Liu v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  •     19-105
    Liu v. Garland
    BIA
    Sponzo, IJ
    A206 065 948
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 10th day of May, two thousand twenty-one.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    DENNY CHIN,
    MICHAEL H. PARK,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    JIBIN LIU,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                          19-105
    NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                   Keith S. Barnett, Esq., New York,
    NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian M. Boynton, Acting
    Assistant Attorney General; John
    S. Hogan, Assistant Director;
    Robbin K. Blaya, Trial Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner      Jibin    Liu,    a    native   and   citizen   of   the
    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 17,
    2018 decision of the BIA affirming a November 8, 2017 decision
    of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of
    removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”).   In re Jibin Liu, No. A206 065 948 (B.I.A. Dec. 17,
    2018), aff’g No. A206 065 948 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Nov. 8,
    2017).       We   assume    the     parties’    familiarity     with    the
    underlying facts and procedural history.
    We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
    “for the sake of completeness.”                 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
    Homeland   Sec.,    
    448 F.3d 524
    ,   528   (2d   Cir.   2006).     The
    applicable standards of review are well established.                    See
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).          The only issue before us is whether
    Liu established his eligibility for asylum and withholding of
    removal based on his claim that he was detained and beaten
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    for gathering with a group at a government office in China to
    seek an explanation for the government’s failure to fully
    compensate them for a broken land lease.
    To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of
    removal, “the applicant must establish that race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
    political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
    for      persecuting      the        applicant.”             
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i); 
    id.
     § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of
    C-T-L-, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 341
    , 348 (B.I.A. 2010).             “In order
    to    establish    persecution       on     account    of   political
    opinion . . . , an asylum applicant must show . . . , through
    direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s
    motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s political
    belief.”    Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 545 (2d
    Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).          “[O]pposition
    to endemic corruption or extortion . . . [and] opposition to
    other government practices or policies[] may have a political
    dimension   when   it   transcends        mere   self-protection   and
    represents a challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the
    ruling regime.”    
    Id.
     at 547–48.         “Punishment for violation
    of a generally applicable criminal law is not persecution,”
    Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
    962 F.2d 234
    , 239 (2d Cir.
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    1992),     but   “prosecution   that       is    pretext    for   political
    persecution is not on account of law enforcement,” Jin Jin
    Long v. Holder, 
    620 F.3d 162
    , 166 (2d Cir. 2010).
    The agency did not err in concluding that Liu faced
    prosecution in China rather than persecution on account of an
    anti-corruption political opinion.              Liu testified that he and
    30 others went to the village management committee for an
    explanation and compensation rather than to oppose endemic
    corruption or government practices.               See Yueqing Zhang, 
    426 F.3d at 547
    .       And Liu did not provide any testimony from
    which to infer that committee members or the police believed
    he and his fellow villagers were at the government offices
    for any reason other than to protect their own interests.
    See 
    id.
     at 547–48.        Liu’s evidence further supports the
    agency’s    conclusion   that   he       was    subject    to   prosecution,
    despite the excessive force used, because it shows that police
    told the group of 30 to disperse, detained him and others
    from the group, charged him with violation of a generally
    applicable public security management law, punished him with
    administrative detention and a fine, and provided him an
    opportunity to appeal (which he did not do).                See 
    id. at 545
    (“[A]n applicant . . . must establish a fear of reprisal that
    is different in kind from a desire to avoid the exactions
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    (however harsh) that a foreign government may place upon its
    citizens.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Vumi
    v. Gonzales, 
    502 F.3d 150
    , 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing
    factors to consider in determining whether prosecution is a
    pretext for political persecution).
    Because Liu failed to show that he was targeted on
    account of an anti-corruption political opinion, real or
    imputed, and because he was subjected to prosecution under a
    generally applicable statute, the agency did not err in
    denying asylum and withholding of removal for failure to show
    a nexus between the harm he suffered and fears and a protected
    ground.     See   
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A);
    Yueqing Zhang, 
    426 F.3d at 545
    , 547–48; Saleh, 
    962 F.2d at 239
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    stays VACATED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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