Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coal. v. EPA ( 2018 )


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  • 16-3420-ag
    Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coal. v. EPA
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
    FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
    York, on the 15th day of May, two thousand eighteen.
    PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges,
    WILLIAM K. SESSIONS III,
    District Judge*
    ________________________________________________
    FINGER LAKES ZERO WASTE COALITION, INC.,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                         No. 16-3420-ag
    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
    AGENCY, SCOTT PRUITT, ADMINISTRATOR,
    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
    AGENCY,
    Respondents.**
    ________________________________________________
    *
    Judge William K. Sessions III, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by
    designation.
    **
    In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), the Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set
    forth above.
    FOR PETITIONER:                            Gary A. Abraham, Law Office of Gary A.
    Abraham, Great Valley, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                            Heather E. Gange, Environmental & Natural
    Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice
    (Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney
    General, Environmental & Natural Resources
    Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Zach
    Pilchen, Michael Lee, Office of General
    Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, on
    the brief), Washington, D.C.
    Petition for Review of a July 29, 2016, order of the Administrator of the
    Environmental Protection Agency.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
    Petitioner Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition, Inc. (“the Coalition”) petitions for
    review of an order of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator denying
    the Coalition’s request that the EPA reopen or object to a permit issued by the State of New
    York for a facility burning gas from a nearby landfill in Ontario County, New York. We
    assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
    and the issues presented in the petition for review, which we discuss as relevant here.
    I.    Statutory Framework
    Title V of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), which Congress added to the CAA in 1990,
    “requires major stationary sources of air pollution to receive operating permits
    incorporating CAA requirements and establishes a procedure for federal authorization of
    state-run Title V permitting programs.” N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Whitman, 
    321 F.3d 316
    , 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (“NYPIRG”); see also 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 7661
    7661f. Following
    2
    the passage of Title V, the state of New York established such a state program through its
    Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The EPA gave the program final
    approval in 2001. See NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at
    32022. Pursuant to the program, the DEC
    may grant Title V permits to major stationary sources of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. §
    7661a; NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at 320
    .
    As part of the permitting process, DEC must offer an “opportunity for public
    comment” on a permit application. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6); NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at 323
    .
    Once the DEC responds to public comments and decides to issue the permit, it “must give
    the EPA 45 days to review and to object to a permit that does not meet the requirements of
    Title V.” NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at
    323 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1); 
    40 C.F.R. § 70.8
    (c)).
    If the EPA does not object, then “any person may petition the Administrator within 60 days
    after the expiration of the Administrator’s 45-day review period to make such objection.”
    
    40 C.F.R. § 70.8
    (d). The Administrator must then review the petition within 60 days and
    object if the petitioner “demonstrates” a permit applicant’s noncompliance with CAA
    requirements. NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at 333
    ; 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2).
    The EPA Administrator may also reopen a state-issued Title V permit for cause
    where the EPA discovers, or a petitioner demonstrates, that one of four requirements for
    re-opening is satisfied. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(e); 
    40 C.F.R. § 70.7
    (f)(1) (listing
    requirements for EPA to reopen a Title V permit). If the Administrator denies either a
    petition to object or a petition to reopen, the petitioner may appeal this final agency action
    to the appropriate U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. See 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
    3
    As the EPA explains, state permitting authorities considering a permit application
    must decide whether to treat certain stationary sources of air pollution as a single source of
    pollution or as separate sources. This decision has “real-world consequences” because “[i]f
    two facilities are part of the same sources, and their combined emissions exceed certain
    thresholds, they are considered a ‘major source’ . . . of air pollutants,” which results in
    “more stringent [CAA] controls.” Respondents’ Br. at 8. To make this determination, state
    permitting authorities must examine whether “any group of stationary sources . . . are [1]
    located on one or more continuous or adjacent properties, . . . [2] are under common control
    . . . , [and] [3] belong[] to a single major industrial grouping.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 70.2
     (defining
    “major source”).
    At issue in this case is the “common control” requirement. While New York state
    law does not define this requirement, the DEC applies its Declaratory Ruling 19-19 to
    analyze the common control question. This ruling explains that the DEC will determine
    common control on a “case-by-case basis,” guided by “EPA’s informal guidance
    documents and determination letters” without being bound by those same letters or any test
    or factor. App. 178.
    II.    Factual Background
    This case began in 2011, when Seneca Energy II, LLC (“Seneca Energy”), applied
    to DEC to renew and modify its Title V permit. Seneca Energy operates a “landfill gas-to-
    energy” facility (“the facility”) in Ontario County, New York. App. 85. The facility obtains
    its gas from a landfill on the same or adjacent property owned by Ontario County and
    leased and operated by Casella Waste Systems of Ontario, LLC. During the public
    4
    comment portion of the permitting process, the Coalition submitted the only public input
    regarding Seneca Energy’s application.
    In its comments, the Coalition sought to demonstrate that the facility and the
    adjacent landfill are under “common control” for purposes of the major source analysis. In
    response, the DEC issued an 11-page “Responsiveness Summary” addressing the various
    issues that the Coalition raised and reaffirming that the facility and landfill are not under
    common control. DEC then submitted the proposed permit to the EPA for review, and the
    EPA did not object within the 45-day time limit. As permitted by 
    40 C.F.R. § 70.8
    (d), the
    Coalition petitioned the EPA on December 22, 2012, to object to the permit on the ground
    that the facility and landfill are under common control.
    The EPA did not respond to the petition until June 29, 2015. The 2015 EPA Order
    determined that the DEC had inadequately addressed the Coalition’s concerns in its
    Responsiveness Summary, because that summary “did not affirmatively identify or explain
    the facts and factors upon which it based its determination that the facilities are not under
    common control.” App. 99. Instead, the “DEC merely provided targeted rebuttals to some
    of the facts presented by the commenter.” App. 100. The EPA then directed the DEC “to
    explain, on the record, what case-specific facts and factors [DEC] considered as part of its
    source determination analysis regarding the two facilities” in order to “provide an adequate
    record sufficient to support a source determination.” App. 10001.
    The DEC responded to the 2015 EPA Order on October 26, 2015, with a “Source
    Determination” explanation. The 2015 Source Determination provided additional
    background details on the facility and the landfill, the statutory and legal framework, and
    5
    analysis of other “major source” criteria. That information was not included in the original
    2012 Responsiveness Summary that the DEC issued. The DEC then applied numerous
    factors from Declaratory Ruling 19-19, concluding that each factor weighed against finding
    common control. As part of this analysis, the DEC (1) included additional reasoning
    regarding the sharing of tax credits by the facility and the landfill to justify its common
    control conclusion that the previous Responsive Summary did not address, and (2) noted
    that the source determination was consistent with prior determinations in New York,
    another factor that the Responsiveness Summary did not discuss.
    On February 8, 2016, 105 days after the DEC Source Determination, the Coalition
    filed a petition styled as a request to reopen the facility’s Title V permit. Although styled a
    request to reopen, the petition noted the EPA’s 45-day timeframe to object to a permit and
    the 60-day timeframe that outside parties have to petition to the EPA for an objection after
    those initial 45 days. Using this timeframe, the Coalition stated that it had timely filed
    within the 60-day timeframe, even though that timeframe is for a petition to object, and not
    for a petition to reopen. As to its substance, the petition incorporated the Coalition’s 2012
    petition to object by reference and noted a few facts from that petition to conclude that the
    facility and the landfill are under common control. The Coalition also argued that the
    DEC’s 2015 Source Determination did not respond to the 2015 EPA Order and applied the
    wrong legal analysis.
    The EPA Administrator denied the Coalition’s petition on July 29, 2016, both as a
    petition to object and as a petition to reopen. As to the petition to reopen, the Administrator
    primarily concluded that the Coalition did not address the reopening criteria under 40
    
