Jiang v. Garland ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •      20-284
    Jiang v. Garland
    BIA
    A087 643 159
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 20th day of October, two thousand twenty-
    5   two.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    9            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    10            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   XIA JIN JIANG,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                      v.                                  20-284
    18                                                          NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Margaret W. Wong, Margaret Wong &
    25                                      Associates LLC, Cleveland, OH.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    28                                      Assistant Attorney General; Linda
    29                                      S. Wernery, Assistant Director,
    1                                   Monica M. Twombly, Trial Attorney,
    2                                   Office of Immigration Litigation,
    3                                   United States Department of
    4                                   Justice, Washington, DC.
    5         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    7    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    8    is DENIED.
    9          Petitioner Xia Jin Jiang, a native and citizen of the
    10   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 27,
    11   2019 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her
    12   removal proceedings.       See In re Xia Jin Jiang, No. A087 643
    13   159   (B.I.A.    Dec.    27,    2019).      We   assume    the   parties’
    14   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    15         Our review is limited to the BIA’s denial of the motion
    16   to reopen removal proceedings, see Kaur v. BIA, 
    413 F.3d 232
    ,
    17   233 (2d Cir. 2005), which we review for abuse of discretion,
    18   see Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517 (2d Cir. 2006).                 We
    19   find no abuse of discretion here.
    20         It is undisputed that Jiang’s motion filed in 2018 was
    21   untimely because she filed it six years after her final order
    22   of    removal.     See    8 U.S.C.       § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)      (90-day
    23   deadline   for   motion    to    reopen);    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2)
    2
    1   (same).     She argues that the BIA should have excused the
    2   deadline    because      her   former       counsel   was    ineffective   and
    3   because conditions in China for Falun Gong practitioners,
    4   Christians, and Jehovah’s Witnesses had worsened since the
    5   time of her hearing before an immigration judge.                        While
    6   ineffective      assistance     and     changed       conditions     implicate
    7   exceptions to the filing deadlines, the BIA did not err in
    8   rejecting these arguments, which we address in turn.
    9       An applicant who demonstrates ineffective assistance of
    10   counsel may be entitled to equitable tolling of the deadline
    11   for a motion to reopen, see Rashid v. Mukasey, 
    533 F.3d 127
    ,
    12   130–31     (2d    Cir.    2008),      but     to   establish       ineffective
    13   assistance,      the   applicant      must    show    that   her    “counsel’s
    14   performance was so ineffective as to have impinged upon the
    15   fundamental fairness of the hearing in violation of the fifth
    16   amendment due process clause,” Rabiu v. INS, 
    41 F.3d 879
    , 882
    17   (2d Cir. 1994).          An applicant cannot state an ineffective
    18   assistance claim where counsel made reasonable, tactical
    19   decisions.       See Changxu Jiang v. Mukasey, 
    522 F.3d 266
    , 270
    20   (2d Cir. 2008).
    21       Here, the agency did not err in finding that Jiang’s
    3
    1   former counsel was not ineffective in failing to request
    2   cancellation of removal and voluntary departure because the
    3   record reflects that Jiang would not have been eligible for
    4   those forms of relief.           Cancellation requires an applicant
    5   to show that her removal would cause a qualifying relative
    6   “exceptional       and    extremely       unusual     hardship,”      8 U.S.C.
    7    § 1229b(b)(1)(D),        but    at   the    time    of    Jiang’s     original
    8    proceedings,       her   only   qualifying     relative       was    her    U.S.
    9    citizen son who had spent most of his life in China.                            For
    10   voluntary departure, she would have had to show that she had
    11   the means to depart the United States and present her passport
    12   or other travel document, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b); 8 C.F.R.
    13   § 240.25(b), but Jiang did not have a passport at the time of
    14   the hearing.
    15          Nor has Jiang shown that the agency erred in concluding
    16   that    she   failed     to   meet   the    changed      country    conditions
    17   exception     to   the    deadline    for    reopening.        There       is   no
    18   deadline for a motion to reopen “based on changed country
    19   conditions arising in the country of nationality or the
    20   country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence
    21   is material and was not available and would not have been
    4
    1    discovered        or       presented        at      the         previous
    2    proceedings.”     8 U.S.C.    § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);       see    also   8
    
    3 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).       But Jiang was found not credible
    4    as to her Falun Gong claim, and in any event, a comparison of
    5    the country conditions evidence at the time of her 2011
    6    hearing and her motion to reopen reveals only incremental
    7    change in the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners and
    8    Christians.      See Kaur, 
    413 F.3d at 234
     (upholding BIA’s
    9    denial of motion to reopen where new evidence did not rebut
    10   underlying adverse credibility determination); In re S-Y-G-,
    11   
    24 I. & N. Dec. 247
    , 257 (B.I.A. 2007) (change that is
    12   “incremental    or     incidental”   does   not   constitute    changed
    13   country conditions to excuse late motions to reopen).             Jiang
    14   did not provide any evidence in support of her claim that
    15   conditions had materially changed for Jehovah’s Witnesses in
    16   China.
    17       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    18   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    19   stays VACATED.
    20                                    FOR THE COURT:
    21                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    22                                    Clerk of Court
    5