Williams v. City of New York , 602 F. App'x 28 ( 2015 )

14-1483
Williams v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
3 New York, on the 7th day of May, two thousand fifteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 DENNIS JACOBS,
7 PETER W. HALL,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Natalie M. Williams,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 14-1483
17
18 City of New York, et al.,
19
20 Defendants-Appellees.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Natalie M. Williams, pro se, Utica,
24 New York.
25
26 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Susan P. Greenberg (for Zachary W.
27 Carter, Corporation Counsel for the
28 City of New York), New York, New
29 York.
30 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
31 New York (Sullivan, J.).
32 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
33 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
34 Appellant Natalie M. Williams, pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her
35 amended complaint, which primarily alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age
36 Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Williams, formerly a tenured teacher in the New
37 York City public school system, was terminated after being found guilty of misconduct. We
38 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
39 issues on appeal.
40 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,
41 “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and
42 drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282
43 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
44 is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[] the
45 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,”
46 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
47 Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district
48 court properly dismissed Williams’s claims. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the
49 district court in its thorough and well-reasoned March 26, 2014 decision.
50 Contrary to Williams’s contentions on appeal, the record reflects that her proposed
51 amended complaint was docketed and considered by both the magistrate judge and the district
1
52 court. Further, the court did not err by deferring discovery until after it ruled on the motion to
53 dismiss: “a plaintiff is not entitled to discovery if his pleadings are fatally and incurably defective
54 as a matter of law.” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). Finally, Williams’s
55 claim that the district court and magistrate judge were biased against her is not supported by the
56 record. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
57 On the merits, the district court correctly dismissed Williams’s ADEA claim, because even
58 accepting her factual allegations as true, “concern with the elevated costs of senior employees does
59 not constitute age discrimination.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2000);
60 see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-13 (1993). Williams does not argue that
61 her age, as distinguished from her pension eligibility, played any role in her termination, or that
62 such eligibility was a “direct function of age[,] rather than years of service[].” Criley v. Delta Air
63 Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1997).
64 As to Williams’s other claims, and the other grounds for dismissal relied upon by the
65 district court, Williams has not raised any relevant arguments in her briefs on appeal, so we need
66 not consider them. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).
67 We have considered all of Williams’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
68 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
69 FOR THE COURT:
70 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
2