Stark v. City of New York ( 2023 )

21-2886-cv
Stark v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed
on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 30th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.
MOSHE STARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant, 21-2886-cv
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK, NYPD DETECTIVE ESTEVEZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ROB RICKNER, Rickner PLLC, New York,
NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: DEBORAH E. WASSEL (Richard P.
Dearing, Ingrid R. Gustafson, on the brief),
for Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix,
Corporation Counsel of the City of New
York, New York City Law Department,
New York, NY.
1
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
2 York. (William F. Kuntz, II, Judge).
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
4 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is
5 AFFIRMED.
6 Plaintiff-Appellant Moshe Stark (“Stark,” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from the October 27, 2021
7 judgment of the District Court granting a motion for summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees
8 the City of New York and NYPD Detective Ileen Estevez (jointly, “Defendants”) in Plaintiff’s 42
9 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for false arrest. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
10 procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
11 “We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo, and will affirm
12 only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, shows no ‘genuine dispute
13 of material fact’ and demonstrates ‘the movant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’” FIH,
14 LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners LLC, 920 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ace Partners, LLC
15 v. Town of E. Hartford, 883 F.3d 190, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2018)).
16 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
17 I. Background
18 On May 28, 2018, David Grossman filed a criminal complaint with the NYPD against Stark,
19 alleging that, on the evening of May 27, Stark assaulted Grossman outside of Grossman’s home and
20 damaged his property. JA 208. Three days later, on May 31, Det. Estevez interviewed Grossman
21 regarding his complaint, id. at 31, and on June 2, Det. Estevez informed Plaintiff on a phone call
22 that Grossman had accused Plaintiff of having hit Grossman with a power drill, id. at 24. During
23 that call, Plaintiff denied hitting anyone. Id. at 125.
24 Following the June 2 call, Plaintiff searched for surveillance footage and located video of the
25 incident recorded on a neighboring building’s security camera. Id. at 129. After obtaining the
26 relevant footage, Plaintiff gave the video to his attorney, Charles Finkelstein, id. at 177, who in turn
27 recounts that, prior to June 12, he told Det. Estevez: “I have a video that I would like her to see that
28 I believe will exonerate my client as not the person who bent any wipers to the car. Surely the
29 complainant was not struck by anything,” id. at 178.
30 On June 12, at approximately 9:30 A.M., Plaintiff and Finkelstein entered the 66th Precinct.
31 Id. at 198. Finkelstein recalls speaking with Det. Estevez in a detective squad room to request that
32 she “look at this video before [she] do[es] anything” because it would exonerate Stark. Id. at 179.
33 He further recounts that Det. Estevez did not watch the video and instead asked him “to step back
34 outside.” Id. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff was placed under arrest. Id.
2
1 II. Discussion
2 The District Court concluded that Det. Estevez had probable cause to arrest Stark on June
3 12. Id. at 213. The District Court determined, first, that on May 31, 2018, Det. Estevez “already
4 had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff . . . based on Mr. Grossman’s complaint and interview,” and
5 second, that “once Detective Estevez had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff . . . she did not have a
6 duty to watch a video which would have purportedly exculpated Plaintiff.” Id. at 213–14. The
7 District Court also concluded that even if the facts were insufficient to support probable cause, they
8 were surely adequate to support “arguable probable cause.” Id. 214. Having determined that there
9 was no unconstitutional arrest, the District Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim
10 against the City of New York. Id. at 215.
11 Probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest where the officer “is in possession of
12 ‘reasonably trustworthy information [concerning] facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a
13 person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is
14 committing a crime.’” United States v. Pabon, 871 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Walczyk v. Rio,
15 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007)). Employing a “fluid and contextual” standard, we “must examine
16 the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir.
17 2008)). In so doing, we “consider the circumstances from the perspective of an objectively
18 reasonable police officer, recognizing that the officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences on the
19 basis of h[er] prior experience.” Id.20 Even where an officer lacks probable cause, qualified immunity shields her from 42 U.S.C.
21 § 1983 liability if she has “arguable probable cause.” Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.
22 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that probable cause is “arguable” “if either
23 (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers
24 of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Figueroa v.
25 Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir.
26 2013)).
27 In reviewing the record de novo, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that as of
28 Det. Estevez’s May 31 interview of Grossman, she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. JA 212.
29 At that time, she had no reason to doubt Grossman’s account. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63
30 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).
31 We need not take a position, however, on the District Court’s ruling that Det. Estevez had
32 no duty to watch the surveillance video before arresting Stark. See Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th 98,
33 107 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[A]lthough [the detective] had no duty to seek it out, [Det.] Lee was not free to
34 disregard the plainly exculpatory evidence that was presented to him.”). In the absence of exigent
35 circumstances, she had a duty to consider “any new or corrective information that reasonably would
36 have affected [her] initial decision [that probable cause existed].” United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734
37 F.2d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Failure to apprise the magistrate of such information would result in
38 the invalidation of the warrant.”); Pabon, 871 F.3d at 175 (explaining that although “Marin–Buitrago
3
1 dealt with the standards for issuance of a search warrant, the same logic applies in evaluating
2 whether probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest”); cf. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70
3 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiff’s version wrong before
4 arresting him.”); Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[S]ome exculpatory evidence
5 does not make an arrest illegal when the totality of evidence still establishes probable cause to
6 believe that the suspect committed the crime.”).
7 Even assuming that Det. Estevez was presented with the surveillance footage (a disputed
8 fact), that she had a duty to watch the footage (a determination we need not make), and that she
9 violated this duty, we conclude that qualified immunity shields Det. Estevez because her
10 counterfactual pre-arrest review of the surveillance footage would not have dissipated “arguable
11 probable cause.” Cf. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743–44 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that under the
12 “corrected affidavits doctrine,” courts “look to the hypothetical contents of a ‘corrected’ application
13 to determine whether a proper warrant application . . . would still have been sufficient to support
14 arguable probable cause”). Although Plaintiff contends that the footage contradicts some of
15 Grossman’s account, Pl. Br. 4–5, 15–16, the recording nonetheless shows Stark outside of
16 Grossman’s home with a drill, the weapon Grossman claims he was assaulted with, and places Stark
17 and Grossman together on the night of the alleged incident. Because “officers of reasonable
18 competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met” after having reviewed the
19 footage, Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100, we conclude that Det. Estevez had “arguable probable cause” to
20 arrest Plaintiff.
21 III. Conclusion
22 We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Stark on appeal and find them to be
23 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
24
25 FOR THE COURT:
26 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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