Singh v. Lynch , 634 F. App'x 841 ( 2015 )


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  •      14-2430
    Singh v. Lynch
    BIA
    Christensen, IJ
    A200 943 204
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   23rd day of December, two thousand fifteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            RALPH K. WINTER,
    8            DENNIS JACOBS,
    9            GERARD E. LYNCH,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   GURPREET SINGH, AKA SINGH
    14   GURPREET,
    15             Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                             14-2430
    18                                                                   NAC
    19   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Amy Nussbaum Gell, New York, New
    25                                       York.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    28                                       Assistant Attorney General; Linda S.
    29                                       Wernery, Assistant Director;
    30                                       Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney,
    1                                    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    2                                    United States Department of Justice,
    3                                    Washington, D.C.
    4          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    7    DENIED.
    8          Petitioner Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
    9    seeks review of a June 20, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming
    10   a May 17, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
    11   Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    12   relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).              In re
    13   Gurpreet Singh, No. A200 943 204 (B.I.A. June 20, 2014), aff’g
    14   No. A200 943 204 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 17, 2013).        We assume
    15   the   parties’    familiarity    with   the   underlying    facts    and
    16   procedural history in this case.
    17         Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
    18   the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.”
    19   Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir.
    20   2006).      The   applicable     standards    of   review   are     well
    21   established.      See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
    22   Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    2
    1        For asylum applications, like Singh’s, governed by the REAL
    2    ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
    3    circumstances,”       base    a   credibility        finding   on    an    asylum
    4    applicant’s     “demeanor,        candor,      or    responsiveness,”            the
    5    plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his
    6    or her statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the
    7    heart    of         the      applicant’s        claim.”              8     U.S.C.
    8    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167
    9    (2d Cir. 2008).           “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
    10   determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,
    11   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
    12   adverse credibility ruling.”               Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .
    13       Substantial           evidence    supports       the   agency’s       adverse
    14   credibility determination, which was based mainly on Singh’s
    15   implausible    testimony.            The    agency    reasonably         found   it
    16   implausible that Singh could be a party activist with a pro-Sikh
    17   political party, without knowing the party’s chief goal, or that
    18   elections occurred shortly after he began his alleged activism.
    19   We uphold an IJ’s implausibility findings unless we have a
    20   “definite     and    firm    conviction       that    a    mistake       has   been
    21   committed,” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 
    435 F.3d 141
    , 145 (2d Cir.
    3
    1    2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), as long as the finding
    2    is “tethered to record evidence,” Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509
    3 
    F.3d 63
    , 67 (2d Cir. 2007).
    4        The   agency’s   implausibility    finding    is     supported    by
    5    Singh’s   inconsistent   testimony    about    alleged    persecution
    6    related to his activism.    His application stated that he was
    7    beaten by Congress Party “hooligans.”         However, he initially
    8    testified that he was at a rally when unknown assailants beat
    9    him for undisclosed reasons, and then immediately testified
    10   that his assailants told him to join the Congress Party.             His
    11   claim of political activism is undermined by his changing
    12   accounts of the incident and the motivation for it, and by his
    13   ignorance of the goals of his party and the fact that elections
    14   had occurred.
    15       Singh was given opportunities to explain the implausible
    16   features of his testimony.     Although he had never heard of
    17   Khalistan (the independent state whose formation is the central
    18   goal of his political party), he said that people in India do
    19   not talk about Khalistan for fear that they will be persecuted.
    20   As to not knowing about the 2009 elections, he stated that he
    21   was a simple party worker who provided free food service for
    4
    1    the impoverished.       Neither explanation is so compelling that
    2    a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to accept it,
    3    particularly    as   it     contradicts   his    assertions   in   his
    4    application that he was one of a small group of activists who
    5    promoted the party.       See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80-81
    6    (2d Cir. 2005).
    7        Further,      the     IJ   reasonably    found     that   Singh’s
    8    corroborating evidence was insufficient to rehabilitate his
    9    testimony.    Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir.
    10   2007).   While Singh stated that he had learned of Khalistan by
    11   attending a Sikh temple in the United States, he produced no
    12   evidence from his fellow congregants.           Further, he submitted
    13   no evidence from his family describing the 2004, 2009, and 2010
    14   incidents.    And, the IJ permissibly afforded scant evidentiary
    15   weight to the documentary evidence that he did submit because
    16   the authors of letters from his village leader and the political
    17   party were unavailable for cross-examination, and his doctor’s
    18   letter was not contemporaneous with the treatment it described.
    19   Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 342 (2d
    20   Cir. 2006).
    5
    1        Considering the foregoing, the IJ’s adverse credibility
    2    determination is supported by substantial evidence.    8 U.S.C.
    3    § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 165-66
    .   This finding
    4    was sufficient to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
    5    relief, as all three claims were based upon the same factual
    6    predicate.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir.
    7    2006).
    8        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    9    DENIED.
    10                                FOR THE COURT:
    11                                Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    6