Sherpa v. Holder , 602 F. App'x 20 ( 2015 )


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  •      14-234
    Sherpa v. Holder
    BIA
    Wright, IJ
    A201 120 105
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.     WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
    APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4   on the 12th day of March, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    8            GERARD E. LYNCH,
    9            CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   KALJANG SHERPA,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                      v.                               14-234
    17                                                       NAC
    18   ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                  Jason A. Nielson, Mungoven &
    24                                    Associates, New York, New York.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
    27                                    Attorney General; Douglas E.
    28                                    Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Deitz
    29                                    P. Lefort, Trial Attorney, Office of
    1                                    Immigration Litigation, United
    2                                    States Department of Justice,
    3                                    Washington D.C.
    4
    5         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    8   is DENIED.
    9         Kaljang Sherpa, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks
    10   review    of    a    December       30,     2013,      decision     of    the     BIA,
    11   affirming the December 12, 2012, decision of an Immigration
    12   Judge    (“IJ”),         which   denied     his       application      for   asylum,
    13   withholding         of     removal,       and     relief    pursuant         to    the
    14   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).                     In re Kaljang Sherpa,
    15   No. A201 120 105 (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 2013), aff’g No. A201 120
    16   105   (Immig.       Ct.    N.Y.C.    Dec.       12,   2012).      We     assume   the
    17   parties’       familiarity          with     the       underlying        facts    and
    18   procedural history in this case.
    19         Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    20   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA.                      See Xue Hong Yang
    21   v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
    22   The applicable standards of review are well established.
    23   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 24
       510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    1        For asylum applications like Sherpa’s, governed by the
    2   REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the
    3   totality   of     the    circumstances,”          base    a   credibility
    4   determination on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s
    5   statements and other record evidence, “without regard to
    6   whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”                  8
    
    7 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).             “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
    8   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    9   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    10   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”               Xiu Xia Lin
    11   v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
    12   Substantial      evidence     supports          the    agency’s    adverse
    13   credibility determination.
    14        The   agency      reasonably       found    inconsistent     Sherpa’s
    15   initial testimony that, after he left Nepal, his wife lived
    16   in   Kathmandu   and    did   not   receive      any   threats    from   the
    17   Maoists, his later testimony that she actually lived in
    18   Solukhumbu and did receive threats from the Maoists, and his
    19   witness’s statement that Sherpa’s wife lived in both places.
    20   While these inconsistencies formed the crux of the agency’s
    21   adverse credibility determination, it also reasonably relied
    3
    1    on an inconsistency regarding the number of interactions
    2    Sherpa and his family had with Maoists when Sherpa was in
    3   Nepal.    See Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at
    166-67 & n.3.             Sherpa
    4   did    not   provide     compelling         explanations   for   these
    5    inconsistencies.      See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81
    6    (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an
    7    applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless
    8   those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to
    9   do so).
    10         Given these inconsistency findings, the totality of the
    11   circumstances    supports    the     agency’s    adverse   credibility
    12   determination.     See Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .                 That
    13   determination    is    dispositive     of    asylum,   withholding    of
    14   removal, and CAT relief as those claims are based on the
    15   same factual predicate.       Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    ,
    16   156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    17
    18
    19
    20
    21
    22
    4
    1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    2   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, Sherpa’s pending
    3   motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED
    4   as moot.
    5                               FOR THE COURT:
    6                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    7
    8
    5