Jiang v. Garland ( 2021 )

19-1659
Jiang v. Garland
BIA
Wright, IJ
A200 196 675
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 27th day of May, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
TIANMING JIANG,
Petitioner,
v. 19-1659
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Troy Nader Moslemi, Esq.
Flushing, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
Assistant Attorney General; Song
Park, Acting Assistant Director;
Virginia L. Gordon, Trial
Attorney; Eliza Collison, Law
Clerk, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Tianming Jiang, a citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a BIA decision affirming
an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Jiang’s application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Tianming Jiang,
No. A200 196 675 (B.I.A. May 13, 2019), aff’g No. A200 196
675 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 11, 2018). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history, and the well-established standards of review. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d
67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
Jiang submits that the agency erred in finding that he
failed to support his application for relief from removal
with credible evidence. Under the circumstances, we have
considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake
of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security,
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448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal
consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of
such statements with other evidence of record . . . without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,
it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d
at 76. That is not this case. Substantial evidence supports
the agency’s determination that Jiang was not credible as to
his claim that police in China had detained and beaten him
for practicing Christianity and would seek to harm him on his
return because he had fled the country.
In finding Jiang’s claim not supported by credible
evidence, the agency reasonably relied on record
inconsistencies regarding (1) whether Jiang had sought
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medical treatment after his release from detention and
(2) how his parents learned of his detention. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Jiang testified that he did not seek
medical care for his injuries, but his father reported that
he took Jiang for medical treatment immediately after his
release. Further, Jiang testified that his parents had to
call church members to discover that their son had been
detained, but Jiang’s father reported that someone came to
their house to tell them of the arrest. Offered an
opportunity to explain these inconsistencies, Jiang’s
responses were not so compelling as to require a factfinder
to credit his evidence. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,
80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a
plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Having questioned Jiang’s credibility, the agency
reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his
testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
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general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Beyond his
father’s letter, which contained the two noted
inconsistencies, Jiang submitted no evidence corroborating
his religious persecution claim.
Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the
agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, there is no merit
to Jiang’s argument that the IJ failed to consider whether he
has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his
religious practice in the United States because Jiang did not
assert such a fear before the IJ, testifying only that he
feared future harm for failing to report to police after his
release from detention and unlawful entry to the United
States.
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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