United States v. Hill ( 2023 )


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  •    21-2673
    United States v. Hill
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
    GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S
    LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
    THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY
    CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 10th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.
    PRESENT:
    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
    Circuit Judges.
    __________________________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.                                              No. 21-2673
    MARVIN HILL,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________________________
    For Defendant-Appellant:              Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender,
    Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office,
    Syracuse, NY.
    For Appellee:                         Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States
    Attorney, for Carla B. Freedman, United
    States Attorney for the Northern District of
    New York, Syracuse, NY.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge).
    UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS    HEREBY     ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED.
    Marvin Hill appeals from the district court’s judgment imposing a
    twenty-one-month term of imprisonment with no term of supervised release,
    following his guilty plea to one count of escape from the custody of the Bureau of
    Prisons (the “BOP”), in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 751
    (a). We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
    On appeal, Hill challenges only the substantive reasonableness of the
    twenty-one-month term of imprisonment imposed by the district court – a
    sentence that he completed on December 30, 2022.          See BOP Inmate Locator,
    http://www. bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2023); App’x at 33 (providing
    Hill’s BOP register number).
    2
    “Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the federal
    judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” United States v. Blackburn, 
    461 F.3d 259
    , 261 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). “So, as a general rule, if
    an event occurs during the course of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it
    impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief . . . , we must dismiss the
    case.” United States v. Chestnut, 
    989 F.3d 222
    , 224 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Therefore, in a criminal proceeding, if “the only relief” that a
    defendant seeks is to reduce or vacate his sentence – and the defendant “has now
    completed that . . . sentence” – we must conclude that “the appeal is moot,” since
    “neither we nor the district court can grant him the relief he is seeking.” 
    Id.
    To be sure, “[i]n certain circumstances, an appeal challenging a criminal
    sentence will not be rendered moot when the defendant is released from prison so
    long as the defendant is still subject to a term of supervision.” Chestnut, 989 F.3d
    at 224.   More specifically, “[f]or a term of supervised release to preserve the
    presence of a live case or controversy, there must be more than a remote and
    speculative possibility that the district court could or would impose a reduced
    term of supervised release were we to remand the matter.” Id. at 225 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). But here, there is no “possibility that the district court
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    could . . . impose a reduced term of supervised release,” since the district court did
    not impose any term of supervised release in the first instance. Id. (emphasis
    added). Therefore, because it would be “impossible for [us] to grant any effectual
    relief . . . to [Hill], we must dismiss the case.” Id. at 224; see also United States v.
    Key, 
    602 F.3d 492
    , 494 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An appellate challenge to a criminal sentence
    is rendered moot when the defendant has been released from prison and when
    there is either no possibility or only a remote and speculative possibility that the
    district court . . . would impose a reduced term of supervised release.” (internal
    quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
    We have considered Hill’s remaining arguments and find them to be
    without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-2673

Filed Date: 2/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/10/2023