Jiang v. Garland ( 2022 )

20-2810
Jiang v. Garland
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A206 998 935
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 18th day of October, two thousand twenty-
5 two.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10 STEVEN J. MENASHI,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 BIN JIANG,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 20-2810
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, Esq., New York,
25 NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; John S. Hogan,
1 Assistant Director; Rebecca
2 Hoffberg Phillips, Trial Attorney,
3 Office of Immigration Litigation,
4 United States Department of
5 Justice, Washington, DC.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Bin Jiang, a native and citizen of the
12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 17,
13 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a June 28, 2018, decision
14 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s application
15 for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
16 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bin Jiang, No.
17 A206 998 935 (B.I.A. Aug. 17, 2020), aff’g No. A206 998 935
18 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 28, 2018). We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
20 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s
21 and the BIA’s opinions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland
22 Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The IJ did not abuse
23 her discretion in denying a continuance for Jiang to submit
24 corroborating evidence, and substantial evidence supports the
25 agency’s determination that Jiang was not credible as to his
2
1 claim that he narrowly avoided arrest for attending an
2 unregistered church in China and that he continues to attend
3 church in the United States.
4 We review the denial of a continuance “under a highly
5 deferential standard of abuse of discretion.” Morgan v.
6 Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ “may grant
7 a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R.
8 § 1003.29 (2021). The IJ did not abuse her discretion in
9 declining to delay proceedings to provide Jiang additional
10 time to obtain and present corroborating documents given that
11 he had more than three years to do so. See Morgan, 445 F.3d
12 at 551; cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.
13 2009) (providing that “the alien bears the ultimate burden of
14 introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ”).
15 We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination
16 for substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891
17 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings
18 of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
19 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Considering the totality of the
21 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
22 base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency
3
1 between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
2 statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
3 considering the circumstances under which the statements were
4 made), the internal consistency of each such statement . . .
5 , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
6 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
7 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any
8 other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We
9 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
10 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
11 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
12 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
13 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
14 The IJ reasonably relied on Jiang’s inconsistent
15 statements regarding whether police threatened him at his own
16 home or at a fellow church member’s home, his omission of
17 that encounter from his asylum application, and his
18 inconsistent statements regarding where he had lived and how
19 often he attended church in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–
21 79 (providing that the agency may rely on omissions of facts
22 “that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been
4
1 expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances”).
2 Jiang did not compellingly explain the inconsistencies. See
3 Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
4 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
5 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
6 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
7 to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).
8 Having questioned Jiang’s credibility, the agency
9 reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his
10 claim with corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure
11 to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
12 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
13 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
14 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d
15 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Jiang failed to provide documentary
16 evidence from fellow church members or from his church to
17 corroborate his church attendance in China or the United
18 States, despite having more than three years to obtain such
19 evidence. The agency did not err in concluding that
20 affidavits from his wife and parents did not adequately
21 corroborate his attendance because they do not attend church
22 with him. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir.
5
1 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the
2 weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).
3 The inconsistencies and lack of corroboration provide
4 substantial evidence for the agency’s adverse credibility
5 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
6 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d
7 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency
8 might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled
9 to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so
10 preclude even more forcefully.”). That adverse credibility
11 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
12 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
13 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
14 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we need not
15 reach the agency’s alternative finding that Jiang failed to
16 satisfy his burden of proving a well-founded fear of
17 persecution on account of his religious practice in the United
18 States. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As
19 a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make
20 findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to
21 the results they reach.”).
22
6
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
3 stays VACATED.
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6 Clerk of Court
7