Singh v. Holder , 593 F. App'x 74 ( 2014 )


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  •          13-2105
    Singh v. Holder
    BIA
    Abrams, IJ
    A093 394 054
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 17th day of December, two thousand fourteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                DENNIS JACOBS,
    8                ROBERT D. SACK,
    9                DENNY CHIN,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _____________________________________
    12
    13       HARJIT SINGH,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                         v.                                   13-2105
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       _____________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:               Joshua Bardavid, New York, New York.
    24
    25       FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    26                                     General; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior
    27                                     Litigation Counsel; Brooke M.
    28                                     Maurer, Trial Attorney, Office of
    29                                     Immigration Litigation, United
    30                                     States Department of Justice,
    31                                     Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Harjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks
    6   review of a May 15, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming an
    7   Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) April 9, 2012, decision,
    8   pretermitting his asylum application and denying his
    9   application for withholding of removal and relief under the
    10   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).    In re Harjit Singh, No.
    11   A093 394 054 (B.I.A. May 15, 2013), aff’g No. A093 394 054
    12   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 9, 2012).     We assume the parties’
    13   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    14   in this case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    16   the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.     See Yan Chen
    17   v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).     The
    18   applicable standards of review are well established.     See 8
    19   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    ,
    20   513 (2d Cir. 2009).   Because Singh does not challenge the
    21   pretermission of his asylum application, we address only
    22   withholding of removal and CAT relief.
    23
    2
    1       For applications such as Singh’s, governed by the REAL
    2   ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality
    3   of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the
    4   applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
    5   plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
    6   statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the
    7   heart of the applicant’s claim.”   8 U.S.C.
    8   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 9
      162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).   “We defer therefore
    10   to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    11   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    12   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
    13   credibility ruling.”   Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    14   Here, the IJ reasonably based the adverse credibility
    15   determination on Singh’s admission that he lied at his 2008
    16   hearing about how he traveled between Toronto and Vancouver
    17   prior to arriving in the United States, and related
    18   inconsistencies regarding his residence and travels in
    19   Canada.
    20       Initially, Singh testified that he flew to Vancouver,
    21   but later admitted that he drove, completely repudiating
    22   extensive testimony at his first hearing.     He also provided
    3
    1   conflicting stories about who he lived with in Toronto and
    2   for how long.    Singh’s excuse, that he was told to lie,
    3   fails to describe the circumstances leading to the false
    4   testimony and therefore does not compel the conclusion that
    5   the IJ did not consider the excuse.    See Xiao Ji Chen v.
    6   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 338 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006)
    7   (explaining that the agency need not “expressly parse or
    8   refute on the record each and every one of [an applicant’s]
    9   purported explanations for testimonial inconsistencies or
    10   evidentiary gaps”); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 11
      77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that an IJ is not required
    12   to credit any plausible explanation, but only one a “fact-
    13   finder would be compelled to credit” (internal quotation
    14   marks and citation omitted)).
    15        Although the IJ did not explicitly consider Singh’s
    16   testimony regarding his past persecution, he did not err in
    17   relying primarily on Singh’s admittedly false testimony
    18   about his life after fleeing India to deny the entire
    19   application.    Under the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in
    20   omnibus, “a single instance of false testimony may (if
    21   attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the
    22   alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”     Siewe
    4
    1   v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2007).      However, the
    2   doctrine “does not excuse assessment of evidence that is
    3   independently corroborated,” and an adverse credibility
    4   determination based on false evidence relating to an
    5   ancillary matter must be otherwise supported by the totality
    6   of the circumstances.     
    Id. Here, the
    IJ reasonably gave
    7   minimal weight to the only corroborating evidence Singh
    8   submitted, affidavits from his wife and a neighbor, because
    9   the authors were unavailable for cross-examination.      See
    10   Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 342 (2d
    11   Cir. 2006) (the weight accorded to documentary evidence lies
    12   largely within agency’s discretion); see also Matter of H-L-
    13   H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (giving
    14   diminished evidentiary weight to letters from “relatives and
    15   friends,” because they were from interested witnesses not
    16   subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui
    17   Lin Huang v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
    (2d Cir. 2012).
    18   Accordingly, Singh’s false testimony infected the balance of
    19   his claim because the incidents of alleged persecution were
    20   not sufficiently corroborated with evidence independent of
    21   the credibility issues.     Taking the false statement, the
    22   additional unexplained inconsistencies, and the failure to
    23   corroborate the past persecution claim, together, the
    5
    1   totality of the circumstances supports the IJ’s adverse
    2   credibility determination.    See 8 U.S.C.
    3   §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d 4
      at 167.
    5       The adverse credibility determination in this case
    6   necessarily precludes success on Singh’s claims for both
    7   withholding of removal and CAT relief, because the only
    8   evidence of a threat to Singh’s life or freedom, or
    9   likelihood of torture, depended upon his credibility.     Paul
    10   v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
    11       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    12   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    13   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    14   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    15   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for
    16   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    17   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    18   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    19                                 FOR THE COURT:
    20                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    21
    22
    6