Denise Felix, Naomi Felix and Irene Cooper as Administrators of the Estate of Denise Felix v. New York City Transit Authority , 324 F.3d 102 ( 2003 )

Judge JACOBS joins in the majority opinion and files a separate concurring opinion.

Judge LEVAL dissents in a separate opinion.

JOHN M. WALKER, Jr., Chief Judge.

Denise Felix sued her former employer, the New York City Transit Authority, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that she was entitled to a position that did not involve working in the subway, which she could not do because of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder that was interfering with her ability to sleep, a major life activity. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Shira A. Scheindlin, District Judge) granted summary judgment to the defendant because the major life activity was not causally related to the accommodation requested. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Denise Felix was hired as a “Railroad Clerk” by the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”). In 1996, the NYCTA employed approximately 3,417 Railroad Clerks. The overwhelming majority of Railroad Clerks work in token booths in subway stations, where they sell tokens, commuter passes, and fare cards, and provide information to passengers. Approximately 50 Railroad Clerks work in office jobs. The Railroad Clerks assigned to office jobs are deployed to work in token booths a few days a year.

On November 26, 1995, Felix was assigned as an “extra” Railroad Clerk, relieving Railroad Clerks who were on breaks. While en route to relieve the Railroad Clerk on the northbound platform of the Kingston and Throop Station, Felix was informed that the Railroad Clerk on the southbound platform of that station had been killed in a firebombing incident. Felix saw the smoke-filled platform and was stuck inside the train for some time. Felix was traumatized by the realization that she could have been killed and was taken to the Kings County Hospital’s Emergency Room.

Felix reported to the NYCTA’s Medical Assessment Center the next day. She was initially categorized .as temporarily medically unable to work. From December 7, 1995 until August 15, 1996, Felix was designated “restricted work, temporary.” Her doctors diagnosed her with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”); her condition included feelings of apprehension and anxiety, recurrent problems with insomnia, and an inability to work in the subways. Her doctors specified that she was not to do any subway work, but could do clerical work. At some point not later than August 13, 1996, Felix requested a reassignment to a position that would not require her to work in the subway as an accommodation of her medical problems. On August 15, 1996, her designation was changed to “no work, temporary.” On November 26, 1996, Felix was terminated pursuant to Civil Service Law § 71, which authorizes the termination of a civil service employee who has been unable to return to work for a year. N.Y. Civ. Serv. § 71.

After exhausting her administrative remedies and receiving a Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Felix commenced this suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq. Denise Felix died on July 27, 2000, before the completion of the district court proceedings, due to causes unrelated to the events at issue in this case and the administrators of her estate were substituted as plaintiffs. Because this substitution has no practical effect on the litigation, we adhere to the previous party designations for the sake of convenience.

The NYCTA moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) her receipt of Social Security disability benefits should estop her from claiming that she was able to work, (2) no reasonable accommodation was available because the ability to work in subways was an essential function of Railroad Clerks, and (3) there was no nexus between the major life activity impaired and the accommodation requested. The district court rejected the first two arguments but granted summary judgment in favor of NYCTA on the basis of its third argument. Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d 640, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). We affirm.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, resolving all disputed facts in the non-movant’s favor. Tri-State Empl. Servs., Inc. v. Mountbatten Sur. Co., 295 F.3d 256, 260 (2d Cir.2002).

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) protects people with disabilities, defined as individuals with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Title I of the ADA, which protects individuals with disability within the workplace, prohibits “discriminating” against an employee with a disability “because of the disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute defines “discriminate” to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, ... unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

The NYCTA concedes that Felix has a disability because her insomnia limits the major life activity of sleeping. Although the NYCTA presents additional arguments for why it did not need to grant the requested accommodation, we address only the issue the district court found determinative: Whether there must be a causal link between the specific condition which limits a major life activity and the accommodation required.

