Carolina v. Rubino Carolina v. Hernandez Carolina v. Woo Carolina v. ( 2016 )

14-2237-pr; 14-3135-pr; 14-4196-pr; 14-4200-pr
Carolina v. Rubino; Carolina v. Hernandez; Carolina v. Woo; Carolina v. Lightner
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 25th day of March, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges,
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN,
District Judge.*
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TYRONE DOUGLAS CAROLINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-2237-pr
MICHAEL A. RUBINO, SYDNEY T. SCHULMAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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TYRONE DOUGLAS CAROLINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-3135-pr
* The Honorable Laura Taylor Swain, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
MIRNA HERNANDEZ, RN Nurse; JON DOE,
Medical Staff; JANE DOE, Medical Staff,
Defendants-Appellees.
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TYRONE DOUGLAS CAROLINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-4196-pr
JHONY WOO, Medical U.R.C; DR. RUIZ,
LIGHTNER, Medical Supervisor of MacDougall
Correctional Institution; DR. KEVIN MCCRYSTAL;
DR. PILLAI OMPRAKASH; DR. JAMES
O’HALLORAN; MEDICAL SUPERVISOR OF
CHESHIRE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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TYRONE DOUGLAS CAROLINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-4200-pr
LIGHTNER, Medical Supervisor; NURSE LAURICE;
NURSE ALICE; CAPTAIN ROBLES; JOHN DOE,
Doctor,
Defendants-Appellees.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: JOHN BOSTON (Seymour W. James, Jr.,
and Veronica Vela, on the brief), Legal
Aid Society, New York, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL A. MARTONE, Assistant
Attorney General (Michael K. Skold,
Assistant Attorney General, on the brief),
for George Jepsen, Attorney General of
the State of Connecticut, Hartford,
Connecticut.
2
APPEARING FOR INTERVENOR: LOWELL V. STURGILL JR., Attorney,
Civil Division (Barbara L. Herwig,
Attorney, Civil Division, on the brief), for
Benjamin C. Mizer, Assistant Attorney
General, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny and Alfred V. Covello, Judges).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Tyrone Douglas Carolina, an inmate serving a 12-year state sentence in
Connecticut, appeals from four judgments denying him leave to proceed in forma pauperis
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) three strikes rule, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), and dismissing his complaints against various attorneys and prison staff
members for failure to pay the filing fee.1 Carolina argues that § 1915(g) impermissibly
burdens his right to access the courts and denies equal protection, thereby violating the
Constitution both on its face and as applied to him. We review the constitutionality of a
statute de novo. See United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2013). In so
doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings,
which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1
These four appeals are not consolidated, but they were argued and briefed in tandem.
See, e.g., Carolina v. Rubino, No.14-2237-pr (2d Cir.), ECF No. 34.
3
1. Carolina’s Three Strikes
In granting Carolina’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis on these appeals and
for the appointment of counsel, this court directed counsel to brief certain issues,
specifically how many PLRA strikes Carolina had and whether certain of Carolina’s
dismissals qualified as strikes. Carolina now concedes that he has at least three valid
PLRA strikes. Accordingly, we need not here consider whether Carolina’s various
dismissals constitute PLRA strikes, as this issue is now moot.
2. Constitutional Challenges to PLRA
In responding to the request for briefing, Carolina’s counsel raises two
constitutional challenges to § 1915(g), which were neither presented to the district court
nor invited by this court.2 While we typically do not address matters raised for the first
time on appeal, we nevertheless have broad discretion to do so. See Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418–19 (2d Cir.
2001). In the interests of judicial economy, we exercise that discretion here, recognizing
both the likelihood that Carolina will soon file a new complaint reiterating his
constitutional challenges and our ability swiftly to resolve his arguments under established
precedent.
2
Contrary to Carolina’s suggestion, our order instructing counsel to address the
enumerated issues, “along with any others that merit discussion,” was not an invitation to
raise forfeited arguments.
4
a. Right To Access Courts
Carolina contends that § 1915(g) violates his First Amendment right to access the
courts. It is “established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access
to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see U.S. Const. amend. I.
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”). This right is not unlimited, however. Indeed,
even before enactment of the PLRA, in order to protect “the fair allocation of judicial
resources,” the Supreme Court recognized a judicial duty to deny in forma pauperis status
to individuals whom the court, in its discretion, determined had abused the system. In re
Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991).
Here, Carolina’s argument is defeated by precedent holding that § 1915(g) does not
deny a prisoner access to the courts. See Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that § 1915(g) “presents no unconstitutional burden to a prisoner’s access
to the court” because it “does not prevent prisoner[s] . . . from filing civil actions, it merely
prohibits them from enjoying [in forma pauperis] status” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that §1915(g)
serves only to narrow “the circumstances under which prisoners may file in forma pauperis
. . . in the federal courts”). As the Supreme Court has ruled, where a fundamental right is
not implicated, there is no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis. See United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (explaining that there is no “unlimited rule that an
5
indigent at all times and in all cases has the right to relief without the payment of fees”).
