Michael v. General Motors LLC ( 2019 )

18‐3658
Michael v. General Motors LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DENNY CHIN,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
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MARCOS MICHAEL,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 18‐3658‐cv
GENERAL MOTORS LLC,
Defendant‐Appellee.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: MARCOS MICHAEL, pro
se, Bronx, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: STEVEN R. KRAMER,
Eckert, Seamans, Cherin &
Mellott, LLC, White
Plains, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (McMahon, C.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Marcos Michael, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
courtʹs judgment, entered November 14, 2018, dismissing his claims against defendant‐
appellee General Motors LLC (ʺGMʺ). By decision and order entered November 13,
2018, the district court granted GMʹs motion for summary judgment. Michael sued
GM after he was injured in a car crash, alleging that the carʹs airbag failed to deploy and
the seatbelt failed to restrain him. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, ʺresolv[ing] all
ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.ʺ Garcia v. Hartford
Police Depʹt, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). ʺSummary judgment is
proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‐
movant, ʹthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law.ʹʺ Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
I. Timeliness of Summary Judgment Motion
We first address Michaelʹs argument that GMʹs summary judgment
motion was untimely, and therefore should not have been considered by the district
court. Contrary to Michaelʹs characterization, the original motion was timely filed.
Further, as the district court explained, the ʺamended motion,ʺ which was filed one day
late, did not make any substantive changes and only highlighted the importance of the
Notice to Pro Se Litigants, which was timely filed the previous day. In deciding the
summary judgment motion, the district court relied on GMʹs timely‐filed Statement of
Material Facts and evidence (which were not changed by the amended motion).
Thus, even if the district court considered only the first, timely‐filed motion, the
outcome would have been the same.
II. Constitutionality of the Summary Judgment Motion
Michaelʹs argument that summary judgment violated his Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial is unavailing. Summary judgment does not violate the
Seventh Amendment where, as here, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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III. Airbag Claims
Although the district court held that Michaelʹs airbag claims failed
because, inter alia, Michael did not proffer any expert testimony showing that the
collision should have triggered airbag deployment, we affirm on a different ground:
Michael failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that any
alleged defect caused his injuries. See Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993)
(ʺ[This Court] may affirm . . . on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to
permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which the district court did not
rely.ʺ).1 In New York, a plaintiff must show that his injuries resulted from the alleged
defect. See Doomes v. Best Transit Corp., 17 N.Y.3d 594, 608 (2011); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 109 (1983). Specifically, where a plaintiff claims that the
1 We note that the district court did not consider whether Michaelʹs airbag claim could
survive summary judgment under a strict liability design defect theory. Liberally construed,
his complaint asserted both manufacturing and design defect theories. In New York, to
establish a design defect, a plaintiff must ʺpresent evidence that the product, as designed, was
not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to
design the product in a safer manner.ʺ Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 108
(1983). Here, the severity of Michaelʹs injuries arguably shows that the non‐deployment of the
airbag created an unsafe condition. And an alternative design ‐‐ airbags that deploy in a
scenario like the crash at issue ‐‐ is, at least arguably, obvious to a layperson. But see Fitzpatrick
v. Currie, 861 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (3d Depʹt 2008) (holding that, although ʺthe opinion of an expert
may not always be necessary in establishing a products liability case,ʺ a claim that an airbag
deployed with excessive force and/or improperly split open required expert evidence). Even if
Michael presented sufficient evidence showing a design defect in the airbag, however, he failed
to show that the defect (the airbagʹs non‐deployment) caused his injuries.
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alleged defects did not cause the car crash itself, he must show how the alleged defect
aggravated his injuries (i.e., he must show the difference between the injuries that
would have occurred without the defect and the injuries that did occur). Garcia v.
Rivera, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379‐80 (1st Depʹt 1990); see also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
647 F.2d 241, 249‐51 (2d Cir. 1981). This causation requirement applies whether the
claims rely on a theory of negligence or strict liability. See Garcia, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 379‐
80 (holding that summary judgment should have been granted as to negligence and
strict liability claims where plaintiff failed to show that his injuries were enhanced by an
allegedly defective truck bumper).
GMʹs evidence showed that even if the airbag had deployed, it would not
have prevented Michaelʹs head from moving laterally through the driverʹs side window
and hitting the concrete barrier. Michael did not proffer any evidence countering this
testimony, nor did he otherwise present evidence that his injuries were aggravated by
the non‐deployment of the airbag; in other words, he failed to present evidence that
even if the airbag had deployed, his head would not have hit the concrete barrier and
he would not have suffered the same injuries. Although Michael may be correct that
he was not necessarily required to have expert evidence to support his claim, see
Fitzpatrick v. Currie, 861 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (3d Depʹt 2008); Jackson v. Melvey, 392
N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (2d Depʹt 1977), he did not offer any evidence to show the requisite
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causation.2 Thus, even if the airbag suffered from a defect (manufacturing or design),
Michaelʹs claim fails as a matter of law.
IV. Seatbelt Claims
Summary judgment was proper as to Michaelʹs seatbelt claims for the
same reason: Michael failed to show that his injuries were aggravated by any alleged
seatbelt defect. See Leon, 988 F.2d at 308 (affirming on any basis in the record). As to
the alleged manufacturing defect, GM proffered evidence that a properly worn,
properly functioning seatbelt would not have prevented Michaelʹs head from moving
laterally outside the driverʹs side window and hitting the barrier. Michael, on the other
hand, failed to proffer any evidence countering GMʹs evidence or otherwise showing
that, if the seatbelt was properly functioning, his head would not have moved laterally
outside the window and hit the concrete barrier. Instead, he argues only that he was
wearing his seatbelt properly ‐‐ a fact that GMʹs experts and the district court assumed
in their conclusions. Thus, even if the seatbelt malfunctioned, Michaelʹs manufacturing
defect claim fails as a matter of law.
As to the alleged design defect, Michael failed to show that such a defect
enhanced his injuries because he failed to propose any reasonable design that would
2 But see Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 250 (ʺ[Evidence of enhanced injuries] will generally, perhaps
even necessarily, be in the form of expert testimony.ʺ).
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have prevented or mitigated those injuries. A plaintiff must proffer some admissible
evidence showing that an alternative reasonable design is technologically and
commercially feasible. See Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 109 (discussing factors courts consider
when determining whether an alternative design is feasible). Here, Michael did not
propose any alternative seatbelt design that would have prevented him from moving
laterally out the window, and none is obvious.
We have considered all of Michaelʹs remaining arguments and find them
to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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