We start our analysis with the text of the statute. The statutory language prohibits discrimination against an employee “because of the disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Although “discriminate” is defined in very broad terms, that expansive definition does not change the requirement that to be actionable the discrimination must be “because of the disability.” Reading the requirement of reasonable accommodation in this light, an employer discriminates against an employee with a disability only by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for the “disability” which is the impairment of the major life activity. Other impairments that do not amount to a “disability” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) do not require accommodation under the ADA.

The principle is not altered by the fact that the disability (which must be accommodated) is caused by another impairment (which need not be accommodated). In this case, her- disability was her insomnia which substantially limited her ability to sleep. Felix’s inability to work in the subway did not substantially limit any major life activity. She was fully able to work, just not in the subway. Her inability to work in the subway was related to her insomnia because they both stemmed from the same traumatic incident and resultant psychological disorder, the PTSD. But this common traumatic origin alone does not mean that the non-disability impairment is entitled to an accommodation.

A simple hypothetical of a car accident illustrates the point well. A passenger in a car is badly injured in an accident. The passenger loses the ability to walk, a major life activity and thus has a “disability” that qualifies him for accommodation. The passenger also suffers some injury to his arms, which lower his typing speed from one-hundred words per minute to forty words per minute, without seriously limiting his ability to perform the major life activity of working in general. Because his arm injuries do not substantially limit any major life activity, these injuries are not a disability. His employer terminates him from a position doing data entry and word processing because his productivity has decreased. The fact that the disability, the inability to walk, and the limitation of his typing stem from the same accident does not change the fact that he was not discriminated against “because of [his] disability.” Similarly, Felix’s inability to sleep (a significant limitation on a major life activity) is separate from her inability to work in the subway (not a significant limitation on the major life activity of working in general), even though both were caused by the subway firebombing and the resultant PTSD.

Felix and the EEOC as amicus curiae argue that prior precedent forecloses this conclusion and that once a person has a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), any other impairment that resulted from the cause of the disability must be accommodated even if that impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity and thus is not itself a disability. We disagree. The cases Felix relies on are inapposite to her case because in each instance the impairment for which plaintiff sought an accommodation flowed directly from the disability itself and was therefore “because of the disability.” Felix points to cases addressing AIDS, epilepsy, paralysis, and mental illness.

In Bragdon v. Abbott the Supreme Court held that for purposes of receiving a public accommodation of dental treatment, a person with AIDS is a person with a disability because AIDS interferes with the major life activity of reproduction. 524 U.S. 624, 638, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). Although the right to the public accommodation of dental treatment is secured by Title III of the ADA, not by Title I, the definition of “disability” applies to all of the ADA. Toyota Motor Manuf., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). However, contrary to Felix’s argument, the dentist in Bragdon denied services to the plaintiff purely because of Bragdon’s disability, her infection with HIV. Although the life activity of reproduction was not directly connected to the dentist’s unreasonable failure to accommodate Bragdon, the same specific medical condition — the risk of HIV transmission— was responsible for both the impairment of her reproductive capacity and the dentist’s unreasonable failure to accommodate her. Thus, the discrimination was because of her disability.

Felix also points to cases that have required reasonable accommodations for disabilities that impair major life activities outside of the workplace but also cause impairments within the workplace. For example, we have permitted a plaintiff to survive summary judgment where she was denied a promotion because she could not drive due to her epilepsy, Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir.2001), despite the fact that driving is not considered a major life activity. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir.1998). Felix argues that because the impairment that affected Lovejoy-Wilson’s eligibility for promotion was her inability to drive, which was caused by her epilepsy but not part of the major life activity that epilepsy interferes with, a causal connection between the major life activity impaired and the accommodation requested cannot be required. However, Lovejoy-Wilson’s inability to drive is due to the same disability — periodic and sudden loss of all motor control- — that qualifies her as disabled because it substantially impairs a major life activity.¹

