Hamilton v. Mark IV Industries, Inc. (In Re Mark IV Industries, Inc.) , 558 F. App'x 135 ( 2014 )

13-2969; 13-3005
In re Mark IV Indus., Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
DENNY CHIN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
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IN RE MARK IV INDUSTRIES, INC.,
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GERTRUDE CORETTA FENNELL
HAMILTON,
Appellant,
v. Nos. 13-2969-bk
13-3005-bk
MARK IV INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Appellee.*
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FOR APPELLANT: Gertrude Corretta Fennell Hamilton, pro se, Walterboro, South
Carolina.
*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official captions as shown above.
FOR APPELLEE: James E. Ivester, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
New York, New York.
Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (George B. Daniels, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgments of the district court entered on September 25, 2012, and
March 5, 2013, are AFFIRMED.
Pro se appellant Gertrude Coretta Fennell Hamilton appeals from adverse judgments
entered by the district court in two bankruptcy appeals docketed in the district court as Nos.
11-Civ-6758 and 12-Civ-3210, as well as from the denial of her motions for reconsideration
in each appeal.1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and history of
the prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1. Dismissal of the Bankruptcy Appeals
“An appeal from a district court’s review of a bankruptcy court ruling is subject to
plenary review.” In re Halstead Energy Corp., 367 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2004). We review
a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard. See In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2003).
1
While Hamilton’s notices of appeal to this court might be construed only to challenge
denial of reconsideration, we construe them liberally also to challenge the district court
rulings for which reconsideration was sought. See Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 42 n.1
(2d Cir. 2001).
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a. No. 11-Civ-6758
In this bankruptcy appeal, Hamilton contested the expungement of her proofs of
claim. The district court correctly dismissed this challenge as untimely. Under the
Bankruptcy Rules, a notice of appeal “shall be filed with the clerk within 14 days of the date
of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from,” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a),
although “[t]he bankruptcy judge may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any
party,” id. 8002(c)(1). “[T]he time limit contained in Rule 8002(a) is jurisdictional, and . . .
in the absence of a timely notice of appeal in the district court, the district court is without
jurisdiction to consider the appeal, regardless of whether the appellant can demonstrate
excusable neglect.” In re Siemon, 421 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Without procuring any extension, Hamilton filed her notice of appeal from
the June 2010 bankruptcy court order disallowing her proofs of claim in August 2011, more
than a year beyond the fourteen-day jurisdictional deadline. This part of the appeal was,
thus, untimely and properly dismissed.
Hamilton also appealed to the district court the bankruptcy court’s orders denying her
motions for reconsideration. “A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to reconsider a
disallowed claim is a discretionary decision, reviewed under the familiar and deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 673 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2012).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hamilton’s motions to
reconsider its disallowance of her proofs of claim. Neither motion presented new issues, but,
rather, continued to argue the merits of the claims raised in her South Carolina litigation.
Accordingly, the district court correctly denied this part of her appeal.
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b. No. 12-Civ-3210
Separately, Hamilton appealed to the district court the bankruptcy court’s case closing
order. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. We have adopted “the general rule
. . . that in order to have standing to appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, an appellant must
be a person aggrieved—a person directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the
challenged order of the bankruptcy court.” In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 89 (2d
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this rule, we generally grant
standing to “creditors . . . appeal[ing] orders of the bankruptcy court disposing of property
of the estate because such orders directly affect the creditors’ ability to receive payment of
their claims.” Id. (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). Hamilton,
however, cannot establish standing as a creditor of the Mark IV estate because the
bankruptcy court disallowed her proofs of claim and her appeal of that decision was
untimely. Absent status as a creditor, there is no basis for concluding that Hamilton is
“directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the bankruptcy court’s case closing order.
Hamilton’s standing in this context is fundamentally contingent on the outcome of her South
Carolina litigation, which, having been fully litigated in Mark IV’s favor, necessarily
precludes standing to challenge the case closing order.
2. District Court Reconsideration Motions
Whether Hamilton’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s orders was
properly entertained pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015, see English-
Speaking Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (favoring Rule 8015);
4
Butler v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 2 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); but see In re
Wilkinson, 923 F.2d 154, 156 (10th Cir. 1991) (permitting either Rule 59 or Rule 8015
motion to toll time for filing bankruptcy appeal notice)—a matter not decided by this
court—and whether the standard of review is abuse of discretion, see Schwartz v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing denial of Rule 59(e) motion for
abuse of discretion); In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing denial
of Rule 8015 motion for abuse of discretion), or higher, Hamilton’s appeal fails for
substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned order denying
reconsideration.
We have considered Hamilton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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