Shunfu Jin v. Holder ( 2014 )


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  •     12-4554
    Jin v. Holder
    BIA
    A089 918 900
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 13th day of February, two thousand fourteen.
    PRESENT:
    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    PETER W. HALL,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    SHUNFU JIN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     12-4554
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Guang Jun Gao, Flushing, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
    General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant
    Director; Christina Bechak
    Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office
    of Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
    review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    Shunfu Jin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review
    of an October 25, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the
    August 3, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert
    Weisel, denying Jin’s application for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”). In re Shunfu Jin, No. A089 918 900 (B.I.A. Oct.
    25, 2012), aff’g No. A089 918 900 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug.
    3, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
    v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
    applicable standards of review are well-established. See
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513-14 (2d Cir. 2009).
    We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
    determination that Jin’s asylum application is untimely, see
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or the agency’s finding that
    untimeliness has not been excused by changed or
    extraordinary circumstances, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
    Notwithstanding these provisions, however, we retain
    jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions
    of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Jin does not dispute
    the agency’s determination that she failed to file her
    asylum application within one year of her arrival in the
    United States but challenges the BIA’s determination that
    there was insufficient factual support for an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim based on Jin’s meeting with
    unidentified attorneys. Jin’s challenge to the BIA’s
    determination, therefore, is not a colorable constitutional
    claim as it merely disputes the BIA’s factual findings.
    Furthermore, although Jin’s brief identifies the
    requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim, as described in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. 637
    (BIA 1988), there is no assertion or evidence suggesting
    that Jin complied with these requirements.
    2
    Jin has also failed to show any error in the agency’s
    determination that she did not prove past persecution or a
    probability of future harm as required for withholding of
    removal or CAT relief.
    The record establishes that Jin assisted a North Korean
    refugee, was detained for 15 days, and fined 4,000 RMB. At
    no time was Jin physically harmed or threatened by
    authorities. These allegations are insufficient to
    establish past persecution. See Jian Qui Liu v. Holder, 
    632 F.3d 820
    , 822 (2d Cir. 2011)(per curiam) (holding that
    petitioner failed to establish persecution where “he
    suffered only minor bruising from an altercation with family
    planning officials, which required no formal medical
    attention and had no lasting physical effect”); Ivanishvili
    v. U.S. DOJ, 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (defining
    persecution).
    As to future persecution, Jin argues on appeal that she
    may be persecuted in China due to imputed political opinion.
    Jin’s testimony, however, undercuts this argument; she
    stated that she joined an association to help North Korean
    refugees, yet no Chinese officials contacted her. Thus,
    there is no indication that Chinese officials knew of Jin’s
    connection to the association or that she was persecuted by
    officials because of an imputed political belief. Hongsheng
    Leng v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 143 (2d Cir. 2008)(per
    curiam) (“[T]o establish a well-founded fear of persecution
    in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien
    must make some showing that authorities in his country of
    nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to
    become aware of his activities.”). Furthermore, after Jin
    left China, her family was contacted only once by police in
    2004. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 128-29
    (2d Cir. 2005)(per curiam) (concluding that “absen[t] solid
    support in the record” a fear of persecution is “speculative
    at best”). As Jin has not shown a “clear probability” of
    persecution or torture, the agency properly denied her
    request for withholding of removal and CAT relief.
    Hongsheng 
    Leng, 528 F.3d at 143
    ; Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
    of Justice, 
    432 F.3d 156
    , 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
    particularized evidence showing the likelihood of torture is
    necessary to establish eligibility for CAT protection).
    3
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DISMISSED, in part, and DENIED, in part. As we have
    completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of
    removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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