Yuxian Wu v. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •     14-3617
    Wu v. Lynch
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A205 220 772
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    1st day of February, two thousand sixteen.
    PRESENT:
    JON O. NEWMAN,
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    PETER W. HALL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    YUXIAN WU,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                 14-3617
    NAC
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                      Corey T. Lee, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                      Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General;
    Jennifer Williams, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Lindsay W.
    Zimliki, Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    Petitioner Yuxian Wu, a native and citizen of China, seeks
    review of an August 29, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a
    June 25, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
    Wu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re Yuxian Wu,
    No. A205 220 772 (B.I.A. Aug. 29, 2014), aff’g No. A205 220 772
    (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 25, 2013).           We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered
    both    the   IJ’s   and   the    BIA’s   opinions   “for   the   sake   of
    completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir.2006).          The applicable standards of review are
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    well established.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also
    Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    For asylum applications such as Wu’s, governed by the REAL
    ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “considering the totality of
    the   circumstances,”      base   a       credibility    finding   on   the
    plausibility    of    an     asylum         applicant’s     account     and
    inconsistencies in his statements and evidence, without regard
    to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” so
    long as they reasonably support an inference that the applicant
    is not credible.     8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia
    Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008).               “We defer
    therefore to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    Wu claimed that he had been persecuted in China because he
    attended an underground Christian church; he also claimed that
    he was a practicing Christian and attended church in the United
    States.   Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
    credibility    determination,     based       on   the    inconsistencies
    between Wu’s testimony and that of his witnesses.            Wu testified
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    that the Sunday prior to his hearing, he had attended a morning
    service with his cousin.   However, Wu’s cousin had been in China
    for the past two months, and did not return until Sunday
    afternoon.    He was visiting China because his grandmother and
    his cousin, who was Wu’s brother, had both recently passed away.
    The   IJ   reasonably   rejected    Wu’s   explanation   for   the
    inconsistency – he thought the question was whether his cousin
    went to Wu’s baptism – given the several questions Wu was asked
    about his church attendance and the clarity of the trial
    attorney’s final question on the issue.           See Majidi v.
    Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Wu testified that although he lived with his cousin, he did
    not know that his cousin had traveled to China, much less why.
    The IJ found it implausible that Wu would not know that his
    cousin and housemate had been in China for the past two months,
    in part because of the death of Wu’s brother.    The IJ’s finding
    was reasonable, given the inherent implausibility in Wu’s
    statements.    See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 63
    , 66 (2d
    Cir. 2007); Siewe v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 168-69 (2d Cir.
    2007).
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    Wu’s claim to be a practicing Christian was further
    undermined by his second witness, who testified that he and Wu
    met at a supermarket in Flushing in November 2011.        Wu testified
    that they met at a bible study group a month earlier.
    Because Wu and his witnesses testified inconsistently, and
    Wu’s testimony was, in part, implausible, substantial evidence
    supports    the   agency’s   findings.       Moreover,   although    the
    inconsistencies do not go to Wu’s claim of past persecution,
    the inconsistencies and implausibility reasonably support an
    inference that he is not credible.       “[A]n IJ may rely on any
    inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility
    determination”      including    those   that       “concern    matters
    collateral or ancillary to the claim” as long as a totality of
    the   circumstances    establishes    that    the   applicant   is   not
    credible.    Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    ; see 
    Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170
    (“a single instance of false testimony may . . . infect
    the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated
    evidence”).       Here, the inconsistencies and implausibility,
    considered cumulatively, provide substantial evidence for the
    agency’s adverse credibility finding, based on a totality of
    the circumstances, as they call into question Wu’s practice of
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    Christianity as well as his general truthfulness.   See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    Because the only evidence of a threat to Wu’s life or
    freedom depended on his credibility, the agency’s finding that
    he was not credible necessarily precludes success on his claims
    for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.     Paul v.
    Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, the pending motion
    for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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