Jiang v. Garland ( 2022 )

20-3041
Jiang v. Garland
BIA
Conroy, IJ
A206 368 837
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 20th day of December, two thousand twenty-
5 two.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 MICHAEL H. PARK,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 JIAN XIN JIANG,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 20-3041
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, Esq., New York,
25 NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Laura Halliday
1 Hickein, Acting Senior Litigation
2 Counsel; Jennifer R. Khouri, Trial
3 Attorney, Office of Immigration
4 Litigation, United States
5 Department of Justice, Washington,
6 DC.
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Jian Xin Jiang, a native and citizen of the
12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 10,
13 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a June 6, 2018 decision of
14 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for
15 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
16 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jian Xin Jiang,
17 No. A 206 368 837 (B.I.A. Aug. 10, 2020), aff’g No. A 206 368
18 837 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 6, 2018). We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
21 BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520,
22 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review adverse credibility
23 determinations for substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v.
24 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and treat the
2
1 agency’s findings of fact as “conclusive unless any
2 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
3 contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
4 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
5 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
6 determination on . . . the consistency between the
7 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements
8 (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering
9 the circumstances under which the statements were made), the
10 internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency
11 of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and
12 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
13 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
14 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
15 relevant factor.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We
16 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
17 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
18 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
19 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
20 2008).
21 Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
3
1 determination here. Jiang alleged a past arrest and
2 detention for violating the family planning policy, a fear of
3 future persecution because the government had demolished his
4 family’s home without compensation, and a fear of religious
5 persecution based on his practice of Christianity in the
6 United States. The agency reasonably relied on
7 inconsistencies within Jiang’s statements and between his
8 statements and other evidence.
9 First, he was inconsistent about his arrest for violating
10 the family planning policy. He testified that police
11 officers arrested him and took him to a police station, but
12 later testified that family planning officials took him to a
13 family planning facility, which was “different from the
14 police facility.” The agency was not required to credit his
15 explanation that family planning officials took him to a
16 police facility because the family planning facility was
17 full, as that explanation conflicted with his testimony that
18 police and family planning officials do not work together.
19 See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
20 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
21 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
4
1 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
2 to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).
3 Second, the record is inconsistent about when Jiang’s
4 family’s home was demolished. There were inconsistencies
5 within his own testimony and with his mother’s testimony. He
6 testified that the destruction of the home gave rise to his
7 issues with family planning authorities in 2009, stated in
8 his personal statement that the home was demolished in 2013,
9 and his mother said it happened in 2011.
10 Third, Jiang’s testimony was inconsistent regarding why
11 he was not baptized. He testified that he attended church,
12 but also that he could not get baptized because he lived on
13 Long Island, did not know how to take subways, and could not
14 schedule a baptism because the Chinese shuttle ran only once
15 a week. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
16 Finally, he failed to rehabilitate his claims with
17 corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d
18 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to
19 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
20 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
21 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
5
1 been called into question.”). His mother did not confirm his
2 practice of Christianity; the agency was not required to
3 credit declarations from Jiang’s wife or mother because his
4 wife and mother were interested parties; his wife was not
5 available for cross-examination; and, as noted above, there
6 were inconsistencies between Jiang’s and his mother’s
7 statements. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d
8 Cir. 2020) (upholding the BIA’s decision to give little weight
9 to letters because they were from interested parties and the
10 authors were not available for cross-examination); Y.C. v.
11 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to the
12 agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s
13 documentary evidence).
14 In sum, the inconsistencies and lack of reliable
15 corroboration provide substantial evidence for the adverse
16 credibility determination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145
17 n.8 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien
18 from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.
19 Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more
20 forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496
21 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination is
6
1 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
2 because all three forms of relief are based on the same
3 factual predicates. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–
4 57 (2d Cir. 2006).
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
7 stays VACATED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10 Clerk of Court
11
7