    6 C.F.R. § 70.7
    (f)(1) and did not engage the 2015 Source Determination. Insofar as the
    Coalition’s submission was a petition to object, the Administrator denied the petition for
    similar reasons. The Coalition now appeals.
    III.   Review of the Petition
    We review the denial of a Title V petition to object or reopen pursuant to the
    standards for judicial review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. NYPIRG, 
    321 F.3d at
    324 (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    ). “Under the APA, we must set aside any agency action
    that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
    law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)); see also Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v.
    EPA, 
    540 U.S. 461
    , 49697 (2004) (reviewing EPA order regarding state environmental
    agency’s decision under arbitrary and capricious standard of 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)). “[I]n
    deciding whether agency action is arbitrary and capricious, a court considers whether the
    agency relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
    consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
    runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
    ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Islander E. Pipeline
    Co. v McCarthy, 
    525 F.3d 141
    , 15051 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We conclude that the EPA Administrator did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by
    denying the Coalition’s petition to reopen or object to the Title V permit. It was not
    arbitrary or capricious for the Administrator to deny a petition to reopen where that petition
    did not mention the relevant legal framework for reopening a case, much less explain why
    the petitioner is entitled to the relief that it seeks under that framework. See 
    40 C.F.R. §
                                7
    70.7(f)(1) (outlining standard for reopening a Title V permit). Similarly, insofar as the
    Coalition’s petition requested that the EPA object to the permit, the Coalition did not
    respond to or engage the 2015 Source Determination. As a result, the petition was plainly
    inadequate under the relevant statutory framework. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2) (requiring
    petitioner to “identify all . . . objections” to the Title V permit); see also id. (requiring
    petitioner to “demonstrate[] to the Administrator that the permit is not in compliance with
    the [CAA’s] requirements”); MacClarence v. EPA, 
    596 F.3d 1123
    , 113033 (9th Cir.
    2010) (affirming denial of petition to object where petition did not adequately address state
    agency decision regarding the aggregation of polluting facilities).
    In contrast to the Coalition’s petition, the 2015 DEC Source Determination set forth
    the applicable statutory framework and common source explanation in significant detail.
    The DEC submitted a detailed memo accompanied by many exhibits to support the
    common control conclusion that it reached. Further, the 2015 Source Determination
    included additional analysis regarding the tax credits that the facility and landfill shared
    and pointed to precedent to justify the common source conclusion. Given the DEC’s
    detailed response to the 2015 EPA Order and the Coalition’s failure to address that
    response, the EPA’s 2016 Order provided a non-arbitrary and reasonable ground to deny
    the petition.
    We also reject the Coalition’s argument that the 2016 EPA Order was arbitrary and
    capricious because the agency requested a more thorough common control explanation in
    2015, but then denied the Coalition’s petition in 2016. First, as we have already explained,
    the Coalition’s petition did not engage with the 2015 Source Determination. Second, as we
    8
    discussed above, the 2015 Source Determination provided a much more thorough
    explanation for the common control decision. Accordingly, the Administrator’s differing
    responses to the two DEC’s explanations from 2012 and 2015 did not constitute arbitrary
    or capricious agency action.
    We have considered the Coalition’s remaining arguments and find them without
    merit. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review of the EPA’s order.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    9