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 2015-07

Chattar v. Lynch , 605 F. App'x 63 ( 2015 )


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  •     14-423
Chattar v. Lynch
BIA
A075 695 441
A095 302 021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 1st day of July, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
REENA RAGGI,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ABDUR CHATTAR, AKA JOHN FRANCIS
CRUZE, NOOR BAHAR, AKA MUKTI
FRANCISCA CRUZE,
Petitioners,
v.                                  14-423
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS:              Amy Nussbaum Gell, Gell & Gell,
New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General; Edward J. Duffy, Paul
Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioners Abdur Chattar and Noor Bahar, married
natives and citizens of Bangladesh, seek review of a January
16, 2014, decision of the BIA denying their motion to
reconsider and reopen.     In re Abdur Chattar, Noor Bahar,
Nos. A075 695 441/A095 302 021 (B.I.A. Jan. 16, 2014).       We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history in this case.    Petitioners do not
contest the agency’s conclusion that, to the extent their
motion is construed as a motion to reconsider, it was
untimely.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion.     Ali v. Gonzales,
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d
Cir. 2006) (per curiam).    “A motion to reopen proceedings
shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that
evidence sought to be offered is material and was not
available and could not have been discovered or presented at
the former hearing . . . .”
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1).
2
Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper
ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is
the movants’ failure to establish a prima facie case for the
underlying substantive relief sought.      INS v. Abudu,
    485 U.S. 94
    , 104-05 (1988).     When the BIA considers relevant
evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to
reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard.      Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
Petitioners’ motion for failure to demonstrate their prima
facie eligibility for withholding of removal.     Petitioners
contend that they met their burden based on evidence
documenting a recent surge in attacks against religious
minorities in Bangladesh.     However, the BIA considered this
evidence and reasonably concluded that isolated incidents of
violence against Christians in some parts of Bangladesh were
insufficient to show a reasonable possibility that
Petitioners would likely be singled out for persecution.
See
    id. at 161-62
    ; Santoso v. Holder,
    580 F.3d 110
    , 112 (2d
Cir. 2009).
3
The BIA also did not err in denying Petitioners’ motion
for failure to demonstrate their prima facie eligibility for
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   The
BIA reasonably concluded that the country conditions
evidence did not show that the government of Bangladesh
would acquiesce in their prospective torture.   See Khouzam
v. Ashcroft,
    361 F.3d 161
    , 170-71 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting
that applicant for CAT relief must show that torture would
be perpetrated with the government’s consent, acquiescence,
or willful blindness).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4