Barretta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ( 2017 )

16-1836
Barretta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 2nd day of June, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
DENNIS JACOBS,
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Frances Ann Barretta,
Appellant,
v. 16-1836
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Frances Ann Barretta, pro se, Meriden, Connecticut.
FOR APPELLEE: Henry F. Reichner, Reed Smith LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Thompson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Frances Ann Barretta, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s denial of her
motion for a stay pending appeal. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) had obtained a
judgment in strict foreclosure in state court on Barretta’s home. Barretta then petitioned for
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, which triggered an automatic stay on
foreclosure proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court granted Wells Fargo
relief from the automatic stay, and plaintiff appealed to the district court, where she filed a motion
to stay the bankruptcy court’s order pending appeal. The district court denied her motion, which
Barretta now appeals to this Court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
As an initial matter, it could be argued that we have jurisdiction to review the district
court’s order, which is essentially a denial of an injunction as encompassed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). See In re Chateaugay Corp., 880 F.2d 1509, 1512 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he preliminary
hearing on a motion for relief from the [automatic] stay is similar to a hearing on a preliminary
injunction, and the decision as a result of the final hearing on the motion for relief is equivalent to
a permanent injunction.”); see also Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“So
long as a party to a proceeding or case in bankruptcy meets the conditions imposed by § 1292, a
court of appeals may rely on that statute as a basis for jurisdiction.”); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287–88 (1988) (“Section 1291(a)(1) . . . provide[s] appellate
jurisdiction over orders that grant or deny injunctions and orders that have the practical effect of
granting or denying injunctions and have serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” (internal
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quotation marks omitted)). But, in any event, to the degree our jurisdiction is in doubt, we would
reach the same outcome by exercising hypothetical jurisdiction. See Marquez-Almanzar v. I.N.S.,
418 F.3d 210, 216 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
Because here the district court’s denial of Barretta’s motion for a stay pending appeal is
akin to the denial of a preliminary injunction, we review the denial for abuse of discretion. See
Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2014). Upon review, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion.
When deciding a motion for a stay pending appeal, a court must consider four factors: “(1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.” In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
The district court properly concluded that Barretta did not establish a likelihood of success
on the merits because her challenge to the bankruptcy court’s order was likely barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that the lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over claims brought by state court losers that invite review and rejection of state court
judgments. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009). This Court has set forth four
requirements that must be met in order for a claim to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
(1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a
state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of the state
court judgment, and (4) the state judgment must have been rendered before the district court
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proceedings commenced. Id.
Each of the four requirements is satisfied in this case. First, Barretta lost in state court by
virtue of the judgment in strict foreclosure. See Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 715 A.2d 743, 745–47
(Conn. 1998) (judgment in strict foreclosure a final judgment despite remaining issues regarding
attorney’s fees); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir.
2014) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review of Connecticut state court judgment in strict
foreclosure). Second, Barretta claims that she will be injured by the foreclosure of her property,
which was authorized by the state court. Third, the objections she asserts to the bankruptcy court’s
order collaterally attack the state court judgment and would effectively require the district court to
declare the state court judgment void for her to prevail on the merits of her appeal. See Kropelnicki
v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002). Lastly, the state court judgment was issued before she
petitioned for bankruptcy.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in holding that the remaining stay factors
did not warrant that relief. While Barretta likely faces irreparable harm without a stay, this factor is
outweighed by the others. See Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2006)
(discussing weighing of stay factors). As for the third factor, the record indicates that Wells Fargo
has not been able to foreclose on the property despite being authorized to do so by the bankruptcy
court’s 2015 order, and has expended resources litigating this dispute. The fourth factor also
weighs against Barretta because there is a public interest in finality. In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373,
379 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997). In light of the balancing of these four factors, we hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barretta’s motion for a stay pending appeal.
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We have considered all of Barretta’s arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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