Paul v. LaValley , 712 F. App'x 78 ( 2018 )

17-1086
Paul v. LaValley
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 23rd day of February, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
Shondell Paul,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 17-1086
Thomas LaValley, Superintendent, Clinton
Correctional Facility, Stephen Brown, Deputy
Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.*
_________________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Shondell Paul, pro se, Comstock, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,
Andrew Bing, Deputy Solicitor General,
Frederick A. Brodie, Assistant Solicitor
General, of counsel, for Eric T.
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State
of New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Suddaby, C.J.; Peebles, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED
for further proceedings.
Appellant Shondell Paul, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment granting qualified
immunity to Superintendent Thomas LaValley and Deputy Superintendent of Security Stephen
Brown in Paul’s suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the relevant times, Paul was a prisoner in
a Special Housing Unit at Clinton Correctional Facility (“Clinton”) in Dannemora, New York.
When Paul first arrived at the facility, he was provided with long underwear for use during the one
hour of daily outdoor exercise. However, Clinton later stopped issuing the long underwear. Paul
complained to LaValley and Brown that, without the long underwear or other winter items, the
standard clothing provided was inadequate to protect him from the harsh winter weather, which
precluded him from participating in daily exercise. His complaints went unheeded. The defendants
moved for summary judgment, both on the merits and on qualified immunity. The magistrate
judge recommended denying the motion. The district court adopted the majority of the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, but concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity. This appeal follows. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all
ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police
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Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Summary judgment is proper only when,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v.
Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The
defendants bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to qualified immunity. Vincent v.
Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013).
To prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, an inmate must show that he suffered a
sufficiently serious deprivation and that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prisoner suffers a sufficiently serious deprivation
when prison officials fail to furnish him with “life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981). Accordingly, we have agreed with other Circuits that “some opportunity for
exercise must be afforded to prisoners,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1985), and
we have held that this right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes by no later
than 1985, Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 703–04 (2d Cir. 1996). Upon review, we conclude
that the magistrate judge and the district court correctly concluded that Paul disputed material
issues of fact concerning the merits of his claim and that the right at issue was clearly established,
and we therefore reject Appellees’ alternative bases for affirming the district court’s judgment.
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The district court nonetheless granted immunity to the defendants based on its conclusion
that it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they may lawfully deny long
underwear to Paul. Paul v. LaValley, No. 9:13-cv-1040 (GTS/DEP), 2017 WL 1167308, at *4–6
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017). However,
once a court has found that the law was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct and for the particular context in which it occurred, it is no
defense for a police officer who violated this clearly established law to respond that
he held an objectively reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful. This is so
because a police officer who violates clearly established law necessarily lacks an
objectively reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful. We clarify here that the
two are part of the same inquiry, not independent elements as some cases
suggested.
Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 433 n.11 (2d Cir. 2009); see also
Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 115 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The focus . . . remains on whether, at the time
of the alleged conduct, the right was clearly established, rendering it objectively unreasonable for
an official to think that his action was lawful.” (emphasis added)); Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139,
166 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hether a right is clearly established is the
same question as whether a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct in question was
unlawful.”). Here, because an inmate’s right to be afforded an opportunity to exercise was clearly
established as of the events in question, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find in them no basis for altering
our decision. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further
proceedings.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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