Gjonaj v. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •      15-2359
    Gjonaj v. Lynch
    BIA
    Vomacka, IJ
    A099 000 574
    A099 000 575
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   9th day of November, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNIS JACOBS,
    8            PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   AGO GJONAJ, ZANA AGRAJA-GJONAJ,
    14            Petitioners,
    15
    16                     v.                                            15-2359
    17                                                                   NAC
    18   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONERS:                    James A. Lombardi, New York, N.Y.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    26                                       Assistant Attorney General; Holly M.
    27                                       Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel;
    28                                       Juria L. Jones, Trial Attorney,
    29                                       Office of Immigration Litigation,
    30                                       United States Department of Justice,
    31                                       Washington, D.C.
    32
    1           UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
    2    of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
    3    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
    4           Petitioners Ago Gjonaj and Zana Agraja-Gjonaj, natives and
    5    citizens of Albania, seek review of a June 30, 2015, decision
    6    of the BIA, affirming a February 20, 2014, decision of an
    7    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Gjonaj’s application for
    8    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    9    Against Torture (“CAT”).1 In re Ago Gjonaj, et al., No. A099
    10   000 574/575 (B.I.A. June 30, 2015), aff’g No. A099 000 574/575
    11   (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 20, 2014).                          We assume the parties’
    12   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
    13   in this case.
    14          Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the
    15   IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t
    16   of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).2 The applicable
    17   standards         of     review        are     well       established.              8 U.S.C.
    18   § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66
    19   (2d Cir. 2008).
    1
    The IJ also denied Zana Agraja-Gjonaj’s separate application for asylum and related relief. She
    did not appeal that decision to the BIA and does not challenge it in this Court. Agraja-Gjonaj,
    Gjonaj’s wife, was however included as a derivative beneficiary in Gjonaj’s application.
    2
    Gjonaj’s challenges to the IJ’s finding regarding his fraudulent passport are not before us
    because the BIA explicitly excluded that finding from its decision. See Xue Hong 
    Yang, 426 F.3d at 522
    .
    2
    1           The REAL ID Act credibility standard provides that the
    2    agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,”
    3    base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor,
    4    candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account,
    5    and inconsistencies in his statements and evidence “without
    6    regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of
    7    the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    8    
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64
    . “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
    9    determination unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable
    10   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
    11   Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    . Further, “[a] petitioner must do more
    12   than    offer   a   plausible    explanation        for   his     inconsistent
    13   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
    14   reasonable      fact-finder     would       be   compelled   to    credit   his
    15   testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005)
    16   (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Substantial
    17   evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gjonaj was
    18   not credible.
    19          The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies regarding
    20   Gjonaj’s medical record. See Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67
    .
    21   Gjonaj testified that he was attacked twice -- in October 2000
    22   outside a polling station and in September 2001 while detained
    3
    1    -- and that he had submitted medical records for each attack.
    2    Gjonaj, however, submitted only one medical certificate from
    3    2007 documenting treatment in October 2001—a date which matched
    4    neither of his alleged beatings. Gjonaj gave a series of
    5    inconsistent explanations: the first attack actually occurred
    6    in October 2001, not October 2000; the record pertained to the
    7    first attack in October 2000; the record referred to the second
    8    attack in September 2001. The agency was not required to credit
    9    these explanations, which were not compelling and created
    10   further inconsistencies that support the credibility
    11   determination. See 
    Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80
    ; Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d 12
      at 166-67.
    13       On appeal to the BIA, Gjonaj maintained that his testimony
    14   was consistent.   In his brief to this Court, however, Gjonaj
    15   argues that any inconsistency was the result of the confusing
    16   phrasing of questions on cross-examination.      We decline to
    17   consider this argument because it is unexhausted. See Lin Zhong
    18   v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 104
    , 123 (2d Cir. 2007).
    19       The credibility determination was also reasonably based on
    20   the absence of certain corroborating evidence. An applicant’s
    21   failure to corroborate testimony may bear on credibility, either
    22   because the absence of particular evidence is viewed as
    4
    1    suspicious, or because the absence of corroboration in general
    2    makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony already
    3    called into question. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    ,
    4    273 (2d Cir. 2007). Beyond the problems with Gjonaj’s medical
    5    documentation, the IJ noted that Gjonaj failed to provide any
    6    letters of support from his brother (who was allegedly detained
    7    with him for three nights and beaten) or either of his parents
    8    (who were both present when he and his brother were arrested,
    9    and who have allegedly been visited by police searching for
    10   Gjonaj).
    11       Given   the    foregoing    inconsistencies   and   lack    of
    12   corroboration, the totality of the circumstances supports the
    13   agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin,
    
    14 534 F.3d at 167
    .     That finding is dispositive of asylum,
    15   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims
    16   are based on the same factual predicate.   See Paul v. Gonzales,
    17   
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    18       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    19   DENIED.
    20                                  FOR THE COURT:
    21                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5