Wright v. Monroe Community Hospital , 493 F. App'x 233 ( 2012 )

11-3520-cv
Wright v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 29th day
of August, two thousand twelve.
Present:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________________________
JACQUELINE WRIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-3520-cv
MONROE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: STEVEN LAPRADE (Christina A. Agola, on the brief),
Christina A. Agola, PLLC, Rochester, N.Y.
For Defendant-Appellee: PAUL D. FULLER, Monroe County Law Department,
Rochester, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
(Telesca, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jacqueline Wright (“Wright” or the “plaintiff”) appeals from a final
judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
(Telesca, J.) on July 29, 2011 in favor of Defendant-Appellee Monroe Community Hospital (the
“hospital” or the “defendant”), following a July 28, 2011 Decision and Order granting the
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the
dismissal of her claims based on (1) racial discrimination, (2) retaliation, and (3) pregnancy
discrimination. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this
case.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed -- but early
enough not to delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). “The standard for addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the
same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cleveland v.
Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we review de novo a district
court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “accepting all factual claims in the
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Famous Horse
Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). In order to state a claim, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.2
We first consider whether the district court erred in dismissing Wright’s causes of action
for discrimination based on race. The complaint’s first, third, and fourth causes of action all
allege race-based claims of hostile work environment, which we analyze using Title VII
standards. See Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Most of the
core substantive standards that apply to claims of discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII
are also applicable to claims of discrimination in violation of § 1981 or the Equal Protection
Clause . . . .”); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We consider
[plaintiff’s] state law claims in tandem with her Title VII claims because New York courts rely
on federal law when determining claims under the New York [State] Human Rights Law.”).
“A hostile work environment claim requires a showing [1] that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment, and [2] that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable
conduct to the employer.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]n limited circumstances” the plaintiff can satisfy the first prong by
pointing to “a single, acute incident of abuse,” but that “incident [must] constitute an intolerable
alteration of the plaintiff’s working conditions, so as to substantially interfere with or impair his
ability to do his job.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The second prong is satisfied if a plaintiff can show that
the employer “failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or if it knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take
appropriate remedial action.” Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The plaintiff principally bases her hostile work environment claims on the following
three allegations: (1) she was reassigned to care for a patient who was known to make
“intolerable racist comments” and “target the minorities within the staff and make complaints
and accusations against them,” J.A. 8, ¶ 16-17; (2) that patient “repeatedly denigrated Plaintiff
and made racial comments such as calling Plaintiff ‘nigger,’” id., ¶ 21; and (3) when Wright
complained about that patient’s behavior, the defendant “refused to acknowledge her complaints
or simply stated that the patient had dementia and told Plaintiff ‘sometimes you just have to deal
with it,’” id. at 8-9, ¶ 23. As an initial matter, Wright does not plausibly allege that the
hospital’s decision to assign Wright to the relevant patient was motivated by racial animus. The
complaint alleges that Wright was given responsibility for the relevant patient after she made a
second report of another patient’s alleged drug use and was confronted by the other patient’s
assigned nurse, who “aggressively swore at Plaintiff” and told the plaintiff she “should just leave
[the other patient] alone.” Id. at 7, ¶ 13. Thus, the plaintiff’s own complaint suggests that it was
this incident, rather than racial animus, that motivated the decision to reassign Wright to another
patient. As to the allegation that the hospital did not take sufficient action in response to her
assigned patient’s racist comments, while the patient’s alleged behavior is certainly
objectionable, we cannot conclude that the facts as alleged provide “a specific basis . . . for
imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer,” Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373, because the
hospital cannot be held responsible for the outbursts of a patient suffering from dementia.
We next consider whether the district court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s
retaliation claims. The plaintiff’s fifth and eighth causes of action allege retaliation under Title
VII and her sixth and ninth causes of action allege retaliation under the New York State Human
Rights Law. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish that
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“(1) she was engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of
[the] plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse action
against [the] plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiff’s protected
activity and the adverse action taken by the employer.” Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d
116, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The term ‘protected activity’ refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily
prohibited discrimination.” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); see
also Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (“Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee (or job
applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’” (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a))). Wright contends that she sufficiently alleged that she was engaged in
protected activity because the complaint alleged that she “complained about [her patient’s]
behavior, yet defendant refused to acknowledge her complaints or simply stated that the patient
had dementia and told Plaintiff ‘sometimes you just have to deal with it.’” J.A. 8-9, ¶ 23. These
allegations are inadequate for the same basic reason as Wright’s racial discrimination
allegations: the patient about whose racist comments she complained was demented. The mere
allegation that hospital staff were aware of and unable to control the racist statements of a
demented patient is insufficient to demonstrate that those statements were attributable to the
hospital. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately allege that in complaining about
the patient she had a reasonable, good faith belief that she was complaining about an
employment practice of the hospital’s. See Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461
F.3d 199, 210 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the “protected activity” element of a Title VII claim
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requires a plaintiff to have a “good faith, reasonable belief that [s]he was opposing an
employment practice made unlawful by Title VII” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the
district court did not err in concluding that the complaint does not adequately allege that Wright
was engaged in protected activity.
The final issue on appeal is whether the district court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s
seventh cause of action brought pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Title VII was
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to clarify that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on
the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k). To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate the following: (1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was qualified for
the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Leibowitz v.
Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir. 2009).
An adverse employment action is a “materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of employment” that “is more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of
job responsibilities.” Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In arguing that the complaint sufficiently pleads adverse employment
action, the plaintiff principally points to three allegations. First, the complaint alleges that when
Wright told her co-worker that she could not assist with a room change, the co-worker screamed
“if you can’t do anything why don’t you have your doctor take you out” and “I’m just sick of
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your attitude, just because your[sic] pregnant doesn’t mean your[sic] handicap[ped].” J.A. 10, ¶
32. Second, the complaint alleges that even though Wright’s supervisor, Nurse Manager
Hughes, observed Wright’s co-worker screaming at her, Hughes failed to intervene, failed to
take any kind of disciplinary action against the co-worker, and told Wright that she would have
to get a doctor’s note if she was unable to move beds. Third, on the same day of this incident,
the hospital held an emergency meeting with Wright, informing her that pregnancy was a
condition, not a disability, and that if she had limitations she would need to bring in a doctor’s
note. While all of these allegations suggest that Wright was subjected to unpleasant comments,
we cannot conclude that any of these incidents constitutes an adverse employment action.
Indeed, the complaint nowhere alleges that Wright was disciplined in any way or transferred to
another position for failing to move the bed. While the plaintiff argues that the hospital
“continued to harass Wright, increase her workload, and scrutinize her work to the point that she
was taken out on medical leave,” Appellant Br. 25, this conclusory allegation is insufficiently
specific to plausibly plead an adverse retaliatory action. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in dismissing Wright’s sex discrimination claim.
We have considered Wright’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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