Sedunova v. City of New York ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •      15-681
    Sedunova v. City of New York
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    CORRECTED SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
    DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
    SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3       States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4       on the 29th day of June, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6       PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
    7                BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    8                REENA RAGGI,
    9                              Circuit Judges.
    10
    11       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    12       NATASHA SEDUNOVA,
    13                Plaintiff-Appellant,
    14
    15                    -v.-                                               15-681
    16
    17       CITY OF NEW YORK, MATTHEW COLLINS,
    18       MICHAEL HOPKINS,
    19                Defendants-Appellees,
    20
    21       CHRIS ANDY GRARY, ANGELA MYERS, JOHN
    22       and JANE DOES 1-10, (the names of
    23       John and Jane doe being fictitious as
    24       the true names are presently
    25       unknown), JOHNE DOE 1-2, JOHN OR JANE
    26       DOE 3-7, CHARLES HYNES, ED PURCE,
    27                Defendants.
    28       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
    1
    1
    2   FOR APPELLANT:             J. ANDREW KENT, on the brief,
    3                              Lincoln Square Legal Services at
    4                              Fordham Law School, New York,
    5                              New York.
    6
    7                              William J. Harrington, Goodwin
    8                              Procter LLP, New York, New York.
    9
    10   FOR APPELLEES:             INGRID R. GUSTAFSON (with
    11                              Richard Dearing and Devin Slack
    12                              on the brief), for Zachary W.
    13                              Carter, New York City
    14                              Corporation Counsel, New York,
    15                              New York.
    16
    17        Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
    18   Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.).
    19
    20        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
    21   AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
    22   AFFIRMED.
    23
    24        Plaintiff Natasha Sedunova appeals from the judgment of
    25   the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    26   New York (Johnson, J.), dismissing her complaint for failure
    27   to state a claim. The complaint alleges, under 42 U.S.C.
    28   § 1983, that NYPD detectives Matthew Collins and Michael
    29   Hopkins, and seven John Doe defendants (collectively, the
    30   “defendants”) violated her civil rights, specifically,
    31   (1) that she was denied a fair trial because her confession
    32   was fabricated, and (2) that the knowing use of fabricated
    33   evidence constituted a malicious prosecution.
    34
    35        We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for
    36   failure to state a claim, and we accept all factual
    37   allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
    38   favor of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v.
    39   Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 
    709 F.3d 109
    , 119 (2d Cir.
    40   2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    41   underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
    42   presented for review.
    43
    44        1.   The plaintiff claims that her confession was
    45   fabricated because it was produced as the result of coercive
    46   interrogation techniques. When a police officer creates
    47   false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and
    2
    1   forwards that information to prosecutors, the accused’s
    2   constitutional right to a fair trial is violated. See
    3   Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 
    124 F.3d 123
    , 130 (2d Cir.
    4   1997).1 Failure to administer Miranda warnings alone cannot
    5   serve as the basis of a § 1983 action; however, a § 1983
    6   claim may arise if coercion was applied to obtain
    7   inculpatory statements, and the statements thereby obtained
    8   were used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding.
    9   Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 
    156 F.3d 340
    , 346 (2d
    10   Cir. 1998) (citing Weaver v. Brenner, 
    40 F.3d 527
    , 535 (2d
    11   Cir. 1994)); see also Jocks v. Tavernier, 
    316 F.3d 128
    , 138
    12   (2d Cir. 2003) (“Miranda violations, absent coercion, do not
    13   rise to the level of constitutional violations actionable
    14   under § 1983.”).
    15
    16        A plaintiff alleging coercion must allege more than
    17   that police told her she was a suspect, suggested that it
    18   would be to her benefit to cooperate, or promised leniency
    19   in exchange for cooperation. See United States v. Ruggles,
    20   
    70 F.3d 262
    , 265 (2d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff must point to
    21   circumstances indicating that she could not make a knowing
    22   and voluntary decision. See United States v. Taylor, 745
    
    23 F.3d 15
    , 24 (2d Cir. 2014).
    24
    25        The factual allegations in this case, even accepted as
    26   true and viewed in the light most favorable to Sedunova, do
    27   not amount to coercion sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim.
    28   The salient allegations are that John Does 1 and 2 tried to
    29   “convince” her that it would be “better for her” and “good
    30   for her” if she confessed to the murder and claimed self-
    31   defense, and that she was told that she would be “free to
    32   leave” if she confessed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-35. None of the
    33   allegations amount to circumstances under which the
    34   plaintiff could not make a knowing and voluntary decision.
    35
    1
    Although Sedunova attempts to plead a fabrication
    claim, she has not alleged that her confession was forged
    (she acknowledges that she made the videotaped confession
    and adopted the written confession), nor has she alleged any
    other circumstances that lead to a reasonable inference that
    any defendant knew her confession was false when made. See
    
    Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129-30
    .   Accordingly, we analyze her
    claim as one alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment
    under § 1983.
    3
    1        2.   The complaint also alleges that the knowing use of
    2   the fabricated confession constituted a malicious
    3   prosecution. See 
    Jocks, 316 F.3d at 138
    . However, as
    4   discussed above, the fabrication claim is rejected because
    5   the confession was not coerced. The use of the confession
    6   therefore was not the use of fabricated evidence.
    7
    8        For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the
    9   plaintiff’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment
    10   of the district court.
    11
    12                              FOR THE COURT:
    13                              CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
    14
    4