Jin v. Sessions ( 2018 )

17-411
Jin v. Sessions
BIA
Zagzoug, IJ
A205 427 950
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 13th day of June, two thousand eighteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 GUIDO CALABRESI,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 LEI JIN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-411
17 NAC
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Wei Gu, Albertson, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
26 Attorney General; Douglas E.
27 Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Erik
28 R. Quick, Trial Attorney, Office
29 of Immigration Litigation, United
1 States Department of Justice,
2 Washington, DC.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Lei Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s
9 Republic of China, seeks review of a January 24, 2017,
10 decision of the BIA affirming a December 23, 2015, decision
11 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jin’s application for
12 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
13 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Lei Jin, No. A 205
14 427 950 (B.I.A. Jan. 24, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 427 950
15 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 23, 2015). We assume the parties’
16 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
17 in this case.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
19 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., reaching only
20 the adverse credibility ruling. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.
21 Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The
22 applicable standards of review are well established. See
2
1 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d
2 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
4 circumstances,” base an adverse credibility ruling on an
5 applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness . . . the
6 consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and oral
7 statements[,] . . . the internal consistency of each such
8 statement, the consistency of such statements with other
9 evidence of record[,] . . . any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
10 such statements, . . . or any other relevant factor.” 8
11 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
12 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
13 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
14 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
15 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
16 that Jin was not credible. Jin alleged that he was arrested
17 and beaten in China for protesting the demolition of his
18 family’s home. The agency reasonably relied on a number of
19 inconsistencies between Jin’s statements and evidence
20 regarding the alleged events in China. Jin produced a
21 mailing envelope showing that his mother still lived in the
3
1 allegedly demolished apartment. Although he testified that
2 the building had, in fact, been torn down, he could not give
3 any other address for his mother. See 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The agency was not required to accept
5 Jin’s explanation that his mother used the old address because
6 she feared harm from the Chinese government, especially
7 because Jin did not know his mother’s current address and
8 could not explain why she used the address of her former
9 apartment instead of another fake address. Majidi v.
10 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
11 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his
12 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
13 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
14 his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Jin compounded
15 this inconsistency by listing the demolished building as his
16 address until October 2011 (when he left China), despite
17 stating at his asylum interview that he and his mother moved
18 in July 2011, and testifying at the hearing that they moved
19 at the end of May 2011. And we give particular deference to
20 the IJ’s additional finding that Jin’s panic when confronted
21 with the envelope further called his credibility into
4
1 question. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d
2 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 In addition to these discrepancies regarding the
4 demolition, the agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency
5 regarding the location of Jin’s arrest. 8 U.S.C.
6 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). At the hearing and in his application,
7 Jin stated that he and his neighbor were arrested outside
8 their apartment building, after returning from the city hall.
9 But Jin’s interview statement and his neighbor’s letter
10 reported the arrest as occurring immediately as they left the
11 government building. Contrary to Jin’s argument, the agency
12 reasonably relied on the record of the asylum interview
13 because the asylum officer typed out the detailed questions
14 and answers, and Jin acknowledged that he used his own
15 Mandarin interpreter during the interview. See Diallo v.
16 Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 632-33 (2d Cir. 2006).
17 The agency also reasonably concluded that Jin’s
18 documentary evidence did not rehabilitate his claim,
19 especially because some of the evidence introduced further
20 inconsistencies. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273
21 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his .
5
1 . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of
2 corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
3 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
4 question.”). For example, the date of the demolition notice
5 conflicted with Jin’s statements and his medical records
6 conflicted with his asylum interview testimony that he did
7 not see a doctor.
8 The above discrepancies, which call into question Jin’s
9 allegation of past harm, provide substantial evidence for the
10 adverse credibility ruling. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
11 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Jin’s asylum,
12 withholding of removal, and CAT claims were all based on the
13 same factual predicate, the adverse credibility ruling is
14 dispositive. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
15 2006).
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
18 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
19 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
20 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
21 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
6
1 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
2 34.1(b).
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
7