Singh v. Garland ( 2022 )


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  •      20-612
    Singh v. Garland
    BIA
    Douchy, IJ
    A208 200 734
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 23rd day of June, two thousand twenty-two.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            GUIDO CALABRESI,
    8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    9            EUNICE C. LEE,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   GURINDERJIT SINGH,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                      v.                                  20-612
    17                                                          NAC
    18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                    Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    26                                      Assistant Attorney General; John
    27                                      S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Todd
    28                                      J. Cochran, Trial Attorney, Office
    1                                   of Immigration Litigation, United
    2                                   States Department of Justice,
    3                                   Washington, DC.
    4          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7   is DENIED.
    8          Petitioner Gurinderjit Singh, a native and citizen of
    9   India, seeks review of a January 21, 2020 decision of the BIA
    10   affirming an April 19, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge
    11   (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and
    12   protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In
    13   re Gurinderjit Singh, No. A208 200 734 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2020),
    14   aff’g No. A208 200 734 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C.Apr. 19, 2018).          We
    15   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    16   procedural history.
    17          We review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the
    18   BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir.
    19   2005).       The   applicable    standards   of   review   are   well
    20   established.         See   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B)     (“[T]he
    21   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
    22   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    23   contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d
    2
    1   Cir.    2009)     (reviewing     factual      findings       for   substantial
    2   evidence and questions of law and application of law to facts
    3   de novo); see also Gjerjaj v. Holder, 
    691 F.3d 288
    , 292 (2d
    4   Cir. 2012) (“We review de novo questions of law, including
    5   constitutional claims.”).
    6          As an initial matter, we reject Singh’s argument that
    7   the    IJ   deprived     him    of    due    process    by    admitting    and
    8    considering country conditions evidence submitted by the
    9    Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on the day of the
    10   hearing.     Singh has not shown that he was deprived of a full
    11   and fair hearing or that he suffered prejudice because of the
    12   timing of the evidentiary submission.                    See Debeatham v.
    13   Holder,     
    602 F.3d 481
    ,    486    (2d    Cir.     2010)(holding     that
    14   petitioner had to show “that the outcome of his removal
    15   proceedings would have been . . . different” but for the
    16   alleged due process violation); Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey,
    17   
    531 F.3d 141
    , 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring petitioner to
    18   show prejudice to state a due process claim); Li Hua Lin v.
    19   U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
    453 F.3d 99
    , 104 (2d Cir. 2006)(requiring
    20   petitioner to show she was deprived of “a full and fair
    21   opportunity       to   present       [her]    claims”    (quotation       marks
    3
    1   omitted)).      Singh’s attorney was provided an opportunity to
    2   review DHS’s evidence and respond in her closing argument,
    3   and Singh has not shown what other arguments or evidence he
    4   would have raised if afforded more time.           See Debeatham, 602
    5   F.3d at 486.
    6       Moreover, we find no error in the agency’s determination
    7   that the record established that Singh could safely relocate
    8   within India.     Where, as here, the agency concludes that an
    9   asylum applicant suffered past persecution, the applicant is
    10   entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future
    11   persecution.      
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1).*           The burden then
    12   shifts    to     DHS     to     rebut    that   presumption.            
    Id.
    13   § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii).          DHS may rebut the presumption if it
    14   establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    15   applicant can “avoid future persecution by relocating to
    16   another   part    of   the    applicant’s    country     of   nationality
    17   . . . ,   and    under    all    the    circumstances,    it    would   be
    18   reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.”                   8 C.F.R.
    19   § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii); see also Surinder Singh v. BIA,
    * Citations to the regulations are to the version in effect
    at the time of the agency’s decisions.
    4
    1   
    435 F.3d 216
    , 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Asylum in the United States
    2   is not available to obviate re-location to sanctuary in one’s
    3   own country.”).           The IJ considers, among other relevant
    4   factors, “whether the applicant would face other serious harm
    5   in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife
    6   within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial
    7   infrastructure;         geographical       limitations;     and   social    and
    8   cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social
    9   and familial ties.”            
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(3).             When the
    10   alleged        persecutor      is   the     government      itself     or   an
    11   organization or group that is government-sponsored, it is
    12   presumed that internal relocation would not be reasonable.
    13   
    Id.
     § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii).
    14        As an initial matter, here the agency properly determined
    15   that Singh was not persecuted by the government, so there is
    16   no   presumption        that   relocation     would   not   be    reasonable.
    17   Jagdeep Singh v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 106
    , 115 (2d Cir. 2021)
    18   (“An applicant’s allegation that he was persecuted by members
    19   of a political party—even one that is in power nationally or,
    20   as Singh alleges of the Akali Dal Badal, is aligned with a
    21   party     in    power    nationally—does       not    establish      that   the
    5
    1   applicant was persecuted by the government.”).
    2       Second,     the       agency     properly    determined         that   DHS
    3   demonstrated Singh could safely relocate within India.                     DHS
    4   submitted a 2017 report by the Law Library of Congress, which
    5   indicates that “[t]here appear to be no legal obstacles for
    6   members of the Sikh faith to relocate to other areas of
    7   India.”   Certified Administrative Record at 204.                   According
    8   to the report, “[o]nly hard-core militants appear to be of
    9    interest to central Indian authorities” and “holding pro-
    10   Khalistani    views      would     not   make   someone   a    high-profile
    11   militant.”    
    Id.
         The Law Library report notes that, according
    12   to a 2001 census, approximately 5 million of the 19 million
    13   Sikhs in India live outside of Punjab, 
    id. at 205
    , and
    14   “members of the Sikh religion are able to practice their faith
    15   without restriction in all states of India,” 
    id. at 207
    .                   The
    16   report further notes that only high-profile militants are at
    17   risk of harm.       
    Id.
     at 208–09.
    18       Third, the agency properly determined that it would be
    19   reasonable for Singh to relocate given his education and work
    20   experience    as     a    computer       techinician.         See    8 C.F.R.
    21   § 1208.13(b)(3).         Accordingly, this record “does not compel
    6
    1   the   conclusion    that   internal     relocation         would    not   avert
    2   future persecution.”       Jagdeep Singh, 11 F.4th at 116.                 The
    3   agency’s    finding   that    Singh         could    safely    relocate      is
    4   dispositive    of   asylum,   withholding           of   removal,    and   CAT
    5   relief.    See Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 119–20 (2d Cir.
    6   2010) (holding that where record does not demonstrate chance
    7   of persecution required for asylum, it “necessarily fails to
    8   demonstrate”   the    likelihood       of    harm    for    withholding     of
    9   removal and CAT relief).
    10         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    11   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    12   stays VACATED.
    13                                   FOR THE COURT:
    14                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    15                                   Clerk of Court
    7