Rong Chen v. Lynch ( 2015 )


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  •      14-1961
    Chen v. Lynch
    BIA
    Zagzoug, IJ
    A087 978 713
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   9th day of September, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    8            DENNIS JACOBS,
    9            CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   RONG CHEN,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                   v.                                                       14-1961
    17                                                                            NAC
    18
    19   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,*
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                          Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
    * Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is
    automatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent.
    1    FOR RESPONDENT:            Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
    2                               Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery,
    3                               Assistant Director; Sarah A. Byrd,
    4                               Trial Attorney, Office of
    5                               Immigration Litigation, United
    6                               States Department of Justice,
    7                               Washington, D.C.
    8
    9        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    12   DENIED.
    13       Petitioner Rong Chen, a native and citizen of China, seeks
    14   review of a May 16, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming an April
    15   2, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Chen’s
    16   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    17   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   In re Rong Chen,
    18   No. A087 978 713 (B.I.A. May 16, 2014), aff’g No. A087 978 713
    19   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 2, 2012).     We assume the parties’
    20   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    21   in this case.
    22       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision “as modified by” the BIA,
    23   i.e., minus the determination that Chen’s asylum application
    24   was untimely filed.   Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
    25   
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).   Contrary to Chen’s argument,
    2
    1    it was not error for the BIA to bypass the timeliness issue and
    2    instead consider the merits of Chen’s asylum claim.       See INS
    3    v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
    4    and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
    5    decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
    6    Accordingly,   we   address   only    the   adverse   credibility
    7    determination and review it for substantial evidence.     See Xiu
    8    Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008); 8 U.S.C.
    9    § 1252(b)(4)(B).
    10       For asylum applications, like Chen’s, governed by the REAL
    11   ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
    12   circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies
    13   and omissions in an applicant’s statements and other record
    14   evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of
    15   the applicant’s claim,” as well as demeanor and responsiveness
    16   during questioning.    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    17   
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64
    , 167.        Omissions are “functionally
    18   equivalent” to inconsistencies, and “can serve as a proper basis
    19   for an adverse credibility determination.”      Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 20 F.3d at 166
    , n.3.   Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
    21   determination that Chen was not credible.
    3
    1        In finding Chen not credible, the IJ gave specific examples
    2    of Chen’s demeanor during the merits hearing.           Demeanor is
    3    “paradigmatically the sort of evidence that a fact-finder is
    4    best positioned to evaluate.”      Li Zu Guan v. INS, 
    453 F.3d 129
    ,
    5    140 (2d Cir. 2006).   We therefore grant “particular deference”
    6    in applying the substantial evidence standard to credibility
    7    findings based on demeanor.       Shu Wen Sun v. B.I.A., 
    510 F.3d 8
       377, 381 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations
    9    omitted).      Moreover,   the   IJ’s   finding–that   Chen’s   fluid
    10   testimony on direct examination appeared “rehearsed” when
    11   compared to his “halting, confused and varying testimony on
    12   cross examination”–is supported by the transcript.
    13       Chen argues that the IJ should not have relied on the
    14   discrepancies between his asylum interview, testimony, and
    15   application.     Because Chen’s asylum interview contains a
    16   “meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the statements made
    17   by [Chen] at the interview,” the agency could rely on it.
    18   Diallo v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 624
    , 632 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
    19   quotation marks and citation omitted).      Chen testified that his
    20   legs and feet were badly bruised and swollen after he was beaten
    21   by police, but his asylum interview and application stated only
    4
    1    he was slapped in the face and punched in the abdomen.           Chen’s
    2    omission of these injuries was a proper basis for the IJ’s
    3    adverse credibility determination.           Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 4
       166, n.3.    Further, the agency was not compelled to credit
    5    Chen’s explanations for these omissions—that he included only
    6    “the important things” in his application and “forgot” to
    7    mention these injuries during his asylum interview.           See Majidi
    8    v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
    9    do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
    10   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
    11   reasonable   fact-finder   would       be   compelled   to   credit   his
    12   testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
    13   It is implausible that Chen’s most severe injuries were not
    14   “important” enough to include in his application, or that he
    15   “forgot” these injuries during his asylum interview.            Majidi,
    
    16 430 F.3d at 80-81
    .
    17       Chen argues that his testimony about his passports should
    18   not have factored into the adverse credibility determination
    19   because it did not have anything “to do with the Petitioner’s
    20   claim regarding the persecution he suffered.”            However, an
    21   inconsistency need not go “to the heart of the applicant’s
    5
    1    claim.”    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).       Thus, the
    2    inconsistent testimony regarding Chen’s passports was properly
    3    considered.      
    Id. 4 Chen
    also attacks the IJ’s conclusion that he did not submit
    5    sufficiently reliable written corroboration to rehabilitate
    6    his testimony.     First, Chen faults the IJ for discounting his
    7    birth certificate and household registration because they were
    8    not authenticated.      Although the agency may err in rejecting
    9    a document based solely on a failure to authenticate it under
    10   the regulations, see Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428
    
    11 F.3d 391
    , 403 (2d Cir. 2005), it does not err where, as here,
    12   it discounted documentary evidence that was not authenticated
    13   in any way and was dated as issued in 2010 (after his stated
    14   arrival in the United States), and there were “legitimate
    15   concerns” about Chen’s credibility, see Qin Wen Zheng v.
    16   Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 143
    , 148 (2d Cir. 2007); Matter of H-L-H &
    17   Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214-15 (B.I.A. 2010).          Chen also
    18   argues    that   the   agency   improperly   speculated     about   the
    19   “document practices of [a] particular police department in
    20   China” by assuming documentation would be issued to him
    21   regarding his arrest and detention.          However, this argument
    6
    1    distorts the IJ’s findings.    The IJ did “not accept [Chen’s]
    2    testimony that there was no documentation whatsoever concerning
    3    his detention or release,” whether from the police or another
    4    source.    Moreover, Chen did not raise this argument before the
    5    Board and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.     See
    6    Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 104
    , 122 (2d Cir. 2007).
    7         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    8    DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    9    that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    10   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    11   is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for oral argument
    12   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    13   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    14   34.1(b).
    15                                 FOR THE COURT:
    16                                 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    7