Wang v. Lynch ( 2015 )

13-4783
Wang v. Lynch
BIA
A097 663 623
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 1st day of December, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 REENA RAGGI,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 YA LING L. WANG, AKA YALING WANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 13-4783
17 NAC
18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,1
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Yee Ling Poon, Robert Duk-Hwan Kim,
24 New York, NY.
25
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is
automatically substituted for former Attorney General
Eric H. Holder, Jr.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
2 General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant
3 Director; Sunah Lee, Trial Attorney,
4 Office of Immigration Litigation,
5 United States Department of Justice,
6 Washington, D.C.
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
11 is DENIED.
12 Petitioner Ya Ling L. Wang, a native and citizen of
13 China, seeks review of a November 25, 2013, decision of the
14 BIA denying her motion to reopen proceedings. In re Ya Ling
15 L. Wang, No. A097 663 623 (B.I.A. Nov. 25, 2013). We assume
16 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
17 procedural history in this case.
18 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
19 abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s
20 admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” See Ali v.
21 Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v.
22 Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1992)). When the BIA
23 considers relevant evidence of country conditions in
24 evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual
25 findings under the substantial evidence standard. Jian Hui
26 Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
2
1 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s
2 motion for failure to establish her prima facie eligibility
3 for relief. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988); Jian
4 Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168. Although record evidence
5 indicated China’s detention of some house church leaders and
6 harassment of church members, the BIA reasonably found that
7 the focus remains on house church leaders absent isolated
8 occurrences. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 172; Jian Xing
9 Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005).
10 Moreover, despite the occasional harassment of house church
11 members discussed in the country conditions evidence,
12 harassment does not rise to the level of harm required for
13 an asylum claim. Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433
14 F.3d 322, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the evidence
15 does not show a reasonable possibility that Wang will be
16 persecuted as a house church member.
17 To the extent Wang argues that her mother’s letter
18 shows a reasonable possibility that Wang will be persecuted,
19 the BIA reasonably found that the letter was entitled to
20 diminished weight because it was uncorroborated, written by
21 an interested witness, and its reliability was particularly
22 limited in light of Wang’s prior adverse credibility
3
1 determination. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471
2 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Qin Wen Zheng v.
3 Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007). Even if
4 given probative weight, the letter does not show that
5 Chinese authorities are likely to discover Wang and
6 persecute her for practicing Christianity because it only
7 discusses the targeting of Wang’s parents. See Hongsheng
8 Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
9 Wang’s argument that the BIA applied an overly
10 stringent standard when considering whether she showed her
11 prima facie eligibility for asylum –- stating that there was
12 no indication that she would “likely suffer” persecution,
13 rather than finding that she did not show a “realistic
14 chance” of eligibility –- is also unpersuasive. Despite its
15 isolated use of unclear language, a review of the BIA’s
16 decision as a whole makes evident that the BIA simply
17 faulted Wang for failing to show that she would even
18 potentially be subject to persecution in China.
19 Consequently, because the BIA applied the correct standard,
20 there is no basis for remand.
21 Because the BIA’s conclusion, that Wang did not show
22 her prima facie eligibility for asylum, is dispositive of
4
1 her motion, we do not address her argument that the BIA
2 abused its discretion in finding that she did not show
3 materially changed country conditions. Abudu, 485 U.S. at
4 104-05; INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
6 DENIED. Having completed our review, any stay of removal
7 that the Court previously granted in this petition is
8 VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
9 this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for
10 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
11 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
12 Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1). Any other motions that may be
13 outstanding are DENIED as moot.
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
16
17
5