Felix cites to similar cases from other circuits. The Seventh Circuit addressed a case where a woman paralyzed from the waist down requested accommodation for pressure ulcers that she periodically develops as a result of her paralysis. Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543-44 (7th Cir.1995). Although the pressure ulcers do not directly relate to walking — the major life activity which was impaired — the Seventh Circuit found that the ulcers were “a characteristic manifestation of [the] disability” and thus were “a part of the underlying disability.” Id. at 544. Felix also looks for support from the Ninth Circuit’s holding that whether a plaintiff “faced substantial limitations in his ability to work is irrelevant to whether his limitations in other major life activities qualify him as disabled for ADA purposes.” McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir.1999). But we agree with the Ninth Circuit that a plaintiff can seek accommodation at work even if the impairment only qualifies as a disability because of a life activity other than working. Like the other cases to which Felix cites, McAlindin differs from Felix’s situation because McAindin appeared to be seeking accommodation for the same mental impairments, such as the inability to interact with other people, as constituted his claimed disability.

Felix seeks a workplace accommodation for a mental condition which does not flow directly from her disability — the mental condition of insomnia that prevents her from sleeping. Felix did not argue to the NYCTA that she was unable to work in the subway because such work aggravated her insomnia; she told the NYCTA that she could not work in the subway because she was “terrified of being alone and closed in.” Thus, in contrast to the cases upon which she relies, the impairment for which Felix seeks accommodation does not arise “because of the disability.” If the requested accommodation addressed a limitation caused by Felix’s insomnia, it would be covered by the ADA. Adverse effects of disabilities and adverse or side effects from the medical treatment of disabilities arise “because of the disability.” However, other impairments not caused by the disability need not be accommodated.

Felix contends that her case falls within our precedents by arguing that her insomnia and her fear of being in the subway are part of the same singular mental disability, the PTSD, and thus her inability to work in the subway is also “because of the disability.” However, we do not view her insomnia and fear of the subway as a singular mental condition: They are two mental conditions that derive from the same traumatic incident. In cases involving conditions like AIDS that are discrete diseases with pervasive effects, it will frequently be obvious that the lesser impairment is caused by the disability. However, in situations like plaintiffs where it is not clear that a single, particular medical condition is responsible for both the disability and the lesser impairment, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the specific condition which impairs a major life activity and the accommodation. Felix has not done so here.

Finally, we note that our interpretation of the language of the statute is supported by policy considerations. The ADA serves the important function of ensuring that people with disabilities are given the same opportunities and are able to enjoy the same benefits as other Americans. The ADA mandates reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in order to put them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does not authorize a preference for disabled people generally. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1521, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002). The interpretation advanced by Felix and the EEOC would transform the ADA from an act that prohibits discrimination into an act that requires treating people with disabilities better than others who are not disabled but have the same impairment for which accommodation is sought. We think that the ADA deliberately speaks in terms of eliminating discrimination and thus do not interpret it so broadly as to require the accommodation of impairments that do not limit major life activities whenever the person with an impairment happens to also have a disability.

Adopting this principle would effectively eviscerate the statutory definition of a disability as an impairment of a major life activity — a significant threshold for seeking redress under the ADA. An ADA plaintiff who is not otherwise impaired in a major life activity but suffers debilitating anxiety or stress from a particular job could get to a jury merely by alleging that the job causes insomnia, difficulty breathing, or some other set of disabling symptoms that can be characterized as a syndrome. We decline to adopt such an expansive reading of the ADA that frustrates its plain statutory meaning. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (inability to perform “a single, particular job” is not a substantial limitation upon working (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i))).

To recap, plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA because she did not seek accommodation “because of [her] disability” and therefore we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

CONCLUSION

We affirm summary judgment in favor of NYCTA and against Felix.

1 . The Court in Lovejoy-Wilson relied on EEOC regulations that specify that epilepsy constitutes a disability and therefore did not have to determine which major life activity was impaired. Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 216 (citing 29 C.F.R. 1615.103(1)(ii)).