Xiangqing Ye v. Lynch , 614 F. App'x 534 ( 2015 )


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  •          13-3252
    Ye v. Lynch
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A200 944 855
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 22nd day of June, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    8                     Chief Judge,
    9                DENNY CHIN,
    10                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    11                     Circuit Judges.
    12       _____________________________________
    13
    14       XIANGQING YE,
    15                Petitioner,
    16
    17                         v.                                   13-3252
    18                                                              NAC
    19       LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21                Respondent.*
    22       _____________________________________
    23
    24
    25       FOR PETITIONER:               Jan Potemkin, New York, New York.
    26
    *
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically
    substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
    1   FOR RESPONDENT:         Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    2                           General; Kiley Kane, Senior
    3                           Litigation Counsel; James A. Hurley,
    4                           Trial Attorney, Office of
    5                           Immigration Litigation, United
    6                           States Department of Justice,
    7                           Washington, D.C.
    8
    9       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    12   is DENIED.
    13       Petitioner Xiangqing Ye, a native and citizen of China,
    14   seeks review of a July 26, 2013 order of the BIA, affirming
    15   the December 12, 2011 decision of an Immigration Judge
    16   (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and
    17   relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re
    18   Xiangqing Ye, No.   A200 944 855 (B.I.A. July 26, 2013),
    19   aff’g No. A200 944 855 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 12, 2011).
    20   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    21   and procedural history in this case.
    22       Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    23   decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.   Yun-Zui Guan v.
    24   Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 391
    , 394 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
    25   The applicable standards of review are well established.
    26   See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v.
    2
    1   Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Xiu Xia Lin v.
    2   Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
    3       For applications such as Ye’s, which are governed by
    4   the REAL ID Act, the agency may base a credibility finding
    5   on an applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account,
    6   and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to
    7   whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”        8
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); see Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. &
    9   N. Dec. 260, 265 (B.I.A. 2007).     “We defer therefore to an
    10   IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of
    11   the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    12   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    13   Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .
    14       Ye contends that the credibility determination was
    15   improperly based on the omission from his application that
    16   the police had attempted to arrest him at home after he was
    17   released from custody.     Although Ye argues that this
    18   omission is not an inconsistency, for purposes of analyzing
    19   a credibility determination, “[a]n inconsistency and an
    20   omission are . . . functionally equivalent.”     Xiu Xia Lin,
    21   
    534 F.3d at
    166 n.3.     Ye does not challenge the agency’s
    22   finding that his explanations for this omission were
    23   themselves inconsistent and further buttressed the
    3
    1   credibility finding.   Nor does he challenge the agency’s
    2   finding that this omission went to the heart of his claim.
    3   See Xu Duan Dong v. Ashcroft, 
    406 F.3d 110
    , 111-12 (2d Cir.
    4   2005) (per curiam) (upholding adverse credibility
    5   determination where an omission was not “incidental or
    6   ancillary” but rather concerned an “essential factual
    7   allegation underlying petitioner’s asylum claim”).       He also
    8   does not challenge the agency’s finding that his
    9   corroborating evidence failed to rehabilitate his
    10   credibility because his father’s letter did not mention the
    11   police’s visit and his sister was unaware of the incident.
    12   See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007)
    13   (per curiam) (recognizing that an applicant’s failure to
    14   corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, either
    15   because the absence of particular corroborating evidence is
    16   viewed as suspicious, or because the absence of
    17   corroboration makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate
    18   testimony that has already been called into question).       He
    19   has therefore failed to demonstrate “that no reasonable
    20   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    21   Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .       As a result, the agency did
    22   not err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
    23   relief because all three claims shared the same factual
    4
    1   predicate.     See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir.
    2   2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    ,
    3   523 (2d Cir. 2005).
    4       Ye’s contention that he demonstrated a well-founded
    5   fear of future persecution based on his status as a
    6   practicing Catholic, regardless of whether he credibly
    7   established past persecution, is misplaced.      See Paul, 444
    8   F.3d at 156.     In Paul, we held that the agency’s
    9   determination that an applicant was not credible as to
    10   claims of past persecution did not preclude the applicant
    11   from demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution
    12   based on objective evidence, where the applicant had
    13   independently established that he was, in fact, a practicing
    14   Christian.     
    444 F.3d at 155-57
    .   Unlike Paul, however, all
    15   of Ye’s claims were dependent upon his credibility because
    16   the IJ did not separately find that he was a practicing
    17   Catholic.
    18       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    19   DENIED.     As we have completed our review, any stay of
    20   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    21   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    22   this petition is DENIED as moot.     Any pending request for
    23   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    5
    1   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    2   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    3                                 FOR THE COURT:
    4                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5
    6
    6