Because § 1915(g) affects only Carolina’s ability to proceed in forma pauperis after
repeated filings reaching a level that Congress has deemed abusive, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), he cannot demonstrate a constitutionally impermissible burden on his right to
access the courts.
In urging otherwise, Carolina argues that Polanco’s holding pertains only to the
imminent danger exception to § 1915(g). The opinion’s language and citations, all of
which concern the constitutionality of § 1915(g) at large, do not support this narrow
reading. To the contrary, they indicate that we there considered whether § 1915(g), as a
whole, either violates a prisoner’s right to access the courts or is impermissibly overbroad.
See Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d at 153−56. Ultimately, this court held that “none of
[Polanco’s] constitutional challenges [were] persuasive,” and we thus joined “the other
circuits that have upheld the constitutionality of this statute.” Id. at 156. Indeed, Polanco
states that “[s]ection 1915(g) presents no unconstitutional burden to a prisoner’s access to
the courts.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Polanco is not distinguishable,3 and its
holding forecloses Carolina’s First Amendment challenge.
3
Carolina also contends that his case is distinguishable from Polanco because he
challenges the constitutionality of the three-strikes provision as applied to his case. He
fails to explain, however, how his apparent inability to pre-pay the filing fees affects the
constitutionality of § 1915(g). In any event, as explained infra at 7, Carolina’s complaints
do not involve interests similar to those that the Supreme Court has recognized to require
court fee waivers for indigents.
6
That the Constitution requires states to waive filing or other court fees for indigent
persons in cases involving certain fundamental rights, often pertaining to family
relationships, warrants no different conclusion. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113
(1996) (recognizing right to free court access only in “narrow category” of civil cases); see,
e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13−17 (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971); cf. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658−59 (1973) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to filing fee by indigents appealing adverse welfare decision because interest at
stake was not akin to marital relationship); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 444−45
(same regarding filing fee to discharge bankruptcy). Neither the Supreme Court nor this
court has extended this line of precedent to all civil cases alleging violations of
fundamental constitutional rights. Rather, the general rule in civil cases—even those
alleging constitutional violations—remains that “indigent persons have no constitutional
right to proceed in forma pauperis.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 119.4
Carolina’s complaints here do not invoke interests recognized as fundamental in
prior precedent. Thus, he has no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis that is
burdened by § 1915(g)’s three strikes rule.
b. Equal Protection
Carolina argues that § 1915(g) violates equal protection by (1) denying court access
4
Section 1915(g) has no application to criminal cases, where an indigent’s rights are
broader.
7
to indigent prisoners while affording it to similarly situated prisoners who can pay the
filing fee, and (2) treating prisoners differently from other litigants. Carolina
acknowledges that neither prisoners nor indigents qualify as a suspect class.
Nevertheless, he urges strict scrutiny based on the alleged burden § 1915(g) imposes on a
prisoner’s right to access the courts. For reasons already explained, § 1915(g) imposes no
such burden, either on its face or as applied to Carolina. Accordingly, § 1915(g) is subject
only to rational-basis review, which it easily passes.5
As early as 1892, “Congress recognized . . . that a litigant whose filing fees and
court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive
to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 1996, Congress responded to the problems caused by
frivolous prisoner litigation by enacting “a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad
claims and facilitate consideration of the good”; among these reforms is the PLRA’s three
strikes rule. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). The rule is a reasonable response
to an identified problem and, thus, satisfies rational basis review. See Nicholas v. Tucker,
114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that PLRA “easily passes the rational basis
test” and that “Act’s goals of relieving the pressure of excessive prisoner filings on our
5
We reject Carolina’s unsupported suggestion that intermediate scrutiny might somehow
apply.
8
overburdened federal courts is a constitutionally legitimate one”). Accordingly,
Carolina’s equal protection challenge fails.
3. Imminent Danger
Although Carolina concedes that his complaint in Carolina v. Hernandez, No.
14-3135-pr, failed plausibly to allege a risk of imminent physical injury sufficient to
bypass § 1915(g)’s bar, he argues that the district court should have granted him leave to
amend his pleadings. Pro se plaintiffs are normally afforded an opportunity to amend, see
Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999), but leave need not be
granted where even a liberal reading of the complaint fails to give “any indication that a
valid claim might be stated.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is this case. Carolina’s complaint, filed in
November 2013, alleged acts occurring in July 2011. To plausibly plead an imminent
danger of serious physical injury, however, a plaintiff must allege a then-present danger, as
opposed to harms that have already occurred. See Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559,
562−63 (2d Cir. 2002). Because Carolina alleged only past harms, his complaint did not
present the possibility of his stating a valid imminent-danger claim. Thus, because
amendment would have been futile, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing Carolina’s complaint without granting leave to amend.
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4. Conclusion
We have considered Carolina’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgments of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
10