Galo Carrillo v. Garland ( 2022 )

19-3197
Galo Carrillo v. Garland
BIA
Schoppert, IJ
A205 308 498
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 7th day of March, two thousand twenty-two.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MELVIN NOE GALO CARRILLO, AKA
14 MARVIN NOE GALO CARRILLO,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 19-3197
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Michael W. Pottetti, Esq., Port
25 Jefferson, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Jessica E.
1 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel;
2 Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney,
3 Office of Immigration Litigation,
4 United States Department of
5 Justice, Washington, DC.
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
9 is DENIED.
10 Petitioner Melvin Noe Galo Carrillo, a native and citizen
11 of Honduras, seeks review of a September 17, 2019, decision
12 of the BIA denying Galo Carrilo’s motion to remand and
13 affirming a February 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge
14 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
15 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Melvin
16 Noe Galo Carrillo, No. A 205 308 498 (B.I.A. Sept. 17, 2019),
17 aff’g No. A 205 308 498 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 9, 2018).
18 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
19 and procedural history.
20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
21 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d
22 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
23 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
24 Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual
2
1 findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de
2 novo); Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 421 F.3d 149, 157
3 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing denial of motion to remand for abuse
4 of discretion). An applicant for asylum must establish
5 either past persecution or a fear of future persecution and
6 show that “one central reason” for the past or feared harm is
7 a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R.
8 § 1208.13(b).
9 The agency did not err in finding that Galo Carrillo
10 failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear
11 of future persecution. Galo Carrillo identified his
12 daughter’s rape as his past persecution, but an asylum
13 “applicant must rely upon harm the applicant has suffered
14 individually.” Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d
15 Cir. 2007). Although harm to a family member may constitute
16 past persecution if “an applicant’s family member was harmed
17 as a means of targeting the applicant on some protected
18 ground,” id. (emphasis in original), there is no allegation
19 that Galo Carrillo’s daughter’s rapist acted out of any intent
20 to harm Galo Carrillo.
21 Galo Carrillo thus had the burden to show a reasonable
3
1 possibility of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
2 § 1208.13(b)(1). He did not do so. He asserted that he and
3 his family were at risk of retaliation from the rapist’s
4 family, but he testified that no one had physically harmed or
5 directly threatened him or his family and that his family had
6 been granted a restraining order against the rapist’s family.
7 See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To
8 qualify as persecution the conduct at issue must be
9 attributable to the government, whether directly because
10 engaged in by government officials, or indirectly because
11 engaged in by private persons whom the government is unable
12 or unwilling to control.” (quotation marks omitted)); Jian
13 Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In
14 the absence of solid support in the record . . . [applicant’s]
15 fear is speculative at best.”). Similarly, the BIA did not
16 abuse its discretion in finding that Galo Carrillo’s new
17 evidence in support of remand—that his daughter’s rapist had
18 been released and the prosecutor had dropped the case—was not
19 likely to change the result in his case because there was no
20 allegation of threats or attempted harm after the release.
21 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008)
4
1 (holding that movant has “‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating
2 that the proffered new evidence would likely alter the result
3 in [the] case” (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (2d
4 Cir. 2005))).
5 The above findings are dispositive of all forms of
6 relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b); Lecaj v.
7 Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly,
8 we do not reach Galo Carrillo’s arguments that his family
9 constitutes a particular social group. See INS v.
10 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
11 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
12 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
14 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
15 stays VACATED.
16 FOR THE COURT:
17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
18 Clerk of Court
19
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