Barrow v. Farago , 707 F. App'x 57 ( 2017 )


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  •     16-3444
    Barrow v. Farago
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 22nd day of December, two thousand seventeen.
    PRESENT:
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    REENA RAGGI,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    VINCENT BARROW,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 16-3444
    DR. LAWRENCE FARAGO, PSYCHIATRIST,
    BRYAN HILTON, SUPERINTENDENT OF
    PROGRAMS, MICHAEL HOAGAN, DEPUTY
    COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF MENTAL
    HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS, ANTHONY DEVITTO,
    EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL
    PROGRAMING, DIANE VANBUREN,
    DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BOB LEWIS,
    OMH THERAPIST, LISA KALIES, UNIT
    CHIEF, OMH, RESIDENTIAL MENTAL
    HEALTH UNIT, JOSEPH BELLNIER,
    1
    DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PROGRAM
    SERVICE, KENNETH S. PERLMAN, DEPUTY
    COMMISSIONER OF PROGRAM SERVICE,
    LUCIEN LECLAIRE, ASSISTANT
    COMMISSIONER, MAUREEN E. BOLL,
    DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND COUNSEL,
    E. LINDQUIST, ASSISTANT
    COMMISSIONER, KAREN BELLAMY,
    DIRECTOR, INMATE GRIEVANCE
    PROGRAM, JEFF MCKOY, DEPUTY
    COMMISSIONER, MAUREEN BOSCO,
    EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL NEW
    YORK PSYCHIATRIC CENTER, OFFICE OF
    MENTAL HEALTH, B. MCARDLE, DEPUTY
    SUPERINTENDENT OF MARCY
    CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DONALD
    SELSKEY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
    LIEUTENANT CORY, HOLANCHUCK,
    BRIAN FISCHER, COMMISSIONER,
    CAPTAIN HARPER, CHARLES KELLY, JR.,
    SUPERINTENDENT, MARCY
    CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    ADOLF, CORRECTIONS COUNSELOR, NEW
    YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL
    HEALTH, NEW YORK STATE
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
    COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, MARCY, NEW
    YORK, ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK
    STATE, KINDERMAN, DEPUTY SUPT. OF
    PROGRAMS,
    Defendants.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                      Vincent Barrow, pro se, Comstock, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                     Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,
    Victor Paladino and Patrick Woods,
    Assistant Solicitors General, for Eric T.
    Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State
    of New York, Albany, NY.
    2
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    New York (D’Agostino, J.; Hummel, M.J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Appellant Vincent Barrow, a prison inmate appearing pro se, brought the instant suit under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against prison officials, claiming violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
    Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Barrow’s claims
    are based primarily on allegations that the defendants required him to wear an exposure jumpsuit
    (a jumpsuit designed to prevent the wearer from removing it) when he left his cell; placed a sign
    reading “exposer” outside his cell; afforded him inadequate process before taking the foregoing
    measures; disproportionately required minority inmates to wear exposure jumpsuits; provided
    inadequate medical care for his foot pain, exhibitionism, and depression; and denied him access to
    certain programming. The district court dismissed on motion all of Barrow’s claims, except for
    an Eighth Amendment claim that his psychiatrist denied treatment for his depression. The court
    later resolved that claim adversely to Barrow on summary judgment. Barrow appeals both the
    dismissal and the grant of summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
    1. We review the district court’s decision to dismiss virtually all of Barrow’s claims de
    novo. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 
    282 F.3d 147
    , 152 (2d Cir. 2002). An independent
    review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed
    Barrow’s claims for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s thorough September
    25, 2014 report and recommendation, which the district court adopted in its entirety. See Barrow
    v. Buren, No. 9:12-CV-01268, 
    2015 WL 417084
    , at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015).
    2. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Barrow’s claim of
    inadequate medical care de novo. Sousa v. Marquez, 
    702 F.3d 124
    , 127 (2d Cir. 2012). To
    establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate medical care, Barrow would need
    to prove that “the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care [was] sufficiently serious,” and that
    the defendant--Barrow's psychiatrist--acted with deliberate indifference to Barrow’s health.
    Salahuddin v. Goord, 
    467 F.3d 263
    , 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    As the district court concluded, Barrow failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
    fact as to whether his psychiatrist acted with deliberate indifference in discontinuing his
    prescription for a particular depression medication. The record on summary judgment showed
    that the psychiatrist offered Barrow other treatment for his depression, including cognitive
    behavioral therapy. See Chance v. Armstrong, 
    143 F.3d 698
    , 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“So long as the
    treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give
    rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that Barrow
    refused visits with his psychiatrist and only partially complied with his treatment.
    3
    We have considered Barrow’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-3444

Citation Numbers: 707 F. App'x 57

Judges: Jacobs, Raggi, Droney

Filed Date: 12/22/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024