations in this case.
    8         The time for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled if
    9    the movant establishes ineffective assistance of counsel and
    10   shows that he acted with diligence in raising the claim.        See
    11   Rashid v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    , 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Jian Hua
    12   Wang v. BIA, 
    508 F.3d 710
    , 715 (2d Cir. 2007); Cekic v. INS,
    13   
    435 F.3d 167
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2006).       The BIA did not abuse its
    14   discretion in declining to toll the time limit here because
    15   Lin raised the same ineffective assistance claim in his prior
    16   motion and petition, both of which were denied because he had
    17   not shown due diligence. See Bai Xiang Lin v. Lynch, 
    615 F. 18
       App’x 706, 707-08 (2d Cir. 2015).       Lin did not identify any
    19   new information that would merit revisiting the issue now.
    20        Although the time and number limitations for filing a
    21   motion to reopen do not apply if reopening is sought to allow
    3
    1    an application for asylum and the motion to reopen is “based
    2    on changed country conditions arising in the country of
    3    nationality,”    the   evidence   submitted   must       demonstrate   a
    4    “material” change since the time of the original hearing.
    5    8 U.S.C.     § 1229a(c)(7)(A),    (C)(ii);    see    also      8 C.F.R.
    6    § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 247
    , 253
    7    (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying
    8    a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country
    9    conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s]
    10   the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion
    11   to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing
    12   below.”).     The BIA acknowledged the news article and State
    13   Department    report    that   Lin    submitted,     but     reasonably
    14   concluded that those documents did not reflect a material
    15   worsening of conditions in China related to the enforcement
    16   of the family planning policy in the relevant time period.
    17   Both   documents   established    that   China     has     consistently
    18   engaged in coercive population control programs since 1971
    19   and reflect a recent lessening of restrictions, in that China
    20   has raised the birth limit from one to two children per
    21   couple.     Although the news article reports continued harsh
    4
    1    restrictions on people who have more than two children, those
    2    restrictions do not constitute a change in country conditions
    3    because they were also reflected in the evidence presented at
    4    Lin’s original hearing.          See In re S-Y-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 5
        at 253.    Thus, on this record, the agency was not compelled
    6    to   conclude    that    Lin’s    evidence    reflected    a   change   in
    7    conditions material to his fear of harm as someone who
    8    resisted the prior family planning policy.                See 8 U.S.C.
    9    § 1252(b)(4)(B)      (“administrative         findings    of   fact     are
    10   conclusive      unless   any     reasonable    adjudicator     would     be
    11   compelled to conclude to the contrary”).
    12        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    14   that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    15   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    16   is DISMISSED as moot.       Any pending request for oral argument
    17   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    18   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    19   34.1(b).
    20                                      FOR THE COURT:
    21                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    22                                      Clerk of Court
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2259

Filed Date: 4/17/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2019