Hepler v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. , 607 F. App'x 91 ( 2015 )

14-4113-cv
Hepler v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 22nd day of June, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 VERONIQUE HEPLER, individually and on
13 behalf of all others similarly
14 situated, DOMINIQUE MARCEAU, HILLARY
15 GIBBS, SHURIKA ROBERTS-CRAWFORD, REED
16 HOFFMAN, CYNTHIA CHAN, CAITLYN
17 ANGELIDIS, PATRICK O’CONNELL, HOLLY
18 ADRIAANSEN, KATHERINE BLAU, JENNY
19 SAM,
20 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
21
22 -v.- 14-4113-cv
23
24 ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO., ABERCROMBIE &
25 FITCH STORES, INC.,
1
1 Defendants-Appellees.*
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
3
4 FOR APPELLANTS: SETH R. LESSER (Fran L. Rudich,
5 Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, Rye
6 Brook, New York, Bradley L.
7 Berger, Berger Attorney P.C.,
8 New York, New York, on the
9 brief), Klafter Olsen & Lesser
10 LLP, Rye Brook, New York.
11
12 FOR APPELLEES: DAREN S. GARCIA (Mark A. Kneuve,
13 Michael J. Ball & Natalie M.
14 McLaughlin, on the brief),
15 Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease
16 LLP, Columbus, Ohio.
17
18 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
19 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.).
20
21 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
22 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
23 VACATED and that this matter be REMANDED.
24
25 Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the United
26 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
27 (Wexler, J.), dismissing as moot their claims against
28 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. and Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
29 (collectively, “Abercrombie”). We assume the parties’
30 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
31 history, and the issues presented for review.
32
33 On appeal from a judgment of dismissal for lack of
34 subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual findings for
35 clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Makarova v.
36 United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
37
38 1. The following analysis applies to offers of
1
39 judgment:
*
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to
amend the official caption in this case to conform with the
caption above.
1
The offer need not comply with the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Doyle v. Midland Credit
2
1 (a) If the offer tenders less than complete relief, the
2 plaintiff is free to accept or not. If such an offer is
3 accepted, the court must enter judgment accordingly and
4 terminate the case; if such an offer is not accepted, the
5 case proceeds as usual. Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank,
6 --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 2251472 (2d Cir. 2015). Under certain
7 circumstances, an unaccepted offer may shift costs to the
8 offeree. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
9
10 (b) If the offer tenders complete relief, the court
11 should (absent additional procedural complications) enter
12 judgment pursuant to the terms of that offer, with or
13 without the plaintiff’s consent. McCauley v. Trans Union,
14 L.L.C., 402 F.3d 340, 341 (2d Cir. 2005); Cabala v. Crowley,
15 736 F.3d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); accord
16 Tanasi, slip op. at 12. A defendant offering judgment for
17 complete relief is, in essence, submitting to the entry of
18 default judgment. Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 32
19 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.). Just as a defendant may end
20 the litigation by allowing default judgment, a defendant may
21 always end the litigation by offering judgment for all the
22 relief that is sought. Id.; McCauley, 402 F.3d at 342.
23
24 We have described an offer of judgment for complete
25 relief as “mooting” the case. However, the offer by itself
26 does not moot anything, Tanasi, slip op. at 11-12, since an
27 offer cannot bind the defendant to provide relief, McCauley,
28 402 F.3d at 342. It is the entry of judgment pursuant to
29 that offer that “moots” the case. Tanasi, slip op. at 11-
30 12; McCauley, 402 F.3d at 342. Mootness, in the
31 constitutional sense, would require dismissal for lack of
32 subject matter jurisdiction. An unaccepted offer of
33 judgment, however, does not impair subject matter
34 jurisdiction: the court retains jurisdiction to either enter
35 judgment in favor of the plaintiff (if the offer tenders
36 complete relief) or allow the case to proceed (if the offer
37 does not).
38
39 2. In light of the foregoing, the district court
40 erred by dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
41 jurisdiction based on Abercrombie’s unaccepted offers of
Mgmt., Inc., 722 F.3d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
It must, however, be an offer of judgment, not simply an
offer of settlement. Cabala v. Crowley, 736 F.3d 226, 228-
29 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
3
1 judgment to Hepler and Marceau. Accordingly, we vacate and
2 remand for further proceedings consistent with this summary
3 order.
4
5 Abercrombie’s offers of judgment have, by now, lapsed.
6 Should Abercrombie renew those offers on remand, the court
7 should consider the following:
8
9 (a) We have previously addressed the appropriate course
10 of action when a court rules that certain relief is
11 unavailable, and the defendant subsequently makes an offer
12 of judgment for the remaining relief. ABN Amro
13 Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Americas, Inc., 485 F.3d
14 85, 92-93, 95 (2d Cir. 2007); Abrams, 719 F.2d at 32.
15
16 (b) As to the state law claims, the complaint alleges
17 not only supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but
18 also original federal jurisdiction under the Class Action
19 Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
20
21 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
22 Abercrombie’s other arguments, we hereby VACATE the judgment
23 of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings
24 consistent with this summary order.
25
26 FOR THE COURT:
27 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
28
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