United States v. Stapleton ( 2015 )


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  • 14-956-cr
    United States v. Stapleton
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after
    January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s
    Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite
    either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party
    citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
    Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day
    of April, two thousand fifteen.
    PRESENT:
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
    Circuit Judges.
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v.-                                                                  No. 14-956 (L)
    NO. 14-1710 (CON)
    CEASAR STAPLETON, JEFFERSON HERNANDEZ,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    RAFAEL ANTONIO ALVAREZ, LEONARDO
    CALDERON-CASTRO, JUAN FRANCISCO
    MONEG PERALTA, MAGDIEL ELIAS VALENCIA,
    RICHARD VIQUEZ VARGAS, KRISTOPHER WILKINS,
    Defendants.
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    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    STAPELTON:                                                                  RANDOLPH Z. VOLKELL, Merrick, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    HERNANDEZ:                                                                  Michael O. Hueston, New York, NY.
    1
    FOR APPELLEE:                                              DOUGLAS M. PRAVDA (Susan Corkery, Tiana A.
    Demas, on the brief), Assistant United States
    Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States
    Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
    Brooklyn, NY.
    Appeals from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
    of New York (Frederic L. Block, Judge).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the judgments of the District Court are AFFIRMED.
    Defendant Ceasar Stapleton appeals a judgment of the District Court convicting him, after his
    guilty plea, of conspiring to launder money, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (h). The District Court
    sentenced Stapleton principally to 27 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised
    release. On appeal, Stapleton contends that the District Court’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
    unreasonable.
    Defendant Jefferson Hernandez appeals a judgment of the District Court convicting him, after a
    guilty plea, of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (h), and sentencing
    him principally to 28 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. Counsel for
    defendant Hernandez moves to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    and the Government moves to dismiss Hernandez’s appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Stapleton’s Procedural Unreasonableness Claim
    We review a sentence for procedural unreasonableness by focusing on whether the sentencing court
    followed all the necessary steps in deciding upon a sentence. United States v. Park, 
    758 F.3d 193
    , 197 (2d Cir.
    2014). A sentencing decision is procedurally unreasonable when a district court “makes a mistake in its
    Guidelines calculation, does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous
    finding of fact.” United States v. Hsu, 
    669 F.3d 112
    , 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
    omitted).
    2
    Defendant Stapleton argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District Court
    failed to give advance notice of its intention to impose an upward departure from the advisory sentencing
    range pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Contrary to Stapleton’s
    claim, however, the sentence imposed was not an upward departure but a variance.1 Variances, unlike
    departures, do not require district courts to provide advance notice, even for those that increase a sentence
    above the Guidelines range. Irizarry v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 708
    , 714-715 (2008). Accordingly, Stapleton’s
    sentence was procedurally reasonable.
    II. Stapleton’s Substantive Unreasonableness Claim
    We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United
    States v. Rigas, 
    583 F.3d 108
    , 114-15 (2d Cir. 2009). An appellate court will “set aside a district court’s
    substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located
    within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 
    550 F.3d 180
    , 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en
    banc) (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). The length of a sentence is outside the
    range of permissible decisions when “affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the
    sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.”
    Park, 758 F.3d at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Stapleton contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the District Court
    predicated its variance on the discovery of drug paraphernalia in his home at the time of his arrest and
    failed to place enough weight on the other sentencing factors listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). But district
    courts are given significant discretion in weighing the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors and nothing precludes a
    sentencing judge from resting a decision on the presence of one particular factor. Indeed, “we have never
    held that a district court’s particular reliance on one factor to justify departing from the Guidelines is
    suggestive of unreasonableness; we have only said that ‘unjustified reliance upon any one factor’ suggests
    unreasonableness.” United States v. Pope, 
    554 F.3d 240
    , 246 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
    emphasis omitted).
    1 The District Court never described the sentence imposed as an upward departure. To the contrary, the District Court,
    at the sentencing hearing, stated that “considering all of the 3553(a) factors . . . a sentence a little bit above the advisory
    guideline range in this particular case is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the end of sentencing as articulated in
    our statutory guidelines scheme.” App’x 106-07. Similarly, the written Statement of Reasons attached to the judgment makes
    clear that the sentence was “imposed . . . pursuant to the factors in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) and . . . is outside and above the
    advisory sentencing guideline range because the defendant was found in possession of drug paraphernalia in his apartment
    which was not taken into account when calculating the advisory guideline range.”
    3
    Here, the District Court was not unjustified in relying on one factor to increase Stapleton’s sentence. In
    light of Stapleton’s prior drug-related conviction and his money laundering activities while still on
    probation for that conviction, the District Court felt it appropriate that Stapleton’s sentence reflect the
    significant amount of drug paraphernalia found at the time of his arrest. App’x 106. It cannot be said that
    the District Court abused its discretion by taking this information into consideration while sentencing
    Stapleton.
    III. Anders Motion by Hernandez’s Counsel
    Michael O. Hueston, counsel for defendant Hernandez, moves for permission to withdraw as
    counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). The Government moves to dismiss the
    appeal based on Hernandez’s waiver of his appellate rights.
    We agree with Hernandez’s counsel and the Government that there were no meritorious issues to
    be raised on appeal because (1) Hernandez’s guilty plea was valid; (2) he knowingly and voluntarily waived
    his right to appeal; and (3) his sentence was reasonable. However, because Hernandez’s term of supervised
    release and the special assessment are beyond the scope of the appeal waiver, he is not barred from
    challenging them on appeal. Nevertheless, Hernandez can make no meritorious objection to those aspects
    of his sentence. Hernandez’s term of supervised release is consistent with the relevant statute, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (b)(2), and the $100 special assessment was mandatory under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3013
    (a)(2)(A).
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, we (1) AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court with regard to defendant
    Stapleton; (2) GRANT the Anders motion with regard to counsel for defendant Hernandez; (3) GRANT
    the Government’s motion to dismiss with respect to the appeal of defendant Hernandez’s conviction and
    term of imprisonment; and (4) construe the Government’s motion to dismiss as also requesting a summary
    affirmance, and GRANT the so-construed motion with respect to defendant Hernandez’s appeal of his
    term of supervised release and special assessment.
    FOR THE COURT,
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-956-cr

Judges: Cabranes, Lynch, Droney

Filed Date: 4/29/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024