Yu Ping Wang v. Lynch ( 2015 )


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  •      14-2751
    Wang v. Lynch
    BIA
    Cheng, IJ
    A087 755 239
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.     WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
    APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4   on the 8th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6           PRESENT:
    7
    8            JON O. NEWMAN,
    9            BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    10            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   YU PING WANG,
    15   Petitioner,
    16
    17                   v.                                                   14-2751
    18                                                                 NAC
    19
    20   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    21   ATTORNEY GENERAL,1
    22   Respondent.
    23   _____________________________________
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONER:                       Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, New
    26                                         Jersey.
    27
    1
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E.
    Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., as the
    Respondent in this case.
    1   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting
    2                                     Assistant Attorney General; Derek
    3                                     C. Julius, Senior Litigation
    4                                     Counsel; John M. McAdams, Trial
    5                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration
    6                                     Litigation, United States
    7                                     Department of Justice, Washington,
    
    8 D.C. 9
    10        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    11   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    12   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    13   is DENIED.
    14   Petitioner    Yu   Ping    Wang,    a       native    and   citizen   of   the
    15   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 8, 2014,
    16   decision of the BIA affirming a May 23, 2013, decision of an
    17   Immigration   Judge      (“IJ”)    denying        Wang’s    application    for
    18   asylum,   withholding      of     removal,        and   relief    under    the
    19   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).               In re Yu Ping Wang, No.
    20   A087 755 239 (B.I.A. July 8, 2014), aff’g No. A087 755 239
    21   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 23, 2013).                 We assume the parties’
    22   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    23   in this case.
    24   Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the
    25   decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.                   See Yan Chen
    26   v.   Gonzales,     
    417 F.3d 268
    ,        271   (2d   Cir.   2005).      The
    27   applicable standards of review are well established.                       See
    2
    1   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
    2   
    534 F.3d 162
    ,    165-66   (2d    Cir.    2008).          The   agency      may,
    3   “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, . . . base
    4   a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between
    5   the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements
    6   (whenever made and whether or not under oath and considering
    7   the circumstances under which the statements were made), . .
    8   . the consistency of such statements with other evidence of
    9   record . . ., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
    10   statements,      without     regard    to     whether      an    inconsistency,
    11   inaccuracy,      or     falsehood      goes     to      the      heart    of     the
    12   applicant’s claim.”          
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    13   Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 163-64
    .             Substantial evidence supports the
    14   agency’s determination that Wang was not credible.
    15   The agency reasonably relied on discrepancies between Wang’s
    16   testimony     and     documents     submitted      in      her   husband’s       two
    17   removal proceedings.           Wang testified that family planning
    18   officials forced her to have one abortion in 2009.                       However,
    19   her   husband,       Zong,   had    twice    unsuccessfully         applied      for
    20   asylum   in    the    United   States,       and     the    records      of    those
    21   proceedings      included          inconsistent       letters       from        Wang
    22   asserting that she had undergone forced abortions in 1998
    3
    1   and 2004, and an abortion certificate confirming the 1998
    2   abortion.
    3       The IJ was not compelled to credit Wang’s explanation
    4   that she did not know that Zong previously had applied for
    5   asylum and that she had not prepared the letters submitted
    6   in his removal proceedings.                    See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
    
    7 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than
    8   offer     a     plausible       explanation          for        his        inconsistent
    9   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
    10   reasonable       fact-finder       would       be   compelled         to    credit    his
    11   testimony.”        (internal        quotation         marks          and      citations
    12   omitted)).        Despite      numerous         continuances,         Wang     did   not
    13   produce       reliable    evidence       sufficient        to    corroborate         this
    14   explanation.       See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273
    15   (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that an applicant’s failure to
    16   corroborate       testimony        may     bear     on     credibility,          either
    17   because the absence of particular evidence is viewed as
    18   suspicious,       or     because    the        absence   of     corroboration          in
    19   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
    20   already called into question).
    21       First,       the     IJ   reasonably         declined       to    credit     Zong’s
    22   unsworn letters stating that Wang had only one abortion in
    4
    1   2009 and had not submitted the letters in his proceedings
    2   because     he     was    an    interested        party     who     was   not   made
    3   available via telephone for cross-examination.                        See Y.C. v.
    4   Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to the
    5   agency’s decision to afford little weight to petitioner’s
    6   husband’s        letter    stating     that       Chinese     authorities       were
    7   looking for her on account of her political activities in
    8   the United States because the letter was unsworn and was
    9   submitted by an interested witness).                        Contrary to Wang’s
    10   contention,       the     IJ    was   not       compelled    to     credit   Zong’s
    11   unsworn letters simply because she relied on unsworn letters
    12   allegedly prepared by Wang to question Wang’s credibility.
    13   See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 171 (2d Cir.
    14   2008) (“We do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in
    15   record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the
    16   agency.”).         That    is    particularly        so     given    that    the   IJ
    17   continued proceedings in part to provide Zong an opportunity
    18   to attest to the veracity of his letters before the U.S.
    19   consulate in China, but he did not do so.                            Wang did not
    20   provide a compelling explanation for this failure.                                 See
    21   Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
    22
    5
    1          The IJ also did not err in declining to credit a report
    2   prepared     in    China,   in    which     two    Judicial      Authenticators
    3   conclude (based on handwriting analysis) that the letters
    4   submitted in Zong’s proceedings were not written by Wang.
    5   See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    ,
    6   341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that determination of the
    7   weight of evidence is largely a matter of IJ discretion).
    8   As the IJ found, there was no information regarding what
    9   training the Judicial Authenticators completed to qualify as
    10   experts in handwriting analysis or how they obtained their
    11   Judicial Authenticator’s Licenses.
    12   Ultimately, the agency’s adverse credibility determination
    13   is     supported    by    substantial        evidence.        See       8    U.S.C.
    14   §     1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).          That     finding      is   dispositive          of
    15   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because those
    16   claims were based on the same factual predicate.                        See Paul
    17   v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    18   For    the   foregoing      reasons,       the    petition    for    review        is
    19   DENIED.      As    we    have    completed       our   review,    any       stay   of
    20   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    21   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    22   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.                Any pending request for
    6
    1   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    2   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    3   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    4                                 FOR THE COURT:
    5                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    6
    7
    7