Zen-Huang Liu v. Holder , 496 F. App'x 152 ( 2012 )


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  •     11-3231-ag
    Liu v. Holder
    BIA
    A077 322 603
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 19th day of September, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    ZEN-HUANG LIU, AKA ZENGHUANG LIU,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                     11-3231-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Kevin Long, Monterey Park, CA.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Lyle D. Jentzer, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Charles S.
    Greene III, Trial Attorney, Office
    of Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Zen-Huang Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China, seeks review of a July 19, 2011 order of
    the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal
    proceedings.   In re Zen-Huang Liu, No. A077 322 603 (B.I.A.
    July 19, 2011).   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
    We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
    abuse of discretion.   See Ali v. Gonzales, 
    448 F.3d 515
    , 517
    (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
    by denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-
    barred, as it was his third motion to reopen and he filed it
    more than eight years after his final order of removal.     See
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
    Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be
    excused when the movant demonstrates changed country
    conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA
    reasonably concluded that Liu did not demonstrate changed
    conditions in this case.
    2
    As an initial matter, the record does not support Liu’s
    contention that the BIA did not consider all of his
    evidence.   See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that we will
    “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the
    evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly
    suggests otherwise”).
    The record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Liu’s
    general evidence of conditions in China—reports and articles
    describing the persecution of Christians including the
    Shouters, a group which the Chinese government considers a
    cult—did not establish a material change in China because
    State Department reports indicate that such persecution
    occurred at the time of Liu’s 2001 merits hearing.     See In
    re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) ("In
    determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen
    demonstrates a material change in country conditions that
    would justify reopening, we compare the evidence of country
    conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed
    at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Jian
    Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 169 (2d Cir. 2008)
    3
    (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed
    country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).
    Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
    declining to credit the affidavits from Liu and his father
    based on an immigration judge’s previous finding that Liu
    was not credible.1   See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 143
    , 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (the BIA did not abuse its
    discretion in declining to credit unauthenticated documents
    submitted with a motion to reopen where the alien had been
    found not credible in the underlying proceedings); see also
    Siewe v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]
    single false document or a single instance of false
    testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the
    balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated
    evidence.”).    Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Liu’s motion as untimely and number-
    barred.    See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.    Any pending request for oral argument in this
    1
    Liu cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ghadessi
    v. INS, 
    797 F.2d 804
    (9th Cir. 1986), to argue that the
    BIA should have presumed that his affidavit was reliable.
    However, that case does not govern in this Court.
    4
    petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5